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Originally Posted by Firral
I already wrote here before in this occasion:
You confuse time pieces (like as it does Tom Clancy in the books).
Correct my data if I am not right:
THE USA
Shell М829: year of acceptance on arms - 1986, power - 500 mm (for hit at 0 degrees)
Shell М829A1: year of acceptance on arms - 1990, power - 600 mm (for hit at 0 degrees)
Shell М829A2: year of acceptance on arms - 1992, power - 620 mm (for hit at 0 degrees)
Shell М829A3: year of acceptance on arms - 2002, power - 720 mm (for hit at 0 degrees)
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The M829 series will penetrate very close to a meter of RHA. The biggest differance is the ability to penetrate after hitting heavy ERA.
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The USSR/Russia
Shell 3BM32: year of acceptance on arms - 1984, power - 510 mm (for hit at 0 degrees)
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IIRC this is a bore riding design and its performance past 1500m was horrible.
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Shell 3BM42: year of acceptance on arms - 1986, power - 530 mm (for hit at 0 degrees)
Shell 3BM48: year of acceptance on arms - 1989, power - 600 mm (for hit at 0 degrees)
Shell 3BM44: year of acceptance on arms - 1994, power - 630 mm (for hit at 0 degrees)
Shell 3BM48-2: year of acceptance on arms - 1995, power - 650 mm (for hit at 0 degrees)
You can notice, that shells are similar between the contemporaries. Only after disintegration of the USSR, backlog of Russia from the USA was outlined.
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Soviet claims are generally over stated and estimates about American equipment are generally low. If you take away the 10% bravado fluff the last Soviet rounds remained unable to defeat even an early Abrams from the front.
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It has the name " belief in your weapon ". It is a healthy situation necessary for a good moral condition of any soldier: you trust that your weapon better, you know that your opponent too is able to be at war well.
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It may be a belief but it is pretty convincing. Soviet military equipment almost never worked as advertised.
The only thing the USSR did well was space missions. Their cosmonauts have a much better chance of getting home safely.
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I think that it is war would be absolutely unpromising not for us, not for you.
In ground operation, you could not excel above us. You represent the sizes of Russia, its relief, quantity of armies and the population, etc. I also very much doubt of the superiority of your technics (as it still never collided with the opponent of its age).
I already spoke you, that Russia has centuries-old history of wars against conquerors. In case of attempt to win Russia, enemies always collided with enormous persistence of its all population.
You were always very sensitive to losses, and in case of ground war your losses would be huge. I do not think that you were ready to such war in 80th years, and the more so now.
PS: Know, you repeat a course think of many up to you. But after that Poland became a part of Russian empire (and was to it till 1917), Swedes have been beaten out from Ukraine, Russian cossacks were in Paris, and later Russian tanks in Berlin.
Such as you, history nothing trains
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What about them Mongols? Or WW1 Germany or Poland in the 1920's. Russia is not impervious to conquest.
As for Iraq, in some ways thier best units were even better than those fielded by the Red Army. The Republican Guards had superior tube artillery via the South African 155mm, superior communications via fiber optics, combat experiance, professional cadres and a unified language and national identity. With the exception of the quality of equipment there is no reason to think they performed any less well than an equivalent Russian soldier. To say the US didn't fight in its league is to miss the key points of the US victory- battle management. The US moved faster and kept its eyes on the enemy while blinding the enemy in turn. Desert Storm was an information war and was fought at a level the Red Army could never hope to match under the Soviet heirarchy. Modern Russia is attempting to change this with the kontrackt soldiers but still has to deal with short enlistments and large numbers of dispirited draftees. She also lacks the US capabilities in information warfare.