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Originally Posted by Bluesman
Hope we're still mates, and you're not going to take this as a slap at you. It isn't.
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No worries, it's all good.
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Originally Posted by Bluesman
But this part is serious.
I actually DO believe there is a prejudice against airpower, and I could go on about why I think so, what you and a great many others that aren't 'air-minded' miss about it. The thread about 'Most decisive weapon of WWII' was GREATLY instructive to me about what is believed and assumed about airpower by people that are knowledgable about other forms of armed force.
The FUNCTION of air forces is quite obviously different from what you're used to, and the capabilities are obviously poles apart, offering massive advantages, while having few relative disadvantages, compared to surface forces. Usually, airpower is misunderstood to have a 'support' function, when in reality, airpower is a PRIME warfighting force in the modern era. (I didn't say 'the only', nor most important', so don't make an argument that supposes that's what I'm saying. But it IS capable of winning wars in ways no surface force can match, or resist, or prevent.)
Personally, and I don't say this to be insulting (but you and Gunny and others that simply do not appreciate what airpower really does might read it that way), I assert that the reason you poo-poo this article or the decisive nature of heavy bombardment in WWII is because you see the air component of a force as an auxiliary, as combat support, as a facilitator of the REAL arbiter of battle: GROUND POWER.
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I don't disagree that air power can be a prime warfighting force. It won the Cold War, as the deterrence provided by SAC forced communism to fight in the hinterlands rather than attempt a more direct approach. It was prime in Afghanistan (however, the issue I have with the article re: Afganistan is not about whether SOF or air power was king, but the fallacious implications that derive from ignoring the necessity of having an indigenous proxy force that provided both a national leader for the new regime and gave an indigenous face to the operation, which gave it legitimacy).
The reason I poo-poo this article is not because of some bias against air power, but because it is an article written about land power than tries to graft Boyd as an inspiration/causation for success while using poor/inaccurate examples. If there is any bias against Boyd, it is because of hero warship of him by many 4GW folks.
If you want to try and point towards people who influenced strategy in Iraq, then you need to read Galula, Kilcullen, Nagl, Cohen, Crane. If you need a strategic inspiration, then read Sun Tzu and link it to this article -
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview...pr06/Cohen.pdf
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Originally Posted by Bluesman
Well, I think Bill Whitten sees what you don't. I also assert something else: this is WAY too deep a subject - with an emotional component to it to complicate communication's meaningfulness further - to take place like this, in an over-'n'-out fashion on a message board. We're simply going to talk past each other, and mis-understand each other's points (although I'm just arrogant enough to believe I 'get' you, but you're not understanding ME). I bet we'd have more fun and piss each other off a lot less if we could give-'n'-take face-to-face, so I'll leave it with this: I like you, I respect you, and I am NOT selling you short (as that would be a mistake). But I can see clearly where you're not seeing this relationship clearly.
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The problem is that I haven't seen you layout anywhere in the thread what the great insights are, i.e., what he sees and what I don't. You moved the argument to some abstract air power vs. land power level without drilling in on the specifics of the article.
If you read my post, I don't ascribe any malacious intent steming from the seemingly air power lens - simply that the examples are weak, indicating that the author has an air power lens. In the end, my contention is that either the insights are nothing new and are readily available and accessible to those who have read Sun Tzu, or are not new and already part of doctrine (OODA). Furthermore, it ignores the real derivation/inspiration of the surge strategy and the on the ground learning and decisions that have evolved. So, my issues with the article lay more heavily on the historical accuracy side and not necessarily with critiquing the validity of his general points. By focusing on Boyd, it sells the real sources short and points readers who may not be familiar with Galula, Kilcullen, Nagl, et al, in the wrong direction.