Quote:
Originally Posted by S-2
Zraver's working on the assumption that G.C.C. states won't allow offensive ops from their soil. As such, the initial air campaign would largely be carried by off-shore carrier-based aircraft.
You suggest otherwise.
A nation's input matters. Should Iraq decline to permit offensive ops, as example, I'd hope we'd honor that decision. Once Iran reacts, we'll likely have all the authority and permission we need to operate from G.C.C. Saudi/Iraqi bases. Probably not beforehand.
I don't know that a carrier group needs to remain in the gulf to sustain maskirovka and I'm unsure that we need three carrier groups. How many carrier aircraft will it take to provoke Iran into observable action that will justify the use of G.C.C. bases, as example? If we are assured that all bets are off at that point and we'll have free use of these facilities following any Iranian retaliation, then our initial effort may be quite small- only sufficient to demand a forceful and obvious response by Iran.
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I think the trouble with trying to provoke an Iranian response to justify full blown offensive operations from nearby states is that Iran's response would not only have to be forceful, and obvious, it would also have to be immediate and non-defensive. Unless offensive operations were sustained and
effective, Iran could opt not to play that game and instead choose to ramp up insurgent activity in Iraq and Afghanistan in retaliation while seeking to strike at US support and escort ships and other targets of opportunity directly related to the striking groups. Israel's fight against Hezbollah last year and past NATO operations against Serbia seems to cast doubt on the ability of a pure air campaign to force Iran into strategic concessions, especially if the Iranians hunkered down and used political means to hamper US operations. In the present political climate, the ultimate duration of such a campaign in the absence of rash Iranian response is also likely to be short.
On the US side, even without explicit permission for offensive operations from their soil, presumably USAF tankers, support craft and defensive combat screens could allow one or two carrier groups positioned outside restricted waters of the Persian Gulf to sustain a higher tempo of offensive operations than they could alone. These could act in conjunction with long ranged bombers flown from outside the Middle East. With aid of the regional Combined Air Operations Center coordinating assets, maybe this could be quite seemless. Would such an operation do enough damage to Iran to force an immediate reaction?
Also, the CAOC is a fixed target at a fixed location. Could the Iranians seek to limit US air operations tempo via political means, then use the opportunity to attack that location with a concentrated ballistic missile strike? (I realize that this is not necessarily consistent with the hunker-down plan.)
Finally, would Israel initiate a new war against Hezbollah in coordination with US action?