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Could you please summarize this? Nobody wants to read a 32,000 page article. Not even my brother.
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How someone can want to research military affairs and not be able to read less then 30 pages...
You're about 14 right?
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Against a poorly trained and emplaced enemy, the "Afghan model" in which SOF lead indigenous forces can succeed as a result of the enemy's ineptitude and overwhelming fire. However, against more skilled enemies, such as al-Queda fighters at Bai-Beche and in Operation Anaconda, the US cannot simply rely on SOF leading massive amounts of fire. It must have the ability to fire and manuever.
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The local allies have to be pretty much as good on the ground as the enemy. In Afghanistan once we showed up the Taliban lost the money they had to pay off warlords (we had far deeper pockets) and lost their control of the skies. Without those two things the NA was more then able to fight them. Even before we showed up the NA was holding the line and controlled maybe 30% of the nation. Our airpower turned things around very fast, faster then just taking away the Taliban's ability to bribe and bomb.
Basically the "Afghan Model" can only work againist certain enemies.
I would go so far as to say we could give it a go in say the Sudan with the local guerillas being able to inflict massive losses on the government already, and showing up would remove the SuAF from the picture and tip a balance of power with our airpower.
On the flip side we couldn't use the MKO in Iran like we used the NA in Afghanistan to remove the mullahs from power. Iran is to much bigger and has a large well trained army ready to fight. Same we couldn't show up to Irian Jaya and support the OPM tomorrow and hope they can win.
You basically need a large, well led and armed group that is holding the line/moving foward on their own to think about giving it a go. Enemy morale also plays a big part as does their skill set.
Afghanistan was rather similar to Laos in using airpower to support the local forces. It was nothing new, America used advanced planes and weapons (LGBs) to support a local ally. But in Laos airpower only allowed them to hold on and balance the scales and in Afghanistan it tipped the scales. Things like terrain, the enemy and your allies play a big part. I can go on for pages about airpower in Laos. Hell the CIA used F-51Ds and B-26s to support Permesta guerillas back in the 1950s againist Indonesia.
Problem with Laos was the Vietnamese had more men and better equipment the throw into the field, breaking the Hmong and RLA overtime. All we could do was help them stay in the fight. And in Permesta the Indonesians were too good and too ready to fight and turned the tide very fast taking American prisoners and the operation fell apart.
So using airpower and such to back up local allies with American advisors to work everything is not revolutionary like it is made out to be but evolutionary.