Quote:
Originally Posted by S-2
If this article is using accurate data then we've a number of very serious problems. While enlistments have struggled for both the reserves and active army, re-enlistment rates of soldiers serving in combat arms have been touted as indicators of resiliency within our personnel system. It now seems that the officers of those soldiers see things differently and are leaving at rates nearly double the historical average, if graduates of the 2002 class of U.S.M.A. are any indication.
The implications of this message obviously reach far beyond the immediate impact upon small unit leadership. The class of 2002 were seniors on 9/11. What are these men and women telling us?
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S-2,
Instead of looking at the fact that USMA 2002 were in their final year on 9/11, look at their world frame of view when they applied to West Point in 1997. The Army they would join upon graduation was one where if you deployed, you would kick a$$ in short order and then return home (ODS) or else spend six months deployed to a peacekeeping mission.
What did they find upon graduation? A trip to Iraq and back for 18 months. A trip to Iraq for 12 months, extended to 15 months, and back for a projected 12 months. The future expectation: wash, rinse, and repeat for a few years out. On the other hand, they have a degree and experience that is essentially a double major - their academic major plus a "major" in leadership/management with years of experience in the latter. Given the strong performing economy, the opportunity cost of staying in for at least two more deployments as a company grade officer is huge.
In contrast, the classes we have now joined in large part because of 9/11. The current graduating class maxed out the infantry slots on branch night, with a quarter of the people willing to serve an additional three years to guarantee that they received infantry. Now, some of those in the post-9/11 matriculation classes will find themselves with a different outlook than when they entered due to marriage, kids, etc., but there will not be a mismatch in expectations.
Additionally, a few years out, as you see the deployment tempo slow to a manageable and more predictable rate (due both to drawdowns and an increased force structure), you'll see attrtion as not being a big issue. The question becomes what to do with the five year group void where attrition combined with increasing the requirements means that we'll be short officers (the change in MTOEs for the transformation of units plus the increase in force size is the biggest contributor to the shortages).