From SWJ-
Can the Anbar Strategy Work In Pakistan?
Clint Watts writes-
"Recent U.S. success in defeating al-Qa’ida in Iraq has prompted policy makers and military planners to export this strategy to other theaters, specifically the tribal areas of Pakistan. However, the U.S. should ask itself three questions before continuing: Will the tribes of Pakistan’s frontier provinces turn on al-Qa’ida?... Will the ideology of al-Qa’ida clash with Pakistani tribes?... Third, will financial and military inducements to Pakistani tribes translate into pressure on al-Qa'ida's logistics?"
A.M. has hinted at shifts in the GoP's approach to exploiting tribal and other fissures/leverage points recently. Perhaps on advice from America's experience in al-Anbar. If so, Watts has some surprising answers to his own questions.
Just as interesting is this reply from a reader-
"But just to make it clear, to see the Anbar narrative as all about tribes “flipping” is an impoverished view of the campaign. It’s a Johnny-come-lately view. Hard and costly kinetic operations laid the groundwork for the tribal realignments. Sheikh Sattar had to have his smuggling lines cut and dismembered by specially assigned units conducting kinetic operations in order to ‘see the light’ and align with U.S. forces. Then, a tank had to be parked outside his residence to provide protection against the insurgents in order to keep him alive and aligned with the U.S.
The pundits talk about the tribes, but the Marines talk about kinetic operations inside Ramadi to provide the window of opportunity for the tribes to realign their allegiance:
DefenseLink News Article: Why We Serve: Marine Staff Sergeant Helps Awaken Anbar
To be sure, the tribal alliance is a large part of the Anbar victory, but force projection (not force protection) was the pretext for the Anbar awakening. We simply cannot do COIN on the cheap. I hope that no one exists who believes that we could have waltzed into Anbar three years ago, without the pretext of force projection, and sat down with the tribes and verbally persuaded them to join “the cause?”
His comments underline those by OoE, if there's any REAL validity to applying the (some, a few, one or two, none) lessons of al-Anbar to Pakistan. A.M. seems awed/sold/inspired (don't know-somewhere in that mix) by the region's mythical cultural intransigence and appears resigned to acquiescing positive sovereign control of this region. Neo seems oddly eager for the ISI to resume/continue doing what it does so well-interfere with the lives of it's immediate neighbors.
Is not FATA already autonomous? What's left except for the declaration of independance by Greater Pashtunistan? Pakistan would seem prepared to make a sizable territorial contribution to a newly-born land-locked nation. All that's left, of course, would be for Afghanistan to do the same.
No. At some point Pakistan's authority to rule must be asserted over all it's citizens or it follows that they're really not a part of your nation. That may include "kinetic" operations. "Guns blazing", I think you said.
Are the loyalties of Pakistan's citizenry so dubious?