WaltzingMatilda

S-2,

As usual, you’ve posed some very tough questions…most of which I haven’t the slightest idea how to answer, as I’ve only recently become interested in Afghanistan (largely due to your posts). Having said that, your questions deserve a response, irrespective of how flawed or incomplete my answers may be. Hopefully, others will continue to chime in...

War tends to promote internal unity, although within the specific context of Afghanistan, it’s hard to definitively say this is in fact the case at present. Analysts remain divided over the extent to which the Taliban has been able to recruit across tribal lines and are uncertain as to the degree of cohesion within the movement. For example, Johnson argues the Taliban “represents a tribal power grab by the Ghilzais” aimed primarily at the Durrani, whom they seek to “subjugate and co-opt.” As evidence, he claims the Taliban leadership is composed almost entirely of Hotaki Ghilzais with a somewhat smaller number of Kakar Ghurgusht. In contrast, Antonio Giustozzi argues the Taliban is a more “composite-like” tribal movement primarily concerned with the ideological commitment of its members, as opposed to their tribal affiliation. He claims the Taliban leadership is, in fact, largely made up of DURRANI with significant numbers of Ghilzai, Kakar, and Karlanri following close behind.

Obviously, an insurgency segmented in geographic scope, limited in tribal composition, and dependent upon coercive measures is much more vulnerable to a well-coordinated counterinsurgent strategy. I fear, however, that the coalition—as presently configured and strategically conceived—provides the flagpole around which otherwise disparate Afghan tribes are able to coalesce.

Again, I hope others will be able to shed some light on this subject, which is critically important to our understanding of the Afghan conflict and the nature of the Taliban insurgency.

Cactus is spot on, IMV.

…by acquiring a monopoly on the “legitimate” use of force.