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Originally Posted by mudshark
Sorry,but the things I wrote are not fallacies,and the only thing that makes them"attractive" is the truth. The thread is about Strykers and the supposed losses they carry.
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You're trying to play both sides of the fence. You now claim that you're writing about Strykers, when you just said you were talking about strategy, even though your original post addressed Strykers. You should make up your mind.
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Originally Posted by mudshark
I do believe they are an "armored" vehicle,and in an urban environment, well, scuse me for not being able to see firsthand what is happening.
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The Strykers are a medium armored vehicle. They do not exist for armored mobile warfare as you originally claimed.
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Originally Posted by mudshark
I thank you for your information. I rely a lot on news sources,and more than a few. The "facts" that I deduct from this info is what I go by.
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You do not deduct facts. You use facts to conduct deductive reasoning.
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Originally Posted by mudshark
I have no promotional drive for me to accept things with an eye or an ear closed. Thanks again.
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Are you now attempting to create a strawman through inference, using yourself as a foil to forward the idea that I have something to gain by taking a particular position. If so, bring it out into the open.
Lastly, once you're done responding to my questions about the success of armored units in Tall Afar and Ramadi, I'd like you to cover down on Mosul and why Michael Yon stated this back in January and ask you to name the type of unit that was operating in Mosul that tamped down the violence to the point that it was ineffectual. I'll give you a hint: it starts with "Stryk" and ends with "er." Now, don't read this as stating that it was because they were a Stryker unit. I simply offer it up because this is where the SBCTs had been operating until just a few months ago, and Mosul has been a success, even if it has been up and down (with the downs being a result of troop #s and not vehicle platforms).
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Right. Hugh, I usually don’t do the crystal ball thing, but I think I’m going to do it this time, because I do have some confidence. I think a year from now, and I’m going to go on the record here, I believe a year from now, the ISF, the Iraqi Security Forces in Nineveh, are mostly going to be running the operation. I believe we’re still going to definitely have a U.S. presence here. That’s going to be needed beyond a year from now. But it’s very clear that the Iraqi Security Forces, the Iraqi police and army, are getting much stronger. We need to build the next layer in their organization. Their combat power is already there. They’re well-trained, they’re getting better as well. But now, the next stage is to build those other layers that go into a military, for instance, logistics and those sort of things, sustainment, but these things take time. But when it comes down to day to day combat, the insurgents are definitely on the run here. They know they’re not welcome in Mosul. And so what’s happening now is the insurgents are trying to operate outside of Mosul in the villages, and they’re now being targeted there. You know, Tal Afar used to be a huge problem west of Mosul about a year and a half ago, but that’s now been a tremendous success story. You’ll still see some attacks on the news, but they’re more of a nuisance than anything else. So I’d say a year from now, you’re…you don’t see Mosul or Nineveh Province in the news much already. So I think a year from now, people are going to forget that it even exists.
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