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Originally Posted by Shek
JAD,
Glad that you liked the book.
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Not finished yet. Like the format; perfect for someone who falls asleep reading technical stuff.
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As far as the AVF goes, the issue is beyond that of the AVF. As a point of departure, strategy encompasses just the military. Grand strategy encompasses DIME (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic) or MIDLIFE (Military, Informational, Diplomatic, Legal, Intelligence, Financial, and Economic), depending on which acronym you want to use.
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I've lost touch with all the acronyms since leaving DoD. Not sure it would make any difference in a layman's discussion. But thanks for the refresher course.
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In any case, the current administration has not developed an integrated grand strategy IMO, and instead, has relied mostly on the military. In choosing to do so, the burden of the war has fallen squarely on the military, while the rest of the machinations of government has for the most part been left out of the fight (with the exceptions of parts of State and some intel agencies), as have the American people.
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I doubt the current adminstration had to do more than assess whether our vital interests were at stake in the ME. The grand strategy, to use your term, already existed. The decision to send the military in must have been very difficult for Bush to make from the standpoint of loss of life and commitment of resources.
I believe the consultative process that really made a difference is ultra top secret. We've only heard about the decision to pin it on WMD and the debate on force structure. We haven't heard Rice laying out the geopolitical picture to Bush in private with all the ramification of this and that. We haven't heard the tacit encouragement of our ME allies.
Doesn't the military assume the greater share of the burden once the decision is made to go in? How is Iraq any different in that respect to any other military action?
I
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suspect that if the President had called for service post-9/11, or even in the summer/fall of 2003 when it became clear that Iraq wasn't going to be an in and out gig, that we could have increased the active end-strength of the Army by several hundred thousand.
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Probably right.
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Bottomline, the inspiration and leadership for mobilizing the country needs to come from the executive office. The bully pulpit wasn't used, and that is where I think much of the apathy towards the war lays. If you're told to go out shopping and living like normal, then that's what you're going to do.
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Too much bully pulpit could spook Congress. Like in, how far is this thing going to go. But the reason it may not have been used is that Rumsfeld was too **** sure of what he was at.