S-2

Could you link me to anything that states that our ongoing, continuing objective remains "progressive" governance, i.e. "democratic transformation" I'd presume? I'm certain that we've regressed back to a far more fundamental approach emphasizing stability at the expense of advancing democratic ideals as an absolute priority.

You said,

"The "after-effects" I worry about is... the "after-effects" of encouraging tribal forces: they may have long-term negative consequenes on nation-building efforts, even if the have short-term positive effect of killing a few local al Queda."

Kilcullen shares the same concern, as do others-

"Unless re-integration measures are formally established, some tribes may come to see their security forces as a permanent entitlement, which would make control over their areas more difficult for any future central government."

At this point, Kilcullen and others appear to realize that whatever may have initially been intended as American national objectives for Iraq are less salient than what is evolving on the ground. He fully acknowledges that the anbari opportunity is not of our making. Capitalizing upon it, however, is. To that extent, we shall see just how opportunistic and flexible our leadership is under these emerging realities.

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"This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski