To be honest I was not sure how serious you were, but since he and Engels did write a lot about the civil war while it was going on I took a look at it anyway, despite both of them were still not the communist we know today. (He stopped reporting about the Civil War to concrentrate on Das Kapital). In his articles he sees the war as one of Southern aggression (which was quite unual fpr the British Press at the time).
I looked again through the other thread:
http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/anc...rative-12.html
And yet I still can not see how the south was oppressed or taxed out. After reading the secessions statements i find it hard to see anything else then State Rights as the cause, and only this then if you considere slavery (mentioned frequently in every statement I've found) a state right. And even if you ignore the morality of slavery (or the lack thereof), how could it be a state right if the declaration of independence clearly states that 'We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.'
(If anyone has an answer for me, maybe it should be moved to the other thread since it would be more fitting to its topic)
Last edited by Shek; 28 Nov 09, at 19:11.
"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3
Industry in the North was already quite advanced by the 1850s, so even if the South did industrialize seriously, it would take time for it to catch up to the North. And, in the case that the Confederate South did retain its independence from the United States, the industrialisation thereof would've been of concern to the Union.
Slavery was on the decline in the North, mainly because large-scale farming was not as big part of the Union States' economic production as it was of that of the South. Not to mention that the temperate/continental climate and soil of the Northern States did not allow for large plantations like what existed in the subtropical South. Not only would've housing slaves been more expensive due to the adverse weather and the risk of Indian raids, but also the growing seasons were not as long as those in the South, nor was there enough rainfall to promote maximum harvest yields. (Until mass irrigation machines were invented, tapping the full potential of rich Midwestern soils was nearly impossible.)
Another - more probable - reason for the lack of slavery in the North was that having a big population of Blacks in what should be White man's land would've not been too popular. (Even though slavery was banned in the North, Blacks were still treated as second-class citizens.) For most Northerners having a few freed Blacks in their midst was better than having a burgeoning population of enslaved Blacks, as was the case in the South.
Of course, there was the Underground Railroad, but - as the name implies - it was a smuggling network to help fugitive slaves reach the North and other places where slavery was outlawed. The network was a clandestine one and being discovered by the public authorities often incurred the risk of the fugitive slave being returned to his owner in the South - at least according to a Wikipedia article on the Underground Railroad.
Canada was one popular destination, since slavery was outlawed there. (The British government outlawed slavery throughout the UK and its overseas territories in 1833.) Once on Canadian soil, there was no chance of fugitive slaves being returned to the South.Due to the risk of discovery, information about routes and safe havens was passed along by word of mouth. Southern newspapers of the day were often filled with pages of notices soliciting information about escaped slaves and offering sizable rewards for their capture and return. Federal marshals and professional bounty hunters known as slave catchers pursued fugitives as far as the Canadian border.[14]
Industralization would've been a direct threat to slavery, which is why the Southern States were slow to adopt industrial technology beyond the cotton gin. Also, the increase in the price of land and slaves meant that cotton and other large-scale agricultural production was in the hands of a few wealthy families in the South. Industrialization and the subsequent automation of cotton production would've threatened the monopoly held by these families and so it was discouraged.
Not to mention that automation would've rendered the enslavement of Blacks redundant and therefore a social revolution of sorts would've taken place in the Confederacy.
The Question of Inevitability II: The Civil War | Crossroads
Historians who try to explain Union victory and Confederate defeat during the Civil War approach that question by asking several questions (or at least implicitly offering their answers). The first question is whether Union victory and Confederate defeat were, in fact, inevitable. Was there any way for the Confederacy to win, or was it a lost cause from the beginning?
How one answers this question shapes how one approaches the study of the Civil War … or at least it should. However one answers that question determines the next questions one asks and which issues one explores. Say you think the outcome of the war was inevitable (which is different from determining when the outcome of the war became inevitable, because that assumes that at some point it was not inevitable). If you believe that, then the study of why certain battles turned out the way they did becomes less important, because the ultimate outcome was set, anyway. It doesn’t matter whether McClellan was slow or Longstreet lost Gettysburg or Thomas was undervalued, because, whatever one may find interesting about those queries on their merits, they don’t shape the ultimate victory, because you’ve already deemed it inevitable. Thus, there’s no need for turning points or contingency. One looks instead to underlying factors such as resources to explain why it was inevitable: the issue of popular will becomes irrelevant.
However, if you do not believe the outcome of the war was inevitable, then you have to deal with actors, decisions, and events. Oh, you can talk about resources, for example, but you’ve acknowledged that the outcome was not preordained, and in fact you have to think in terms of counterfactuals as well as contingency and turning points. If certain events led to Appomattox, then different outcomes would have led to different results, and then you have to identify what made the difference. For example, I happen to think it is harder to imagine Union victory without Grant. Take Grant out, and you have to presuppose that someone else would have come along with a mix of talents and skills approximating his. Take Grant out, I’ll add, and it becomes more difficult to consider the rise of Sherman, who found in Grant his North Star.
I don’t happen to think that Union victory was inevitable. Nor do I think that the events in the East in 1863 offered a so-called turning point. If 1863 was in any way a turning point, it was because the victories at Vicksburg and Chattanooga established Grant as the coming man, and that led to the two turning points of 1864, Grant’s rise to top command and the success of his grand strategy in September 1864. The Union may have had superior resources, but Grant was the first commander to use them in coordinated fashion and to make that superiority tell.
As to how the Confederacy might have won, I’ll save that for another time.
"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3
things really didn't become inevitable until approx august-september 1864.
The human mind cannot grasp the causes of phenomena in the aggregate. But the need to find these causes is inherent in man’s soul. And the human intellect, without investigating the multiplicity and complexity of the conditions of phenomena, any one of which taken separately may seem to be the cause, snatches at the first, the most intelligible approximation to a cause, and says: “This is the cause!"
-Leo Tolstoy
War and Peace
I would stretch that to October 19, 1864 when the Union Army of the Shenandoah destroyed the Confederate Army of the Valley...which was really the last forces Lee had available for operational maneuver.
The fall of Atlanta followed by the great news from the Valley just a 2 weeks before the elections sealed the deal. If Early was not destroyed and was the victor on 19 OCT then it could have been seen as another Union defeat and cost Lincoln the election.
Remember that it is the Actions and not the Commission that make the Officer and that there is More expected from him than the title. – GEORGE WASHINGTON
AR,
even a lincoln defeat wouldn't have saved the confederacy at this point. mcclellan would have continued persecuting the war, and either way, by the time lincoln was out of office in jan 1865 there wasn't much more of a war to persecute.
fall of atlanta pretty much sealed the confederacy's fate politically. before then, a very severe defeat of the union army might have been enough to either throw the democratic nomination to a copperhead or to change mcclellan's views towards a negotiated peace.
of course even if the war came to a negotiated peace by jan 1865 the confederacy would have been BADLY truncated. most likely tennessee, arkansas, and the indian territory would have remained in union hands. 50/50 chance texas goes independent. any round two, and the opening rounds of the war would probably be a US drive towards south carolina and georgia, cutting the CSA in half relatively easily.
The human mind cannot grasp the causes of phenomena in the aggregate. But the need to find these causes is inherent in man’s soul. And the human intellect, without investigating the multiplicity and complexity of the conditions of phenomena, any one of which taken separately may seem to be the cause, snatches at the first, the most intelligible approximation to a cause, and says: “This is the cause!"
-Leo Tolstoy
War and Peace
A minor quibble that actually reinforces your point about the ability for Lincoln to continue to prosecute the war - inaugurations occured in March back then. Lincoln's second inauguration was 4 Mar 65. While weather would have made it difficult to have accelarated Grant's tenth offensive in the Petersburg Campaign, this would be an interesting "what if" scenario excursion to determine if the fate of the ANV could have been sealed prior to McClellan's inauguration in the course of an accelarated timeline.
"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3
I think a McClellan victory could have also brought a Democratic majority to Congress. And the Democratic Party platform did call for a negotiated settlement of the war. Now I know McClellan was more a War Democrat then a Copperhead but I am thinking of what the impact of a Federal loss at Cedar Creek would have meant from a military standpoint.
1. Lee still has Early's army as a mobile striking force.
2. The Confederate leadership, both civil and military, could have decided to switch to a guerrilla war knowing that they only had to hold on before McClellan, forced by his own party, would have to at least allow more generous terms and may even have prevented a lot of the Reconstruction events from happening.
I have no disagreement on Atlanta being the critical tipping point from the ballot box. But Early's crushing defeat at Cedar Creek removed the last option for the Confederacy. There was nothing left in the Confederates drawer militarily...especially when coupled with Thomas' wallopping of Hood at Nashville.
To use a term Choggy would appreciate...on the night of 19 OCT 64 the Confederacy was out of air speed and altitude.
Remember that it is the Actions and not the Commission that make the Officer and that there is More expected from him than the title. – GEORGE WASHINGTON
AR,
the issue is that the clock runs down for lincoln at march 1865. it's just very hard for me to see a scenario where the confederacy credibly hangs on until then, even with a federal loss at cedar creek. atlanta was going to fall sometime in the autumn. with the confederacy almost defeated even the copperheads would have to know that continued support for negotiation at that point would almost certainly mean political defeat, if not lynchings at the hands of enraged northern mobs.I think a McClellan victory could have also brought a Democratic majority to Congress. And the Democratic Party platform did call for a negotiated settlement of the war. Now I know McClellan was more a War Democrat then a Copperhead but I am thinking of what the impact of a Federal loss at Cedar Creek would have meant from a military standpoint.
looking at it from the southern independence POV, the "best" case scenario is where the Confederacy is still toast, but the difference being a nasty, nasty insurgency. martial law would have been extended even longer.
given northern war-weariness there's a high possibility that the north would withdraw from some of the south, and hang on to the vital ports and communication hubs at all costs. depending on how nasty the insurgency was i wouldn't be surprised if the north started to surreptiously arm freedmen to act as a counterinsurgency force, which might have turned into a race war. otherwise the north just gets out of dodge and pretends everything is okay. either way it's not going to be pretty. lee did the US-- and the south, especially- more good than he could have possibly imagined by shooting down the idea of a guerilla war.
The human mind cannot grasp the causes of phenomena in the aggregate. But the need to find these causes is inherent in man’s soul. And the human intellect, without investigating the multiplicity and complexity of the conditions of phenomena, any one of which taken separately may seem to be the cause, snatches at the first, the most intelligible approximation to a cause, and says: “This is the cause!"
-Leo Tolstoy
War and Peace
As a reminder about Lincoln's determination to end the war prior to a new administration, the following incident with his cabinet demonstrates his resolve:
Originally Posted by Wikipedia
"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3
I think we arguing along the margins.
We all agree it was Atlanta...I was just making the point that the loss at Cedar Creek removed the last piece from the Confederate chessboard.
Astralis, you are right about how nasty it could have gotten...I guess my point was the Confederate loss then removed the means...the November election results removed the will.
Remember that it is the Actions and not the Commission that make the Officer and that there is More expected from him than the title. – GEORGE WASHINGTON
I can see Signal Knob clearly from my window just as clearly as it could be seen hereabouts before the battle of Cedar Creek. What wasn't clear to people back then was exactly where the war stood. I always have to remind myself that much of what we know now wasn't widely known back then. Modern day criticism of actions taken back then often rely on realities not known until later. But that's not always the case. Here's a letter printed in Harpers Weekly dated 6 days before the 1964 election that captures the shift in sentiment toward Lincoln. The same issue also carried an account of Sheridan victory at Cedar Creek 3 weeks before.
Battle of Cedar CreekJUDGE VANDERPOEL UPON THE
CRISIS.
HON. AARON VANDERPOEL says; in a late letter to a Union meeting in Ulster County.
"I voted against Mr. LINCOLN in 1860, and for HORATIO SEYMOUR in 1862, but now feel called upon, by every obligation of duty and patriotism, to cast my vote for ABRAHAM LINCOLN and Mr. FENTON.
" My doctrine is that, as the rebels began the war without cause, they must end it by laying down their arms and submitting to that Government against which they have so wantonly rebelled. I can see in the election of McCLELLAN and PENDLETON nothing but the breaking up of the Union. I agree with FERNANDO WOOD, a prominent supporter of McCLELLAN, that as the Chicago nominee he is bound to carry out the principles of the Chicago platform, which has not a word of fault to find with the rebels, and goes for peace at all events, and at any price.
To be Truly ignorant, Man requires an Education - Plato
JAD
I love the note in the article just prior to the one you cite!
GENERAL SHERMAN AND THE
ARMY VOTE.
REBELS shrink from SHERMAN'S sword and Copperheads from his pen. A foolish story has been circulated that he had said ninety-nine out of every hundred soldiers in his army would vote for McCLELLAN. General SHERMAN flanks and routs the falsehood in the following letter:
"HEAD-QUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, KINGSTON, GA., Oct. 11, 1864.
"MY DEAR SIR,—There is not one word of truth in the paragraph you sent me cut from the New York Herald of September 20. I never thought, said, or wrote that McCLELLAN would get ' ninety-nine out of every hundred' votes in the army. I am as ignorant of the political bias of the men of this army as you are at a distance of a thousand miles, and I would as soon think of tampering with a soldier's religion as with his preference for men. I have not and shall not attempt to influence a vote in the coming struggle. I believe Mr. LINCOLN has done the best he could. With respect, etc. W. T. SHERMAN.
Remember that it is the Actions and not the Commission that make the Officer and that there is More expected from him than the title. – GEORGE WASHINGTON
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