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Originally Posted by dalem
I think your logic fails here. You are correct in that we can come up with a half-dozen "If someone really wanted to X..." scenarios, but that's hardly the point. One doesn't defend solely against the easiest methods, one also defends against likely threats.
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The easiest methods are the most likely. Why spend billions developing an ICBM when you can simply sneak your nuke into some US port? Such an attack has the added benefit of being difficult to trace back to the culprit.
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Here's a reasonable example of what I'm trying to say:
Since WWII, no one has been able to threaten the United States with a blockade. Before WWII it was not impossible, but since that time it has become impossible - no hostile naval force has a survival time greater than a day or so within a few hundred miles of our coasts. So that is a form of attack that we are protected form in a practical sense by our military, and the political reality follows, and no leverage is gained by enemies looking for a vulnerability to threaten.
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Unfortunately we cannot keep track of what is on all the thousands of commercial ships moving in and out of US waters. The Navy knows this is a problem, it just hasn't come up with a good answer.
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ICBMs are a threat to us - it is something that we cannot shrug off, and therefore anyone with a capability of launching even one single nuke-tipped missile gains bargaining power with us, and maneuvering room. As our ability to stop such attacks increases, the geopolitical leverage of our enemies decreases. That in itself is a desirable goal, even if the system itself is limited to stopping one narrow type of threat.
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ICBMs are just one means of attacking with nuclear weapons. None of the other WMDs even remotely compare with the destructive power of a nice little one megaton bomb. It stands to reason we should implement the most practical countermeasures first. It also stands to reason we should deploy working ABM technology. The HTK interceptors are not working ABM technology. It is wasted money that could have been spent on port defence or more viable ABM technology such as boost phase. The HTK interceptors simply provoke countries like China into upgrading their small force of ICBMs into a larger, more survivable one. Does that really make you feel safer?
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No, A real threat is as you describe above, not THE real threat. And I'd rather front fewer plans that give Kim money, especially because he's a devious little sack who's probably nuts to boot. The faster that sonuva***** goes broke the better off everyone will be.
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I won't get into a debate with you over Kim's mental stability or the lack there of. However, a desperate nut-job is usually the most dangerous variety.
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Really? So you're a "glass half-empty" kind of guy. List three weapons systems concepts in the last 100 years that you would label as technological failures.
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Do I have to stop at three?
1) Nuclear powered bomber - Pluto project. If this plane ever flew, the radiation from it's exhaust would have killed more than its payload.
2) Dyna-soar. Aptly named, this was intended as a sub-orbital nuclear bomber.
3) B70 Mach 5 nuclear bomber (cancelled after USSR deployed high altitude SAM).
4) Spartan-Sprint ABM (one base deployed, shut down 24 hours later).
5) B-1 Bomber (deployed even though it's electronic counter-measures suite proved to be totally inadequate in meeting performance goals).
6) Star Wars ABM. Tens of billions, no deployment.
These are just some of the hilights in the strategic systems. We all know of failed conventional systems (Osprey, DIVAD, etc, etc, etc, etc).