Brigadier,
There's also this-
Canadian Armour in Afghanistan- Canadian Army Journal Winter 2008
Taken together, they reinforce what we've all known (and so too the Israelis)- combined arms operations that closely integrate/synchronize all assets (engineers, fire support, close-air, attack aviation, armor, and infantry) are required to achieve success in close-combat environments.
As spacious as Afghanistan seems to be, at eye-ball level in Helmand and Kandahar the terrain and structures are exceedingly complex and the fight is close combat w/ engagement ranges for armor as close as 100-150 meters. Breaching operations are commonplace and require careful planning in nearly every instance. Hasty breaches are uncommon and dangerous. Assets are valued and carefully utilized.
Israeli forces operated in the absence of sound tactical intelligence despite having owned the terrain six year previous. Mr. Matthews correctly identifies the erosion of Israeli basic conventional combat skills. He identifies various areas of failing which contributed to this erosion. While agreeing that an emphasis on OOTW contributed to this failing, I'd disagree with Matthews' contention that it partially results from the Israeli pursuit of COIN operations. As Shek has pointed out (as early as 2005 elsewhere)-
NOTE: He did so PRIOR to the 2006 conflict- Israel has been an advocate of CT operations and a VERY POOR practicioner of COIN ops. A huge difference.
Back to the war- Brigadier, POG was no terrorist group. Their forces shaped the battle-space through extensive re-engineering of the "confrontation villages". Armor kill-zones were clearly calculated from oblique lines-of-sight that diminished detection and increased opportunities for flank shots.
Matthews suggested at one point the use of SAGGERS. I doubt this, personally, although I don't doubt the use of sophisticated ATGW. That's obvious. Israeli casualties were quite high, with a few notable examples. It seems that the best part of a pioneer-demolition company took shelter in a house hit by three ATGW weapons near-simultaneously. 40 casualties, 10 dead, in the blink of an eye.
Nahal brigade had been tasked to seize high ground that offered overwatch of a canalized passage used by Israeli armor. They failed to do so. Israeli tanks were PULVERIZED in a ATGW kill-zone eminating from positions that should have been cleared by Nahal.
Finally, indirect fire procedures were poorly managed, it seems. Why, I cannot imagine. The terrain offers a lot of challenges to observed fire- deep defilades, poor lines-of-sight, outstanding cover and concealment. Still, nothing insurmountable to trained forward observers.
Both articles are great reads and full of insight.