Quote:
Originally Posted by citanon
In contrast, coalition air dominance and air attacks blinded enemy intelligence collection, disrupted enemy communications, and denied maneuver freedom to enemy forces, preventing the enemy from fulfilling requirements 2, 6 and 7. Coalition use of deception and surprise denied the enemy requirements 4 and 5.
In essence, the coalition had the opportunity to utilize OODA at the theater level. Was this done? Gen. Tommy Franks' autobiography contends that this was essentially what happened during the operational phase of the war.
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Citanon,
GEN Franks oversells this based on research done since the war. Slide #7 gets directly at this:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...warcollege.pdf
I think your analysis that OODA is simply a process and that it's the decisions made within the process that are key is spot on.