"The United States Navy has recently begun to explore seriously the concept of a small, distributed littoral surface combatant, first referred to as Street Fighter and now known as SEA LANCE3. The original concept lacked organic air cover and a viable scouting capability, both of which are critical for mission success4. The CROSSBOW force we defined combines a SEA LANCE variant, called SEA LANCE II, with SEA ARCHER, a small, high-speed aircraft carrier (or UAV Tactical Support Ship)5, and SEA QUIVER, a notional high-speed support ship. The SEA ARCHER air wing is comprised of 8 multi-mission SEA ARROW Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs), 8 support UAVs with multi-mission capabilities, and 2 MH-60 multi-mission helicopters. "
I
or
http://www.nps.navy.mil/SEA/SEA%202%...mmary%20v2.doc.
or
http://www.nps.edu/research/meyer/Co...mmary%20v2.pdf
Note:
Sea Lance II:
"Small, powerfully armed ships are suitable for high-risk missions, sanitizing dangerous waters for high-value ships."
LCS is not that ship but somehow morphed from Sea Lance II if I understand correctly by the time-line. As the LCS program study began in 2002.
Ah yes the "LCS Task Force":
http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/pubs/Case%207%20LCS.pdf
Also this has never really been come to grips with:
"A self-deploying, helicopter-carrying ship would have to be larger and slower."
Sea Archer:
http://web.nps.navy.mil/~me/tsse/files/2001/report.pdf
"The teams decided to use the following project names:
• The FORCE would be called CROSSBOW
• The UCAV would be called SEA ARROW
• The aviation ship would be called SEA ARCHER (the subject of this report)
• The escorts, as mentioned, would be SEA LANCE II
• The logistics ship system would be called SEA QUIVER.
"There would be 20 escorts, based on a notional
extension of the 2000 TSSE SEA LANCE design (with increased displacement, additional missiles for strike and defense, and speed comparable to the aviation platform), referred to as SEA LANCE II. There would be a replenishment capability, hoped to be high-speed-capable, as well."
Here is what Cebrowski proposed that was the combined with Hughes small combatants. Really a natural fit. The downfall being a ship seen as expendable and at first rather skimpillly armed among othre drawbacks that can be readilly seen by reading of the original Sea Lance conception. Unfortunately its been all downhill from thre. So far at least.:
"Network Centric Warfare (NCW).
NCW is an information superiority enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization. In essence, NCW translates information superiority into combat power by effectively linking knowledgeable entities in the battlespace."
"There were advocates for an expanded small ship role in the battle force, notably then-CAPT Wayne Hughes, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, who wrote an influential book on fleet tactics in 1986.3
3 Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986). This book was updated for coastal operations in 2000. "
More on the original Sea Lance:
TSSE Projects: Sea Lance