Anon

"I respect your knowledge and opinions, M21 but..."

Thanx.

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to let the battleship [New Jersey] fire on December 14, 1983. Eleven 1900-pound high-explosive shells were lobbed into the Shouf Mountains. THERE WERE NO SPOTTERS IN THE AIR OR ON THE GROUND TO ADJUST WHERE THE SHELLS FELL [my emphasis]. The results were pitiful. [the author does not define 'pitiful']..."

Actually, the way that (reportedly) happened is that SecNav J.Lehman told President Reagan that the Iowa could kill that bunker where airstrikes had failed after the CNO told Reagan 'we have nothing in theater to kill that command bunker'.

Furious, Reagan immediately ordered the Jersey to destroy the target. Which it did without loss of US life. This was prior to the installation of the Iowa class BB's suite of unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs). Since there was no FO to observe the fall of shot, the firemission was obviously going to suffer from poor accuracy, as any fire mission would.

"She was cleared for another fire mission the afternoon of February 8, 1984. The targets-all located by satellite- were Druze and Syrian gun positions near a mountain village about fifteen miles east of Beirut. Again, no spotters were present. For eight hours, the New Jersey hurled nearly 300 sixteen-inch shells. She fired another thirteen shells on February 26 before heading back to her homeport...The results of these two missions were even worse than in December.
Marine Colonel Don Price, who had served in combat in Vietnam and was familiar with naval shore-fire bombardment practices investigated the New Jersey's gunnery in Lebanon and concluded that she missed her targets by as much as 10000 yards (about six miles). Price was convinced that some of the New Jersey's errant shells killed civilians living in the Shouf Mountains, although the Navy denied this. "You have a multimillion-dollar weapons system and nobody knows how to put the rounds anywhere near the target," Price said."

Yes, well i welcome the author- or anyone- to try and adjust any arty firemission without a spotter or FO. The results would be the same. Exactly the same.

"Although the Navy publically claimed that the New Jersey hit her targets, the CNO...thought otherwise...[he] met with RADM Bill Fogarty and asked him if there had been a powder problem when he commanded the New Jersey."

The CNO at that time was strongly opposed to the BBs reactivation to begin with. I view anything he has to say about the BBs with skepticism.

p. 138
" Fred Ralston, a fire controlman assigned to forward main plot, noticed that while the ship was firing on the San Clemente, California gunnery range, the velocity of the projectiles exiting the barrels was wildly erratic. Some projectiles left the muzzles travelling 120 feet per second faster and some 120 feet per second slower than the 1725 feet per second norm for a 2700-pound armor-piercing shell. Gunnery experts say that a deviation of only two or three feet per second is cause for alarm. The excessive deviation made it almost impossible for the New Jersey to aim her guns accurately. It also indicated that the powder could be unstable."

That's flat BS. A S/D of 10fps is excellent. Nothing i am aware of has a S/D of 2-3 fps, not even match grade rifle ammunition. That claim is ridiculous. The S/D of the Mk7 16"/50s is just under 10fps...about equal to the best match grade rifle ammuntion.

"Poor powder (and no spotters ) was the root of the problems for the Iowas throughout the 80's and 90's. It was only after they found an uncontaminated supply that accuracy began to get where it should be."

The powder problems were later corrected, and radar sensors were mounted on the turrets to track the shells in flight, plus the UAVs were installed to give the Iowas an organic spotting capability. Their accuracy during ODS was greatly improved as a result, even with old pitted barrels and WWII era shells.

Rebarreled, with modern munitions, and in conjunction with the radar directors and UAVS of the BBs, the Iowas would have an artillery range and accuracy unparralled in the history of indirect fire. By a very wide margin IMO.

"You have to admit that one bunker hit out of 324 rounds fired is pitiful."

Considering that there was no capacity for adjusting fires used, it's to be expected. BTW, that bunker was hit 30 times, not once(See below post). Frankly, with no spotters or FOs adjusting the fire, it's amazing they hit it at all.

Just for the record, i have called probably as many as 500 fire missions(Real and simulated) and served in a 4.2" mortar plt.(both on the gun line and in the FDC) during my time in the military. I have a lot of real world experience with indirect fires. A lot more than the author of that book i'd wager.