World Affairs Board - View Single Post

WaltzingMatilda · 03-23-2008, 06:24 AM

T_igger_cs_30,

To the extent I downplayed the role of “fear and intimidation,” your response is a necessary and welcome corrective to my previous post. Without question, Shabnamah is part and parcel to the Taliban’s goals of denying popular support to the counterinsurgent effort and inhibiting governance through recourse to fear and intimidation. Nevertheless, I wonder whether or not there isn’t more we can say about the practice as an expression of the Taliban’s narrative.

As you pointed out, we’re currently witnessing a rise in Taliban support. Should the rise in support be attributed to fear and intimidation alone, or does the Taliban’s narrative also have a certain popular appeal?

Johnson’s analysis indicates that we need to expand our understanding of the Taliban’s narrative. In his view, the Taliban is able to draw on popular support for several reasons: 1) it appeals to a sense of shared historical experience and past resistance to outsiders; 2) it espouses traditional tribal values and the sanctity of tribal independence; 3) it has framed the Afghan conflict as an epochal struggle between Islam and the West; and 4) it extols self-sacrifice and the preservation of honor.

Insurgency and counterinsurgency is a “tug-o-war” for the population’s support. In the same way that the US-led coalition cannot obliterate the insurgency through military action alone, the Taliban is unable to terrorize the Afghan population into utter submission. In order to thrive, the Taliban requires the population’s willing cooperation and/or acquiescence, which implies a strategy of both coercion and inducement.

Given the relative ease with which the Taliban was toppled back in 2001 and the widespread resentment with its rule at the time, I suspect the insurgents have learned a thing or two along the road to recovery. If in fact the Taliban is attempting to fashion a broad-based, social movement and its resurgence is an indication of its success, what are the implications for the US-led coalition and its present strategy?

I look forward to your thoughts.

03-23-2008, 06:24 AM	#8 (permalink)
WaltzingMatilda Regular Join Date: 04-02-07 Location: San Francisco, CA Posts: 75 Country:	T_ T_igger_cs_30, To the extent I downplayed the role of “fear and intimidation,” your response is a necessary and welcome corrective to my previous post. Without question, Shabnamah is part and parcel to the Taliban’s goals of denying popular support to the counterinsurgent effort and inhibiting governance through recourse to fear and intimidation. Nevertheless, I wonder whether or not there isn’t more we can say about the practice as an expression of the Taliban’s narrative. As you pointed out, we’re currently witnessing a rise in Taliban support. Should the rise in support be attributed to fear and intimidation alone, or does the Taliban’s narrative also have a certain popular appeal? Johnson’s analysis indicates that we need to expand our understanding of the Taliban’s narrative. In his view, the Taliban is able to draw on popular support for several reasons: 1) it appeals to a sense of shared historical experience and past resistance to outsiders; 2) it espouses traditional tribal values and the sanctity of tribal independence; 3) it has framed the Afghan conflict as an epochal struggle between Islam and the West; and 4) it extols self-sacrifice and the preservation of honor. Insurgency and counterinsurgency is a “tug-o-war” for the population’s support. In the same way that the US-led coalition cannot obliterate the insurgency through military action alone, the Taliban is unable to terrorize the Afghan population into utter submission. In order to thrive, the Taliban requires the population’s willing cooperation and/or acquiescence, which implies a strategy of both coercion and inducement. Given the relative ease with which the Taliban was toppled back in 2001 and the widespread resentment with its rule at the time, I suspect the insurgents have learned a thing or two along the road to recovery. If in fact the Taliban is attempting to fashion a broad-based, social movement and its resurgence is an indication of its success, what are the implications for the US-led coalition and its present strategy? I look forward to your thoughts.