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Ray · 09-16-2007, 12:33 PM

The above post is from what I remember.

Here is something from the web.

Quote:

The Rise and Fall of the Taliban

The Taliban factor that menaced the region did not emerge in a vacuum. After a decade of war and the defeat of the Soviets, the United States and the rest of the world abandoned Pakistan and the Mujahideens. The resulting power vacuum plunged Afghanistan into a bitter civil war. The continuation of the Najeebullah regime posed a threat to Pakistan at a time when the Kashmir uprising had led to a serious stand off with India. Pakistan now by itself tried to secure a friendly government in Kabul as a prize for its support for liberating Afghans from the Soviets. Mujahideens found their way into Pakistan causing internal problems, and further into Indian-held Kashmir. Pakistan supported the Kashmir struggle at one end and also attempted to forge a broad-based alliance to settle the Afghanistan problem. India, Iran and Russia meanwhile supported the Tajik- Panjsheri factions (notably the Burhanuddin Rabbani). Civil strife continued in Afghanistan, reducing Kabul to rubble. Essentially it was a battle between the Pashtuns (mostly led by Hikmatyar`s Hizb-e-Islami, a key ally and then favorite of the Inter Service Intelligence—ISI) and the Panjsheris (led by Ahmed Shah Masud—the "Lion of Panjsher") that had entered a stalemate phase.

The Taliban—student militias—came from seminaries (Madrassah) mainly based in the tribal areas in South and Eastern Afghanistan and in the Pashtun belt of Pakistan—NWFP and Baluchistan, notorious for their ferocious independence. By the mid 1990s the Taliban were a cult-like organization, a peculiar hybrid of the Wahhabi-Deobandi schools of thought that had made inroads since the early 1950s. The Wahabis played an active role in the late '70s and early '80s when they provided massive funds for the Madrassah schools. Many of the Taliban were orphans of the "Afghan Jihad" against the Soviets. The Taliban cult was propped up initially with the support of the civil government of Benazir Bhutto, then in coalition with the Deobandi Jama'at-ulema Islam (JUI) led by Maulana Fazlur Rehman—now the elected opposition leader at the Center in Islamabad and whose protégé is now the chief Minister in the NWFP. The Taliban was known to be brainchild of the interior Minister Naseerullah Babar, himself a Pashtun and ostensibly driven by incentive to open up a trade route to Turkmenistan via Kandahar.[12]

The success of the Taliban in establishing writ in the Kandhar province and the continued infighting in the north of Afghanistan and Kabul significantly weakened the fledgling Rabbani regime. Ironically, in June 1996 after some 10,000 casualties between themselves, Hikmatyar became the Prime Minister of Afghanistan under the Rabbani Presidency. This unnatural alliance barely lasted a few months. It was then that Pakistan agencies—in particular the ISI—shifted support from Hikamatyar to the rising Taliban. In October 1996 to the surprise of all, the Taliban overthrew the Rabbani regime and established a semblance of law and order after a devastating period of civil war.

In November 1996, the civilian President of Pakistan sacked the government of Benazir Bhutto and thus ended the reign of the government that had spawned the Taliban. From then on the Taliban regime grew apace with the support of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. This brought a clash of interests with Iran, which was becoming increasingly concerned as the Taliban continued to consolidate power in Afghanistan and in the process actively repressed ethnic and religious minorities especially the Shia Hazara. Iran found sympathy in India and some Central Asian countries that had earlier seen a historic opportunity for a trade outlet once Afghanistan freed itself from the yolk of the Soviets. Since then Afghanistan became a pawn in the hands of regional neighbors and the war torn society suffered immensely.[13]

It was around this period that Osama bin Laden and others quietly arrived as "guests" of Mullah Omar. Their arrival went unnoticed against the backdrop of a twenty year flow of mercenaries and religious fighters in and out of Pakistan for the "global jihad."

By the late 1990s the Pakistani establishment grew weary of the Taliban and the presence of the global Jihad network in Afghanistan. Pakistan found that the Taliban had transformed from a subservient political client into an independent regime that had become something of a Frankenstein monster for Islamabad. Focused on its own internal political divisions and on its now-nuclear rivalry with India, a weakened Pakistan was unable to manage the Taliban. In 1998, Osama Bin Laden struck U.S. embassies in East Africa, and the United States responded with cruise missile attacks. Meanwhile the Taliban's incivility culminated in the destruction of the Buddhist statues in Bamyan. Pakistan was clearly frustrated. But abandoning the Taliban could mean anarchy on its border—tantamount to opening a second front. In the process of trying to bring Afghanistan out of its isolation, Pakistan became increasingly isolated itself.[14]

Given this backdrop, when the Taliban regime was ousted from power in the fall of 2001, it was good riddance of a bigoted regime that freed both Pakistan and Afghanistan. However in the eyes of the Pashtuns—the largest ethnic group in the population of Afghanistan—it spelled the retreat of the Pashtuns from political power for the second time this decade after dominating the country for nearly 300 years. [15]

When Operation Enduring Freedom commenced in October 2001, an influx of refugees into Pakistan and Iran began. Both countries blocked entry of the displaced persons. Nevertheless about 200, 000 were able to enter Pakistan. But nearly 2 million were displaced persons and they remained within Afghanistan.[16] Most of those suffering displacement were Pashtuns, and as the war shifted eastwards towards the Pakistani border, the sympathy of the tribal Pashtuns was a natural outcome. To add insult to injury, Kabul was allowed to be captured by the Northern Alliance. Further, the Northern Alliance—dominated by the Panjsheris, historic archrivals of the Pashtuns—captured the key posts in the interim government.
The Refuge Behind the 'Pashtunwali' Code

One significant factor that influenced the behavior of the Taliban as well as the tribal Pashtun areas was the "Pashtunwali code." This code demands blood vengeance, has a strong focus on hospitality, bravery, chivalry and defense for the honor of women[17]. One key obligation under this code is to provide protection—even at the peril of their own lives—to individuals who seek shelter or refuge in the tribal area. In fact, Mullah Omar used this antiquated custom as an excuse to shelter Osama Bin Laden and other "guests" that had taken refuge in Afghanistan.

Since December 2001 as Operation "Enduring Freedom" pushed towards Eastern Afghanistan into areas that overlapped with the tribal Pashtun belts of Pakistan, which are characterized by a rugged terrain, new complications arose for the military operation. The Al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban renegades took refuge in these areas, the abode from where most of them came from. The Pashtunwali code provided subterfuge for the tribal Pashtuns and their political sympathizers for sheltering and protecting the fleeing Taliban and Al Qaeda. In reality the behavior of the Pashtun tribal areas reflected ongoing rivalry with the Panjsheris of the Northern Alliance.

CCC - Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations: Rough Neighbors