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rickusn · 11-03-2007, 21:16 PM

On the 250 WWII destroyers the USN attempted to replace.

They built 77 new units plus converted three WWII cruisers whose mission was similar to the latest new built DLGs of the mid 1960's.

The cancellation of the Typhon missile program set back surface combatant construction.

They got 75 units of the Bronstein/Garcia/Brooke/Knox class built.

The MFE called for 60 DD/DDG plus nuclear powered escorts but only 31 Spruances were built one as a pork project and six nuclear powered escorts.

Planned up to 75 OHP class reduced to 50 then fewer but wre added back and then Congress funded a final as pork.

Then the USN got the four bargain Kidds .

The proposed 600 ship fleet called for 238 destroyer type escorts.

And then the Ticos got started building .

And the USN even finally got the Burke program started to begin replacement of the 1950/early 1960 era ships.

Its not like the USN didnt try thats for sure.

What about Cruisers you say? 19 were in-commission at the end of the Korean War but this was inflated by units temporarilly commissoned to provide fire support for the reason I related earlier.

So if you consider that the USN considered one for each carrier to be sufficient and only one of those of a Talos missile configuration then 15 would be our #..

USS LONG BEACH CGN actually comprised the capbilities of a TALOS cruiser type ship and a Terrier destroyer type ship.

And the USN did convert six to various TALOS missile conversions(two of which were also configured as Fleet Flagships) and had planned another three which were canceled.

Along with keeping in service two all-gun cruisers that also were configured as Fleet Flagships.

So we come to fourteen planned 10 of which would be armed with Talos which was far more important.

Pretty close.

In the early 60's in reponse to the lack of high-end escorts now according to the uSN including even the newly FRAMed WWII era destroyers.

The USN experimented beginning in 1964 with using tree or four missile armed escorts for each carrier rather than the previous two(one after Korea) all-gun cruisers and eight destroyers(A DESRON).

Ther MFE study of 1967 confirmed that three or four missile escorts would be sufficient as long as they also were ASW capable along with two or three dedicated ASW ships.

The building of only 30 Spruances caused the USN to consider two sufficient.

But the FF/FFGs of the Garcia/Brooke/Knox class were assigned to carrier battlegroups from the outset and continued even after the Spruances were built because the USN may officially have stated that was enough but they knew damn well it wasnt by the mere fact of how they trained and deployed.

As late as 1988 Captain Galdorisi wrote that CVBGs were conceptually designed to contain four AAW ships, two Spruances and four to six FF/FFGs.

And while the battlgroups didnt always deploy with that many they did deploy with frigates not just the high-end ships officially conceptualized and sometimes in liu of some of those ships. Particulary for ASW.

This got even worse when in the late 80s early 1990's all the older DDGs/CGs/FF/FFG were retired and before enough Burkes were ready for deployment.

Leaving the OHP FFG 7 class to fill even the high-end DDG role for which it was ill equipped. Not that it hadnt from time to time before but now there was little choice.

Sorry for ranting a bit but sometimes the games that get played with force structure irk me a bit. LOL

It may have been a calculated, educated low risk gamble but its fortunate no one pressed the USN at this very vulnerable time.

Well more later.

Maybe :

On Captain Hughes architect of the ASW section of the MFE 1967. Wrote the book "Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice" 1986.and "Fleet Tactics and Coastal Operations" 1999/2000. Champion of small ships and in the late 1990s collaborated with Cebrowski with the so-called "streetfighter" concept.

"Following graduation from the Naval Academy in 1952
Capt. Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. served two years aboard the
USS CUSHING (DD-797) as Navigator and DCA. He then
served on the staff of COMINRON FOUR before becoming
the Executive Officer of the USS SHRIKE (MSC-201) from
December 1954 until February 1956. Capt. Hughes then
assumed duties as the Commanding Officer of the USS
HUMMINGBIRD (MSC-192) until July 1957. After a threeyear
tour at the Naval Academy Capt. Hughes was the
Operations Officer of the USS ROBERT A. OWENS (DDE-
827) until 1962 when he was transferred to the USS
DYESS (DDR-880) as her Executive Officer.
Attending U.S. Naval Postgraduate School In Monterey,
California, Capt. Hughes earned a Master's degree in
Operations Research in 1964. He then attended Nuclear
Power Basic School in Bainbridge, Maryland followed by
studies at the Nuclear Power Training Center in West
Milton, New York, where he earned his qualification to
operate nuclear power plants. In 1965 he returned to the
DYESS serving again as her Executive Officer. From
August 1966 to August 1968 he assumed duties as ASW
Analyst on the Staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP- 96). During this time he led the ASW analysis of the successful Major Fleet Escort Study which yielded the DX/DXG Program.

Capt. Hughes was Morton’s seventh Commanding Officer, from 8 October 1968 until she was decommissioned for modernization on 28 September 1969.

As of November 2002 Captain Hughes is:
Dean of the Graduate School of Operational Information and Sciences
Naval Post Graduate School
Monterey, Ca.

Note: This bio was taken from the WestPac 1968-69 cruise book and is therefore missing the years 1970 to 2002.

11-03-2007, 21:16 PM	#6 (permalink)
rickusn *Military Professional* Join Date: 08-09-03 Posts: 1,317	On the 250 WWII destroyers the USN attempted to replace. They built 77 new units plus converted three WWII cruisers whose mission was similar to the latest new built DLGs of the mid 1960's. The cancellation of the Typhon missile program set back surface combatant construction. They got 75 units of the Bronstein/Garcia/Brooke/Knox class built. The MFE called for 60 DD/DDG plus nuclear powered escorts but only 31 Spruances were built one as a pork project and six nuclear powered escorts. Planned up to 75 OHP class reduced to 50 then fewer but wre added back and then Congress funded a final as pork. Then the USN got the four bargain Kidds . The proposed 600 ship fleet called for 238 destroyer type escorts. And then the Ticos got started building . And the USN even finally got the Burke program started to begin replacement of the 1950/early 1960 era ships. Its not like the USN didnt try thats for sure. What about Cruisers you say? 19 were in-commission at the end of the Korean War but this was inflated by units temporarilly commissoned to provide fire support for the reason I related earlier. So if you consider that the USN considered one for each carrier to be sufficient and only one of those of a Talos missile configuration then 15 would be our #.. USS LONG BEACH CGN actually comprised the capbilities of a TALOS cruiser type ship and a Terrier destroyer type ship. And the USN did convert six to various TALOS missile conversions(two of which were also configured as Fleet Flagships) and had planned another three which were canceled. Along with keeping in service two all-gun cruisers that also were configured as Fleet Flagships. So we come to fourteen planned 10 of which would be armed with Talos which was far more important. Pretty close. In the early 60's in reponse to the lack of high-end escorts now according to the uSN including even the newly FRAMed WWII era destroyers. The USN experimented beginning in 1964 with using tree or four missile armed escorts for each carrier rather than the previous two(one after Korea) all-gun cruisers and eight destroyers(A DESRON). Ther MFE study of 1967 confirmed that three or four missile escorts would be sufficient as long as they also were ASW capable along with two or three dedicated ASW ships. The building of only 30 Spruances caused the USN to consider two sufficient. But the FF/FFGs of the Garcia/Brooke/Knox class were assigned to carrier battlegroups from the outset and continued even after the Spruances were built because the USN may officially have stated that was enough but they knew damn well it wasnt by the mere fact of how they trained and deployed. As late as 1988 Captain Galdorisi wrote that CVBGs were conceptually designed to contain four AAW ships, two Spruances and four to six FF/FFGs. And while the battlgroups didnt always deploy with that many they did deploy with frigates not just the high-end ships officially conceptualized and sometimes in liu of some of those ships. Particulary for ASW. This got even worse when in the late 80s early 1990's all the older DDGs/CGs/FF/FFG were retired and before enough Burkes were ready for deployment. Leaving the OHP FFG 7 class to fill even the high-end DDG role for which it was ill equipped. Not that it hadnt from time to time before but now there was little choice. Sorry for ranting a bit but sometimes the games that get played with force structure irk me a bit. LOL It may have been a calculated, educated low risk gamble but its fortunate no one pressed the USN at this very vulnerable time. Well more later. Maybe : On Captain Hughes architect of the ASW section of the MFE 1967. Wrote the book "Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice" 1986.and "Fleet Tactics and Coastal Operations" 1999/2000. Champion of small ships and in the late 1990s collaborated with Cebrowski with the so-called "streetfighter" concept. "Following graduation from the Naval Academy in 1952 Capt. Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. served two years aboard the USS CUSHING (DD-797) as Navigator and DCA. He then served on the staff of COMINRON FOUR before becoming the Executive Officer of the USS SHRIKE (MSC-201) from December 1954 until February 1956. Capt. Hughes then assumed duties as the Commanding Officer of the USS HUMMINGBIRD (MSC-192) until July 1957. After a threeyear tour at the Naval Academy Capt. Hughes was the Operations Officer of the USS ROBERT A. OWENS (DDE- 827) until 1962 when he was transferred to the USS DYESS (DDR-880) as her Executive Officer. Attending U.S. Naval Postgraduate School In Monterey, California, Capt. Hughes earned a Master's degree in Operations Research in 1964. He then attended Nuclear Power Basic School in Bainbridge, Maryland followed by studies at the Nuclear Power Training Center in West Milton, New York, where he earned his qualification to operate nuclear power plants. In 1965 he returned to the DYESS serving again as her Executive Officer. From August 1966 to August 1968 he assumed duties as ASW Analyst on the Staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP- 96). During this time he led the ASW analysis of the successful Major Fleet Escort Study which yielded the DX/DXG Program. Capt. Hughes was Morton’s seventh Commanding Officer, from 8 October 1968 until she was decommissioned for modernization on 28 September 1969. As of November 2002 Captain Hughes is: Dean of the Graduate School of Operational Information and Sciences Naval Post Graduate School Monterey, Ca. Note: This bio was taken from the WestPac 1968-69 cruise book and is therefore missing the years 1970 to 2002.