Quote:
Originally Posted by mudshark
Thanks Shek,
First, I need to apologise for some of those remarks I truly got carried away. Its probably because I can't really see what is happening. All I ever get are reports about our troops getting killed ,and some tortured before getting killed. It burns me to the core that this enemy has no respect for anything civil,and we as American people can't see any results against them.
So to everyone on this forum "I publicly apologise".
I do look forward to what you have to say in the future.
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Mudshark,
Iraq is a complicated mosaic. It is best to think of it as a multi-dimensional chess board, with the different boards being connected and related, although often in ways that we can't see since we can only process 2D and 3D with ease. Furthermore, on the chess boards that we concentrate on, what may look like losing really isn't - it's the price that you pay for setting up your next series of moves, which may quickly turn the tide and cascade into victory. The question then becomes how this board relates to the others - will it have an effect? is it important?
So, the aggregate can at times look depressing, but that's not the best level of analysis. It is often better to disassemble and look at the micro-level, and then build back up to the aggregate. So, take yourself back two years in time to where the Sunni insurgency was Al Anbar, and AQI was entrenched in Al Anbar. It would be hard to fathom that AQI was not only no longer welcome in Al Anbar, but it no longer had any sanctuary worth noting. Yet, that is where we find ourselves today. LTC Alford is a success story. You've probably never heard of him, but that's not a surprise, as if I recall correctly, he's only been reported about in some local newspapers. He turned Al Qaim around, just as COL MacFarland turned Ar Ramadi around, and just as COL McMaster turned around Tall Afar (however, this is still a tough nut because of the deeply rooted sectarian and ethnic divide that you find there).
I cite these as examples of where the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy that you now see being implemented in Baghdad and the Baghdad belts have worked on the micro-level. Does this guarantee or even imply success? No, because you have a different and much different ethnography in the Baghdad area. However, it is a proven technique that can bear fruit in time. Qaim, Tall Afar, and Ramadi all took months to bear fruit - because of the complicating ethnography, it shouldn't be a surprise that it will take longer in the Baghdad region.
So, enough about the examples for now. If you have trouble finding more links, let me know and I'll dig some up for you.
As far as the question of armored vehicles, you cannot look at the vehicle as being the causation of strategy. For example, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division (COL MacFarland's brigade) didn't just park their tanks one day and say, "jeez, let's go drink pink lemonade with some tribal sheiks." No, they continued to operate their tanks as it gave them protection and precision anti-sniper fire when needed. Simultaneously, they engaged the local leadership and co-opted them based on mutual interests. So, don't equate vehicle platforms with strategy. They will drive tactics (i.e. if you have a HMMWV vs. Stryker vs. Bradley vs. Abrams will dictate how you take out a sniper's nest - you can't ignore it and so you must eliminate it), but the vehicle doesn't drive strategy (after you take out the sniper's nest, you'll need to engage the populace with some information operations, report casualties and the incident so it can't become propaganda fodder, reimburse the owner of the building as necessary and appropriate, etc. - what vehicle you transport troops around in doesn't dictate which of these things you'll do).
Hopefully, the above gives you a flavor of what I've been trying to convey.