Quote:
Originally Posted by Shek
Zraver,
Thanks for your argument that ST provides better advice to rulers, and in re-reading it, I saw that ST does offer a lot.
However, I think you have VC wrong.
VC was quite misinterpreted by the German Army in the early 20th century, with their interpretation that once war started, then the politicians handed off the battle to the generals completely, and then re-engaged once it was time for peace. I may be wrong, but I think this is the interpretation that you are implying. I offer the following passage from Paret's essay "The Genesis of On War" that precedes the translation as evidence that there can be no dichotomy between politics and war.
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I disagree and think you misunderstood me, the passage you provided showed only that recognized the importance of politics in deciding to go to war and what strategy to pursue once the decsion to make war had been made. VC did not councel rulers on what course to take. Like a modern western professional he left politcal decsions to politicans rather than push the miltiary way of thinking into the politcal arena. While generals have often made good presidents or rulers becuase of their graps of issues, critical thinking skills, and deep under standing of the law of unintended consequences, not all generals make good rulers. VC clearly saw that the miltiary mind often has to few tools to make sound political decsions inside of the context of a nation vs dynasitc state. The hammer, scaple, and barred teeth all have thier role, but often you need softer tools and forms of thinking inorder to avoid war or even simple domestic politcal crisies. It is easier for a politican to borrow a military man's skills, that it is for a general to borrow concepts of give and take from a diplomat.
I do not dispute this, I simply assert that VC's advice was operational in nature not strategic.
War is not an independent phenomenom, but the continuation of politics by different means. Consequently, the main lines of every strategic plan are largely political in nature, and their political character increases the more the plan applies to the entire campaign and to the whole state. A war plan results directly from the political conditions of the two warring states, as well as from their relations to third powers. A plan of campaign results from the war plan, and frequently - if there is only one theater of operations - may even be identical with it. But the political element even enters the separate components of a campaign; rarely will it be without influence on such major episodes of warfare as a battle, etc. According to this point of view, there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it.
Notice he does not actually give advie on the politcal details, but if you look for advice on what to do when attackign or defending you will find it. Vc will tell you how to prepare the battle feild, how to manuver, what to aim for, how to concentrate, but not why to fight.