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I just read a few items on this subject. One article dealt with the 10 lessons we SHOULD learn from Iraq. Another dealt with historical lessons from past guerilla tactics (which was VERY interesting). Francis Marion ("The Swamp Fox" in the American War of Independence), John Mosby ("The Gray Ghost" of the American Civil War) and Cochise (Apache Wars) were excellent leaders and very effective raiders.
But the BEST article was about one simple principle of war, and how guerilla actions stand it on its head. Usually, the simple physical principle of mass times velocity equals energy translates in martial terms as numbers and speed equals shock.
But in guerilla warfare, the dilemma is for anti-guerilla forces to avoid ceding large areas to the enemy guerillas by massing into a few large and relatively sluggish formations, or fighting a 'war of detachments', thereby allowing guerilla forces parity and sometimes superiority against a more powerful force. Also, guerilla forces are usually able to determine timing, size and tempo of actions, forcing anti-guerilla forces into a reactive posture.
I think the greatest thing we're learning from Iraq is how to balance those competing imperatives, by standing that old principle on its head, and doing the complete opposite: the SPEED AT WHICH FORCES MASS is more important than the size of those forces, or the speed with which that mass moves.
On the tactical level, we put this concept into operation by assuring that we only arrive at the contact point with mission-tailored combat forces (not all the nice-to-have support stuff), and with precise timing to guarantee that we don't do anything to telegraph our punch, like a helicopter hovering for 'one last look'. Planning is great, rehearsal is great, and recon just prior to execution is great, but NONE of that is worth compromising surprise, so if it will, go without it. Terrorists holed up in a 'safe house' ain't Warsaw Pact tank divisions, so stop fighting 'em like they are. If you get a tipper that is specific enough to act on, DO SO, and don't wait until you know what color wallpaper is in the spider hole.
Operationally, the same dictum is operable. If you intend to clear Fallujah, DO NOT put it in Iraqi Stars and Stripes; and marshal troops no earlier than 24 hours before you are able to tell your commander that there is now no easy way into or out of Fallujah. This is VERY tough to do, but the Marines proved it can be done, but it takes FOCUS AND ENERGY to adhere to your timeline. If a single rifle company starts cutting roads even six hours too early - that is, before you anticipate that you can cut ALL of 'em - you will watch as the rats start looking for boltholes, and they'll find 'em. You'll clear Fallujah, capture/kill grunches of Bad Guys...and their leaders will be looking at the smoke and dust in their reaview mirrors as they drive away laughing.
There are some other aspects to this 'anti-principle', as well, but it's a fascinating new look at what it means to attempt to get inside the decision/action lop of a VERY agile and cunning enemy. As trained military professionals, we tend to over-emphasize PROCESS; amateurs are far more results-oriented, with minimal comittment to processes they never learned and have no attachment to. They do not 'staff' decisions; they MAKE decisions, on the spot, with whatever imperfect and incomplete information they have. Sometimes incorrect, at least those decisions are timely, and SPEED is the dominant battlefield requirement (Principle #4 in the article below).
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"The quickest way of ending a war is to lose it, and if one finds the prospect of a long war intolerable, it is natural to disbelieve in the possibility of victory."
- George Orwell
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