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Galrahn · 04-23-2007, 23:59 PM

In my version of the "Littoral Strike Group" I have a HSV, so I can't say anything is wrong with the HSV being the pilot. The HSV would have access to areas a deep draft ship couldn't go, and that is important.

Assuming for a minute that "Global Fleet Stations" is a "Sea Basing" deployment for "Building Partner Capacity" through "Cultural Awareness" and "Task Focused Training," then I think it leaves a lot to be desired from the CNO's own message.

However, I don't believe in any major Navy intuitive unless it includes "Adaptive Force Packaging" that includes "Cross Fleet Standardization" models to "Aggregate, Disaggregate, Re-aggregate" for "Distributed Operations" to support the larger "Globally Networked Operations" that define the global challenges facing the United States in the 21st century.

So far from what I am reading, Global Fleet Station is about the first and passes up on the second.

The CNO's own definition of the littoral is: "Conceptually, the littoral is comprised of two segments. The seaward portion is that area from the open ocean to the shore which must be controlled to support operations ashore. The landward portion is the area inland from the shore over which friendly forces can be supported and defended directly from the sea."

If using that definition, the Global Fleet Stations CONOP is limited and focused to only a small part of the littoral, which in my opinion sums up a lot of the problems with the various littoral strategies the US Navy has discussed since the 1997 QDR. In my opinion the US Navy littoral strategy should include the Global Fleet Station concept, but it must contain the warfighting capabilities that fit into the US Navy operational model so it can be sustained, supported, and ultimately effective. The Global Fleet Station concept outlined above is basically the engagement process in the littoral with host nations, but as it only contains that single focus, for me it fails the larger effort to establish US Navy focus in the littoral.

The CSG and ESG models fit well into the traditional challenges facing the United States, both in major conflict and in small wars, but those task force units fall short in providing the Navy with its littoral "Maritime Domain Awareness" solution that builds the "1000-ship navy" partnership required to fight the 21st century peace.

To me the "Littoral Strike Group" is the solution to several of the questions being asked surrounding the new Naval Maritime Strategy. The "Littoral Strike Group" represents a "Forward Naval Presence" able to provide "Information Operations" and "Maritime Security Operations" in troubled regions. Its flexibility must include "Crisis Response" to any humanitarian situation that may arise, able to react independently without returning to a major port for supply. It is through "Security Cooperation" and "Civil-Military Operations" with nearby nations the US can work to realize true regional partnerships, but also through "Sea Control" can the Navy impact troubled regions in "Counterterrorism," "Counter-proliferation," and "Counterinsurgency" actions that threaten regional stability.

True regional "Deterrence" requires that the Navy builds partnerships, but also possesses the capability to take action unilaterally when required, because although regional nations will often share objectives, there will be exceptions where regional political will prevent governments from taking action, even when they want to. This means the "Littoral Strike Group" may require limited "Expeditionary Power Projection" for limited combat, or as Israel learned last summer, an "Air and Missile Defense" just in case regional relations breakdown.

I see the Littoral Strike Group based on certain capabilities. While I am not sure the right mix, I envision something like:

1 LPD
- as C4ISR Command Ship / Mothership
- w/ 2 H-60S and 2 H-60R or 2 MV-22 or 2 CH-53E
- 2 80ft patrol vessels or 1 80ft patrol vessels and multiple smaller vessels
- unmanned vehicles including air, surface, and undersea
- 1 AAV platoon w/ 1 USMC Rifle Company
- Joint USN/USCG inspection teams
- medical detachment
- SOF

1 T-AKE w/ 2 H-60S and 1 HSV w/ 2 H-60S
- w/ civil military teams
- w/ State Dept teams
- w/ Army Engineers
- w/ SeaBees
- w/ Salvage Teams
- w/ stocked shop with parts specific to regional naval assets
- w/ mechanic detachments for repair of host nation vessels
- w/ stock humanitarian stores
- w/ 30 days supply for combat operations 1 USMC rifle company
- w/ SOF equipment
- Crane for swapping LCS modules in low sea states
- Additional LCS modules (4 MIW, 4 ASuW, 4 SOF)
- 4 spare module crews (2 MIW and 2 ASuW) all w/ SOF qualification

1 DDG-51
- w/ Sea Strike and Sea Shield capability, including limited ABM if available

4 LCS w/ 1 MH-60R each.
- ASW configuration w/ SOF qualification

Basically this is a 4 ship LCS squadron able to fully deploy any of the 4 modules (ASW, MIW, ASuW, or SOF) including helicopters supported by a T-AKE and HSV that act as tenders and littoral relations vessels escorted by a Flight I DDG-51 and a LPD-17 with a mixed USN/USMC loading plan. I think submarines (both SSN and SSGN) make a natural fit into this type of task force, but see no reason to qualify them here.

The LSG consists of small, medium, and large task force units that can be tailored to any number of missions. Spare LCS crews and unused mechanics are hands for construction and 'good will' operations. The USMC presence should focus on regional language skills while both deployed for training exercises and while on the LPD. As the T-AKE and HSV both enjoy civilian crews mixed with Navy crews, these platforms can sustain long deployments.

The key would be to entice officers, interested sailors, and the full marine company to make a 12-18 month commitment, perhaps with enticement of educational benefits through the use of college credit hours towards a degree in any number of international focus studies. The Navy should be able to entice professors into providing semester long classes on the LPD to these regional deployments considering the level of interaction with the local populace they could insure, particularly in anthropology, language study, history, and science curriculum.

The DDG-51, LCS, and individual attached military air, sea, land, and civilian detachments could rotate via standard 6 month exchanges using the 'sea swap' concept to sustain duration of presence for the Global Fleet Station.

Should the need arise for mission module swapping and a required crew is unavailable (example all LCS have to go MIW configuration to respond to a MIW threat), the LCS crews should be able to deploy to the area within 48 hours, which is faster than the time it would take to swap all 4 modules from a harbor one at a time, much less from a modified T-AKE.

In the end, I think the "Littoral Strike Group" in this configuration gives the Navy a much needed solution for the littoral mission of the 21st century, both at sea and in partnership. It allows a GFS to distribute its operations, as to insure presence over the horizon while interaction with a neighbor anywhere mutually agreed. By utilizing the LPD as a command ship, the Navy extends the littoral across the shore line of continents instead of simply from the sea over land, which increases the Maritime Domain Awareness regionally in ways that prevent global organizations from out flanking a concentrated naval sea base, while at the same time providing the Navy with the right warfighter capabilities to "Aggregate, Disaggregate, Re-aggregate" with other Navy elements in response to regional warfighter requirements.

Finally, it provides the mechanism the Navy requires in order to provide war fighter capabilities that simply cannot be obtained state side. As anyone familiar with ASW or MIW will tell you, these warfighter techniques require skilled people with the time to perfect their craft. The Global Fleet Station in operation combined with the outlined "Littoral Strike Group" provides the Navy with a unique opportunity for a forward deployed international cooperation framework to improve these critical areas that demand both time and practice.

The "Global Fleet Station" introduces a unique overseas medium for the US to engage in enhanced "Task Focused Training" that encourages partnership from the greater international community. Through this persistence the "1000-ship Navy" becomes more than just a regional buzzword for mutual "Security Cooperation", but an example where "Building Partner Capacity" with international partners achieves the type of "Globally Networked Operations" that lead not only to regional "Deterrence," but contribution towards the international "Deterrence" the US Navy is seeking with the phase 0 shaping operations in troubled regions to begin with.

All phrases in italics represent the ideas thrown around in this thread combined with the methods and missions outlined in the CNO Naval Operations Concept 2006 vision.

04-23-2007, 23:59 PM	#41 (permalink)
Galrahn *Defense Professional* Join Date: 04-14-06 Posts: 405	In my version of the "Littoral Strike Group" I have a HSV, so I can't say anything is wrong with the HSV being the pilot. The HSV would have access to areas a deep draft ship couldn't go, and that is important. Assuming for a minute that "Global Fleet Stations" is a "Sea Basing" deployment for "Building Partner Capacity" through "Cultural Awareness" and "Task Focused Training," then I think it leaves a lot to be desired from the CNO's own message. However, I don't believe in any major Navy intuitive unless it includes "Adaptive Force Packaging" that includes "Cross Fleet Standardization" models to "Aggregate, Disaggregate, Re-aggregate" for "Distributed Operations" to support the larger "Globally Networked Operations" that define the global challenges facing the United States in the 21st century. So far from what I am reading, Global Fleet Station is about the first and passes up on the second. The CNO's own definition of the littoral is: "Conceptually, the littoral is comprised of two segments. The seaward portion is that area from the open ocean to the shore which must be controlled to support operations ashore. The landward portion is the area inland from the shore over which friendly forces can be supported and defended directly from the sea." If using that definition, the Global Fleet Stations CONOP is limited and focused to only a small part of the littoral, which in my opinion sums up a lot of the problems with the various littoral strategies the US Navy has discussed since the 1997 QDR. In my opinion the US Navy littoral strategy should include the Global Fleet Station concept, but it must contain the warfighting capabilities that fit into the US Navy operational model so it can be sustained, supported, and ultimately effective. The Global Fleet Station concept outlined above is basically the engagement process in the littoral with host nations, but as it only contains that single focus, for me it fails the larger effort to establish US Navy focus in the littoral. The CSG and ESG models fit well into the traditional challenges facing the United States, both in major conflict and in small wars, but those task force units fall short in providing the Navy with its littoral "Maritime Domain Awareness" solution that builds the "1000-ship navy" partnership required to fight the 21st century peace. To me the "Littoral Strike Group" is the solution to several of the questions being asked surrounding the new Naval Maritime Strategy. The "Littoral Strike Group" represents a "Forward Naval Presence" able to provide "Information Operations" and "Maritime Security Operations" in troubled regions. Its flexibility must include "Crisis Response" to any humanitarian situation that may arise, able to react independently without returning to a major port for supply. It is through "Security Cooperation" and "Civil-Military Operations" with nearby nations the US can work to realize true regional partnerships, but also through "Sea Control" can the Navy impact troubled regions in "Counterterrorism," "Counter-proliferation," and "Counterinsurgency" actions that threaten regional stability. True regional "Deterrence" requires that the Navy builds partnerships, but also possesses the capability to take action unilaterally when required, because although regional nations will often share objectives, there will be exceptions where regional political will prevent governments from taking action, even when they want to. This means the "Littoral Strike Group" may require limited "Expeditionary Power Projection" for limited combat, or as Israel learned last summer, an "Air and Missile Defense" just in case regional relations breakdown. I see the Littoral Strike Group based on certain capabilities. While I am not sure the right mix, I envision something like: 1 LPD - as C4ISR Command Ship / Mothership - w/ 2 H-60S and 2 H-60R or 2 MV-22 or 2 CH-53E - 2 80ft patrol vessels or 1 80ft patrol vessels and multiple smaller vessels - unmanned vehicles including air, surface, and undersea - 1 AAV platoon w/ 1 USMC Rifle Company - Joint USN/USCG inspection teams - medical detachment - SOF 1 T-AKE w/ 2 H-60S and 1 HSV w/ 2 H-60S - w/ civil military teams - w/ State Dept teams - w/ Army Engineers - w/ SeaBees - w/ Salvage Teams - w/ stocked shop with parts specific to regional naval assets - w/ mechanic detachments for repair of host nation vessels - w/ stock humanitarian stores - w/ 30 days supply for combat operations 1 USMC rifle company - w/ SOF equipment - Crane for swapping LCS modules in low sea states - Additional LCS modules (4 MIW, 4 ASuW, 4 SOF) - 4 spare module crews (2 MIW and 2 ASuW) all w/ SOF qualification 1 DDG-51 - w/ Sea Strike and Sea Shield capability, including limited ABM if available 4 LCS w/ 1 MH-60R each. - ASW configuration w/ SOF qualification Basically this is a 4 ship LCS squadron able to fully deploy any of the 4 modules (ASW, MIW, ASuW, or SOF) including helicopters supported by a T-AKE and HSV that act as tenders and littoral relations vessels escorted by a Flight I DDG-51 and a LPD-17 with a mixed USN/USMC loading plan. I think submarines (both SSN and SSGN) make a natural fit into this type of task force, but see no reason to qualify them here. The LSG consists of small, medium, and large task force units that can be tailored to any number of missions. Spare LCS crews and unused mechanics are hands for construction and 'good will' operations. The USMC presence should focus on regional language skills while both deployed for training exercises and while on the LPD. As the T-AKE and HSV both enjoy civilian crews mixed with Navy crews, these platforms can sustain long deployments. The key would be to entice officers, interested sailors, and the full marine company to make a 12-18 month commitment, perhaps with enticement of educational benefits through the use of college credit hours towards a degree in any number of international focus studies. The Navy should be able to entice professors into providing semester long classes on the LPD to these regional deployments considering the level of interaction with the local populace they could insure, particularly in anthropology, language study, history, and science curriculum. The DDG-51, LCS, and individual attached military air, sea, land, and civilian detachments could rotate via standard 6 month exchanges using the 'sea swap' concept to sustain duration of presence for the Global Fleet Station. Should the need arise for mission module swapping and a required crew is unavailable (example all LCS have to go MIW configuration to respond to a MIW threat), the LCS crews should be able to deploy to the area within 48 hours, which is faster than the time it would take to swap all 4 modules from a harbor one at a time, much less from a modified T-AKE. In the end, I think the "Littoral Strike Group" in this configuration gives the Navy a much needed solution for the littoral mission of the 21st century, both at sea and in partnership. It allows a GFS to distribute its operations, as to insure presence over the horizon while interaction with a neighbor anywhere mutually agreed. By utilizing the LPD as a command ship, the Navy extends the littoral across the shore line of continents instead of simply from the sea over land, which increases the Maritime Domain Awareness regionally in ways that prevent global organizations from out flanking a concentrated naval sea base, while at the same time providing the Navy with the right warfighter capabilities to "Aggregate, Disaggregate, Re-aggregate" with other Navy elements in response to regional warfighter requirements. Finally, it provides the mechanism the Navy requires in order to provide war fighter capabilities that simply cannot be obtained state side. As anyone familiar with ASW or MIW will tell you, these warfighter techniques require skilled people with the time to perfect their craft. The Global Fleet Station in operation combined with the outlined "Littoral Strike Group" provides the Navy with a unique opportunity for a forward deployed international cooperation framework to improve these critical areas that demand both time and practice. The "Global Fleet Station" introduces a unique overseas medium for the US to engage in enhanced "Task Focused Training" that encourages partnership from the greater international community. Through this persistence the "1000-ship Navy" becomes more than just a regional buzzword for mutual "Security Cooperation", but an example where "Building Partner Capacity" with international partners achieves the type of "Globally Networked Operations" that lead not only to regional "Deterrence," but contribution towards the international "Deterrence" the US Navy is seeking with the phase 0 shaping operations in troubled regions to begin with. All phrases in italics represent the ideas thrown around in this thread combined with the methods and missions outlined in the CNO Naval Operations Concept 2006 vision.