Thread: Rumsfeld Questions

Originally Posted by TopHatsLiberal

Since I don't pay much attention to the man (honestly, he kinda freaks me out) I would like to have it explained in simplest terms:

What did he supposedly do? Other than being a politican, how did he make these people mad?

He jams the press at press conferences, which is very entertaining no matter what you think about the man. So, I don't think the press in general likes him. He was very outspoken in the beginning about returning control to the civilians at the Pentagon (which is where it is supposed to be). He has cancelled some major weapons procurement programs, which has found him quite a few opponents. He is tough on the commanders, making them justify their decisions.

In essence, he has ruffled quite a few feathers and thus created quite a stir. Add to that the fact that progress in Iraq has been very unsteady with some controversy (Abu Ghraib resulted in numerous calls for his resignation), and what you have is a figure that is polarizing, much like his boss.

So, I think what you have know is a gelling of all of the above to the point where some of the generals are speaking out and fanning the flames. What is interesting to me is that some of these generals are saying the exact opposite of what they did just a few short months ago while they were in uniform, and they really have offered much of an alternative. So, it makes me wonder what their motivations are, and the fact that the top military advisor to the President, General Myers, and the top two commanders that were responsible for OEF and OIF, General Franks and Lieutenant General DeLong, have all come out in support of Secretary Rumsfeld really makes me question the six generals that have come out.

London Times
April 18, 2006

Why America's Generals Are Out For Revenge

The US top brass are ducking their responsibilities - and beleaguered Donald Rumsfeld is just doing his job

By Dean Godson

Who will be the Admiral Byng of the Iraq conflict — the symbolic victim executed for the alleged failures of the war? That is what the current “revolt of the generals” against Donald Rumsfeld, the US Defence Secretary, is about. It is the ruthless Washingtonian version of “pass the parcel”.

Much of the military brass feels that it carried the can for the civilian leadership’s errors in Vietnam and is determined never to do so again. General Anthony Zinni — the former US commander in the Middle East and perhaps the most voluble of Mr Rumsfeld’s critics — was particularly taken with a study written by a youngish Army officer, H.R. McMaster, criticising the US Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Robert McNamara era for not speaking up more loudly against a war they knew could not be won.

The generals’ criticisms will certainly strike a chord among critics of the war in Iraq, who contend that neoconservative ideologues at the Pentagon rode roughshod over professional military advice. They particularly alight on the supposed insufficiency of troop numbers sent to Iraq for post-conflict operations and the failure to plan for the insurgency.

What of these charges? Mr Rumsfeld was right in believing that the war itself could be won with a much smaller force than was used in the first Gulf War of 1991, not least because the Iraqi army had halved in size. He was right effectively to send Tommy Franks away with a flea in his ear when the then US commander presented the original war plans, as General Franks has conceded. Pace George Galloway, there was no Stalingrad by the Tigris.

This was no McNamara-style micromanagement of targeting when Pentagon “whiz-kids” constantly encroached upon professional military prerogatives. Rather, Mr Rumsfeld’s big picture approach is exactly what civilian control of the military is supposed to be all about: in other words, asking what would be the price in blood and treasure of a particular plan? Dick Cheney, the Vice-President, did much the same as Defence Secretary in 1990 when he asked Norman Schwarzkopf to revise his plans for a costly frontal assault on the Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

What about the postwar period? General Jack Keane, the Army Vice-Chief of Staff during this critical period, told me that it was just as much the military’s responsibility to anticipate the insurgency, if not more so. “We had no plans for that”, he said. “It was our fault, not Donald Rumsfeld’s.”

The point was inadvertently underscored in Franks’s autobiography when he told Pentagon civilians that he would not involve himself in the detailed work on Phase 4 or “stability” operations — that is, after major combat was over. “I’ll do the day of and you’ll do the day after,” he snorted. He also refused to work alongside “Free Iraqis” ready to take up postwar security tasks. All of this cost the US dearly when the looting began in Baghdad. Yet Rumsfeld et al acquiesced.

The real issue in postwar Iraq was less that of numbers than of the mix of forces. The Americans did not need many more GIs who cannot speak Arabic patrolling the streets in heavy body armour; rather, they could have done it with the existing size of force, but with more military policemen, intelligence officers and civil affairs specialists.

Curiously, Mr Rumsfeld’s position does indeed resemble that of his predecessors in the Vietnam era — but the analogy is with the hopeful period of the early 1960s rather than the tragic finale. John F. Kennedy fought a tremendous bureaucratic battle with the US Army brass to reconfigure the forces for more British-style counter-insurgency operations in the Third World: the Green Berets were the best known expression of that aspiration.

But JFK’s more ambitious plans were seen off by the US Army Chief of Staff, George Decker — who was concerned about the diversion of resources from US conventional forces facing the Soviet divisions on the Central European plain. The incomplete nature of those reforms cost the American forces dearly later on.

Mr Rumsfeld, by contrast, has had far more success than Kennedy in shaking up the US Army. Until September 11 it was still too much of a garrison force, geared up for Cold War contingencies. Or, in the quip of one of Rumsfeld’s intimates, it was full of “Fulda Gap warriors”, rather than the kind of expeditionary forces required for the War on Terror.

The Defence Secretary has trod on toes in this process. He has insisted on interviewing every appointment to four and three-star rank — something that was more of a pro forma process under his predecessors. He appointed a retired Special Forces general, Peter Schoomaker, as US Army Chief of Staff, thus passing over stacks of serving officers. And with his greater emphasis on high-tech “jointery”, he has forced both the Army and the Marines to depend more on Air Force and Navy supporting fire.

The real criticism of Mr Rumsfeld is not that he “kicked to much butt”, but that he kicked too little. At George Bush’s behest, he sent the US armed forces into a war that they weren’t yet fully ready to fight: they are much more prepared now, but the insurgency genie is out of the bottle. He was part of the Republican consensus that was contemptuous of Clinton-era peacekeeping operations, believing that real soldiers don’t do social workerish stuff. Like so many reformers, his problem is that his changes discomfit existing interest groups before the benefits become fully visible.

Dean Godson is research director of Policy Exchange.

Rumnamara screwed the pooch real good with 1CAV sir(i do know you know that ). A LOT of people blame HIM PERSONALLY for the insurgency and all the deaths since, because of that fact.

I can see their logic, at least to a large degree...

What's the 1Cav story, if I may ask ?

Originally Posted by fkbello

What's the 1Cav story, if I may ask ?

1 CAV and 1 ID were in the pipeline to deploy as part of OIF I. However, their deployment was "turned off" because it was believed that they were not necessary.

1ID too huh?

I didn't even know that...

DumNamara strikes again.

http://austinbay.net/blog/?p=1050

4/19/2006
UPDATED: The Marine Sends (and the subject is GEN Zinni)
Filed under: General— site admin @ 6:11 am
I served in Iraq with the young man (a Marine reservist) who uses the nom-de-plume “The Marine” when he posts comments on this site. His tour in Iraq was his second deployment since 9/11. He epitomizes the “ready reservist.”

Here are his thoughts on the revolt of the generals, in particularly General Anthony Zinni , USMC retired. (this also appears as a comment on a recent post). This is Marine on Marine, and for my friend, a rather restrained statement. I am still waiting for a reporter to ask General Zinni what he means when he argues that “the sanctions were working.” Saddam had broken the UN Desert Storm sanctions regimen. Look at Oil For Food. We now have officials from Saddam’s regime admitting that Saddam intended to revive dormant special weapons programs once the sanctions were lifted. So how is it the sanctions were working? I suspect Zinni will make the argument that Saddam got rid of his WMD. That appears to be true. Forcing Saddam to stop his programs is (or was) an achievement. However, it was a narrow achievement, and a short-run achievement, which means “the sanctions were working” in a very technical sense regarding WMDs. In the strategic sense they were not. Saddam was still murdering ethnic and religious minorities (which UNSCR 687 also forbid, and was part of the sancitons regimen). Saddam had not given up the desire for WMD (the programs weren;t dead, but dormant). Saddam possessed missiles and delivery systems in violation of the sanctions regimen (so technically the sanctions weren’t working in the sphere of delivery systems). If Zinni argues that the sanctions had weakened Saddam’s military machine I’ll agree with that. But once again, that’s a “dormant, not dead” weakness. Anyway, here are The Marines thoughts :

I find it interesting that so few are critically examining why a handful of retired generals have decided to publicly call for Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s head on the proverbial silver platter. Are these retired military men immune from probing public scrutiny, unlike those civilian men, they formerly served but currently challenge?

Take General Zinni, who astonishingly now asserts he was “never convinced” about Iraq’s WMD programs. Yet General Zinni while still serving as the Commanding General of CENTCOM testified in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee in February of 2000 that “Iraq remains the most significant near-term threat to U.S. interests in the Arabian Gulf…primarily due to its large conventional military force, pursuit of WMD [emphasis mine], oppressive treatment of Iraqi citizens, refusal to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR)…” As if this was not enough Zinni’s testimony continued “despite claims that [Iraq’s] WMD efforts have ceased, Iraq probably is continuing clandestine nuclear research, retains stocks of chemical and biological munitions,…Even if Baghdad…surrendered all WMD capabilities, it retains the scientific, technical, and industrial infrastructure to agents and munitions within weeks or months.” That’s right folks General Zinni, who was now blithely states he was “never convinced” about the threat of Iraq’s WMD programs was in point of fact, not too long ago, sufficiently convinced to deliver a threat assessment to the U.S. Senate in which he concluded among other things that Iraq’s WMD programs and its ties to terrorism made it “the most significant near-term threat to U.S. interests.”

Perhaps Zinni’s most incredulous indictment of Rumsfeld comes in his stunning claim that the Iraq Invasion Plan was “fatally flawed” and based on “erroneous intelligence.” Well, sheer seriousness of these bald assertions certainly begs the question - Who was responsible for collecting reliable intelligence and properly planning U.S. military operations in support of established U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives and threat assessments within the CENTCOM AOR? Ups…Has the cat finally got the general’s well used tongue? Just to clarify the record, Bill Clinton changed the official U.S. Foreign Policy regarding Iraq in 1998, establishing the new objective of “Regime Change.” At the time General Zinni was the theater commander overseeing a JTF responsible for enforcing the “Northern & Southern No-Fly Zones” in Iraq. As such he was already commanding U.S. Forces engaged in routine low level hostilities over the skies of Iraq. Furthermore, Zinni’s testimony in front of the U.S. Senate indicates he was at least aware of Saddam’s UNSCR transgressions, WMD proclivities, terrorist connections, and belligerent history. Additionally, he assessed Iraq as the “most significant near-term threat the U.S. interests.” All of which suggests at the very least that General Zinni in support of the new “Regime Change” policy and in light of his own threat assessment should have vigorously planned and prepared a wide range of “full spectrum” military operations for Iraq. He should have redoubled the intelligence collection effort in Iraq. He should have war gamed every possible “Regime Change” and invasion scenario. He should have developed contingency plans and post hostilities plans. Yet, inconceivably the seemingly omniscient General Zinni did precisely the opposite and apparently did nothing to improve intelligence collection or operational planning. These facts beg another question - Was General Zinni too ignorant to fully appreciate the potential likelihood of CENTCOM fighting a war in Iraq in the near future OR was General Zinni too incompetent to make the necessary preparations?

Although it is hard for me to imagine why on earth anyone would oppose such a dynamic, aggressive, substantive and consequential leader, it is nevertheless unnecessary to enthusiastically support Secretary Rumsfeld to detect the rant odor of hypocrisy and ulterior motives underpinning the all too convenient recent statements of General Zinni. In case there is anyone left who hasn’t heard, General Zinni “knew all along” invading Iraq was a “bad idea” but at the time nobody wanted to listen. But what’s new? After all General Zinni enjoys nothing more than another PR opportunity to say again “I told you so.” In an uncanny way I actually agree with General Zinni, it is indeed too bad more people didn’t pay closer attention to what he said and what he did on the eve of 9/11. Just for the record General Zinni – I told you SO!!

UPDATE: A reader sends a link to the Center for Defense Information site. GEN Zinni is now a Dinstinguished Military Fellow at CDI.
Make of this what you will. CDI has a political track record– definitely on “the left” side of the spectrum. I was not aware of this. Has he mentioned this professional connection on his book tour? Zinni’s bio is that of a distinguished military man, that’s for sure. The Somalia operation –both before and after the battle of Mogadishu– was a complex a military-politica operation, and Zinni served in a variety of jobs, each one of them demanding and critical.

NOTE: A reminder about the milblog conference in Washington, this coming Saturday (April 22). It’s all volunteer, with all expenses paid by the participants. I still need to raise some expense money. If you want to contribute, please hit the PayPal tip jar (the donation button at the top of this page). Thanks. If you are attending, I look forward to meeting you.

Comments »

Here's a comment: I distrust Zinni even more than RumNamara.

There are plenty of credible critics out there, McCaffrey, Wallace, et al, but Zinni aint one of them IMO.

Originally Posted by shek

http://austinbay.net/blog/?p=1050
Although it is hard for me to imagine why on earth anyone would oppose such a dynamic, aggressive, substantive and consequential leader,

Leader is not what I would use to describe the SECDEF. Micromanager is the word I would use.

Originally Posted by shek

Although it is hard for me to imagine why on earth anyone would oppose such a dynamic, aggressive, substantive and consequential leader

I'm not sure if that's the bloggers comment or your own sir, but i feel an urge to puke when i read it.

"Dynamic, aggressive, substantial and consequential?"

WTF is that supposed to mean?

IMO RumNamara is Arrogant, abstract, and has been seduced by the techo-babblers at the Pentagon. About the only difference between him and Strange(McNamara's middle name- how appropriate) is Strange's overriding fascination with body counts and numbers.

I think Rumsfeld is a dumbasss myself, and if i could do it personally, i'd stick an M-33 grenade up the ass of "Transformation" and pull the pin.

I care about the troops AT LEAST as much as that marine, and damned if i don't come to the EXACT OPPOSITE conclusion about Rummy.

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

Leader is not what I would use to describe the SECDEF. Micromanager is the word I would use.

An abstract thinking techo-devotee micro-manager at that.

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

Leader is not what I would use to describe the SECDEF. Micromanager is the word I would use.

Sir,
If it's worth managing, then it's worth micromanaging

Originally Posted by M21Sniper

I'm not sure if that's the bloggers comment or your own sir, but i feel an urge to puke when i read it.

"Dynamic, aggressive, substantial and consequential?"

WTF is that supposed to mean?

IMO RumNamara is Arrogant, abstract, and has been seduced by the techo-babblers at the Pentagon. About the only difference between him and Strange(McNamara's middle name- how appropriate) is Strange's overriding fascination with body counts and numbers.

I think Rumsfeld is a dumbasss myself, and if i could do it personally, i'd stick an M-33 grenade up the ass of "Transformation" and pull the pin.

I care about the troops AT LEAST as much as that marine, and damned if i don't come to the EXACT OPPOSITE conclusion about Rummy.

Dammit Snipe - why do you always insist on attributing article information to me

Originally Posted by M21Sniper

Here's a comment: I distrust Zinni even more than RumNamara.

There are plenty of credible critics out there, McCaffrey, Wallace, et al, but Zinni aint one of them IMO.

Been watching too much Braveheart recently