Thread: Robert E.Lee overrated?

I have always thought Lee to have been terribly overrated. A case study for this would be his actions (or lack thereof) at Gettysburg. No use of cavalry assets for recon (and he had cavalry available, just not Stuart until the third day when Custer stopped him). And very vague and few orders issued through the course of the battle. Pickett's Charge was probably inexcusable.

Originally Posted by Blademaster

Lee's flaw was that he didn't recognize the futility of his actions. He was reacting to the symptoms not the cause. He did not address his enemy's overwhelming manpower and industrial power by taking any action that would negate those two advantages of the Union. Instead he got caught in the grind and the attrition took care of him and his troops.

So would you say that Lee's overrated on a strategic level, but a brilliant commander on the tactical level? Much like Rommel. Rommel was a brilliant tactical commander, but he was not trained or maybe just not used to think on a very large strategic level.

it's been said that lee was the last of the great napoleonic generals, and that grant/sherman were the beginning of the great attrition-era generals.

Originally Posted by Albany Rifles

1. Yes

2. Lee & Grant

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Originally Posted by gunnut

So would you say that Lee's overrated on a strategic level, but a brilliant commander on the tactical level? Much like Rommel. Rommel was a brilliant tactical commander, but he was not trained or maybe just not used to think on a very large strategic level.

Yes, Lee was a brilliant tactical commander on the tactical level. He had a fine grasp of the art of operational manuever but to translate it into strategic strengths, he came up short.

Lee needed to be like Guderian or von Mantetz (sp?) during the attack against France and its Maginot Line or like Alexander against the Persians.

Lee was an excellent commander but he had some serious flaws.
1. He would fixate on a target. He fixated on Fitz John Porter's corps on Malvern Hill and could not be dissuaded from conducting a head on assault against a full corps of infantry backed up by an incredible array of artillery. Stand on Malvern Hill and you have to ask yourself who in their right mind would attack here. At Gettysburg, he did much the same thing. He had a victory on 1 July but the Union had the decisive terrain at the end of the day. After Day 2 his Army was in shambles…yes he had a fresh division coming up but the Union had him outnumbered. He was deep in enemy territory with a river between him and safety. He had an enormous train to clear out of the area. It made more sense defend while his units withdrew. But that was against his nature. His attacks on July 3 shredded the offensive ability of the ANV for rest of the war. And as OFOGS mentioned he mismanaged his cavalry (had almost a full division with him)
2. If you study Lee’s battle management in 1862 – 1863 you will see that he would mange the movement to the battlefield and allow his subordinate commanders fight it. During the Seven Days He managed the movement but then the subordinate division commanders fought individual battles unsupported in 4 of the 6 battles. The two he managed directly, Gaines Mills and Malvern Hill, he went 1-1. From then on in the battles where he took the offensive, study 2d Manassas and Antietam. Jackson and Longstreet fought those battles pretty much independent of each other. Same at Chancellorsville, with Early in the Longstreet role. At Gettysburg, with Jackson gone, he depended too much on Ewell and Hill. He chose to spend his time more with Longstreet and not with his more inexperienced corps commanders. He himself had seen the northern end of the battlefield as decisive yet he did not place himself there. It was not until the 1864 campaign that he started to take control on the battlefield itself…with some really astounding results when one considers how beat up the ANV was.
3. Lee had a hard time disciplining his subordinates. Read Lee’s Lieutenants…you will see this as a common thread all of the way through.
This may appear to be nitpicks…but these opinions are ones I formed with years of reading, research and seminars.
Grant, like Lee, had some flaws (no, drinking was not one of them). He badly mismanaged his army before Shiloh…but corrected his errors on the battlefield. At Iuka and Corinth he was guilty of poor battlefield management. However, he learned from these errors. He recognized after the Holly Springs raid that he had to find another way to get at Vicksburg and he tenaciously held to that, adjust his plans as needed. He, like Lee, often got more out of subordinates which others could not. He was able to forge an effective team amongst the likes of Baldy Smith, George Thomas and Joseph Hooker. But most importantly he recognized that the battlefield was not divorced form the political. In a civil war, the political side of events is deeply connected to the battlefield and vice versa. And unlike some Union commanders, he fought with what he had…and won. He understood the way to win the war was to apply full combat power at all points. A rebellion only can last as long as the rebels have a standing force in the field (see Washington, George and the Continental Army). Grant knew, destroy the Confederate Army and you win the war. He was the first one to pick up Scott’s Anaconda Plan and apply it.
Sherman….ahh, now there is an interesting situation. Like all men, Sherman had his demons and he sometimes allowed them to get the best of him...They almost knocked him out of the war early on. He was brilliant at Shiloh…once he got over his prejudice of volunteer officers. Considering the terrain, he actually performed fairly well at Chickasaw Bayou. He probably should not have sent in the second charge but he had to try. He did not believe in Grant’s plan at Vicksburg for quite some time…in fact McClernand was the true believer of the group and performed well at Port Gibson. His performance at Tunnel Hill at Chattanooga was, to be charitable, bad. And he was overwhelmed at first in the Atlanta Campaign…he never quite seemed to get Joe Johnston where he needed to get him. And his success at Atlanta was due to the effective generalship of George Thomas and the fortuitous removal of Joe Johnston with and his replacement by the overmatched John B. Hood. But he grew into a highly effective Army Group commander. But while he did great in Georgia and the Carolinas, how much of that was due to the size of his force?
So, Lee was the best the Confederates had and Grant was the best the Federals had.

Originally Posted by Bluesman

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Okay, and........what?

I think a sound argument could be made that Lee, with able corps commanders, could operate with very loose mission based tactics. Having read some of his battlefield "direction," I think he just barely passes. Once he lost Jackson, however, he desperately needed to apply the "directed telescope" to his new commanders and provide more consistent and definite direction. A trademark of Napoleon was his ability to do just that: missions to his corps commanders and then to apply himself to directing the decisive point (ideally) of the battle- notwithstanding the couple Davout's corps basically won for him. So, even if Lee was a good Napoleonic general, he could have learned much more from him.