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S-2 · 12-18-2007, 17:54 PM

Kurdistan Region's Foreign Policy Explained

Turkish readers be forewarned- the above linked article is a press release from the KRG on their unofficially official website.

Please note-

"Our [KRG] foreign relations cannot be independent, we must work to harmonise our activities with Baghdad. For us, there is no realistic alternative. We must understand and accept that our best course is to move ahead as part of a federal, democratic and pluralistic Iraq.”

Falah Mustafa Bakir, December 6, 2007.

I consider the remarks by Jamal Abdullah and Ali al-Dabbagh in Kansas Bear's latest AP article as interestingly mild rebukes to this incursion. They reflect both Iraq's fundamental inability to secure it's own borders and Turkey's local military dominance.

Personally, I question the military effectiveness of these raids. However, if Ucar indicates valid targets identified and confirmed by their electronic signature then, clearly, there's some utility to these attacks.

My understanding of the area is that there's a traditional slowdown of PKK cross-border attacks at this time of the year because of weather. The snows deepen. Movement is hard. The cover disappears. Concealment is difficult. I assumed that most PKK forces take the winter off, more or less-retreating into the safety and warmth of the larger towns and cities across Kurdistan. In doing so, they further diffuse effective targeting by dispersing their organization IAW seasonal change.

Traditionally this has been the case in Afghanistan. This year, however, ISAF officers are reporting solid contacts with Taliban who appear intent on remaining and engaging allied/ANA forces. They evidently haven't returned to Pakistan. The reasons as yet are unknown. An altogether different war, yet a change to what's been an accustomed pattern of operations.

Is there any reason to believe that NOW is the best time militarily to attack PKK facilities/installations, given similar seasonal operational patterns along the Kurd-Turkish border? Have PKK forces, in spite of clear warning and overwhelming Turkish strength and facing worsening weather, stepped up or continued their summer-fall terror campaign? In short, just how target-rich is an environment of this size containing a terror-guerrilla organization of some 2,000-2,500 fighters (by U.S. estimates)?

Conversely, is there any reason to not believe that now represents the best political environment for Turkey to demonstrate it's intent, purpose, and resolve?

Does the border remain open? Bet it is.

I remain committed to believing that Turkey is best served by HELPING Iraq. Is this helpful?

What remains MOST interesting to me is contemplating a post-PKK existence along the Turkish-Kurd border. Why? Were I Kurdish, I'd be eager to remove the impediment of the PKK just to uncover what lies underneath for Turkey. Is there more?

12-18-2007, 17:54 PM	#36 (permalink)
S-2 *Military Professional* Join Date: 09-11-06 Location: Portland, Oregon Posts: 2,553 Country:	Minister Bakir's Recent Comments Kurdistan Region's Foreign Policy Explained Turkish readers be forewarned- the above linked article is a press release from the KRG on their unofficially official website. Please note- "Our [KRG] foreign relations cannot be independent, we must work to harmonise our activities with Baghdad. For us, there is no realistic alternative. We must understand and accept that our best course is to move ahead as part of a federal, democratic and pluralistic Iraq.” Falah Mustafa Bakir, December 6, 2007. I consider the remarks by Jamal Abdullah and Ali al-Dabbagh in Kansas Bear's latest AP article as interestingly mild rebukes to this incursion. They reflect both Iraq's fundamental inability to secure it's own borders and Turkey's local military dominance. Personally, I question the military effectiveness of these raids. However, if Ucar indicates valid targets identified and confirmed by their electronic signature then, clearly, there's some utility to these attacks. My understanding of the area is that there's a traditional slowdown of PKK cross-border attacks at this time of the year because of weather. The snows deepen. Movement is hard. The cover disappears. Concealment is difficult. I assumed that most PKK forces take the winter off, more or less-retreating into the safety and warmth of the larger towns and cities across Kurdistan. In doing so, they further diffuse effective targeting by dispersing their organization IAW seasonal change. Traditionally this has been the case in Afghanistan. This year, however, ISAF officers are reporting solid contacts with Taliban who appear intent on remaining and engaging allied/ANA forces. They evidently haven't returned to Pakistan. The reasons as yet are unknown. An altogether different war, yet a change to what's been an accustomed pattern of operations. Is there any reason to believe that NOW is the best time militarily to attack PKK facilities/installations, given similar seasonal operational patterns along the Kurd-Turkish border? Have PKK forces, in spite of clear warning and overwhelming Turkish strength and facing worsening weather, stepped up or continued their summer-fall terror campaign? In short, just how target-rich is an environment of this size containing a terror-guerrilla organization of some 2,000-2,500 fighters (by U.S. estimates)? Conversely, is there any reason to not believe that now represents the best *political* environment for Turkey to demonstrate it's intent, purpose, and resolve? Does the border remain open? Bet it is. I remain committed to believing that Turkey is best served by HELPING Iraq. Is this helpful? What remains MOST interesting to me is contemplating a post-PKK existence along the Turkish-Kurd border. Why? Were I Kurdish, I'd be eager to remove the impediment of the PKK just to uncover what lies underneath for Turkey. Is there more? __________________ "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski Last edited by S-2 : 12-18-2007 at 17:57 PM.