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pincer · 04-23-2007, 18:25 PM

ank you for an excellent conversation. I am new to the site but have been following this thread with interest.

First, there’s another useful document out there that I think has not been mentioned explicitly: The Navy White Paper on Global Fleet Stations (Inside Defense, March 2006, subscription required). It’s a bit dated now, but worth the read if you haven’t already.

A few thoughts/questions for the group:

First, perhaps trivial, is the name: what's global about any of the current concepts? I believe this name emerged from an early concept of maintaining land-based logistics and support stations for persistent regional forces in remote areas. These would have been nodes for combat logistics feeds, maintenance bases for small craft (e.g. PCs), and a source of support and supplies to expeditionary forces in the region engaged in Shaping operations. More recently, the concept has evolved to something closer to rickusn's "Littoral strike group" (nice name) I think. The idea is to seabase a set of capabilities that reside somewhere in the Phase 0 / Shaping / GWOT / TSC regimes.

My next question is: Are we proposing anything new? How will GFS differ from UNITAS, WATC, or the many PACFLT deployments for HA/DR? How will it differ from AFSBs (like the Stockham)? Is it more than the training engagements with host nation security forces we already routinely schedule? We already do a lot of low level engagement. Is GFS a new name for this activity or are we adding missions we are not currently doing?

Also, How does the GFS fit in to the larger picture of everything else the Navy needs to do? As rickusn just pointed out, we’ve got primary war fighting readiness to think about. If we tailor platforms for these low level missions, are we stealing money (and training time and energy) from the Navy’s core missions? It seems to me that in the past we’ve done community relations, fostered goodwill, forged enduring relationships etc (some of the GFS effects) with the assets we bought for war fighting. In that context, slight modifications of a prepo ship makes a lot of sense. Buying and dedicating JHSVs as GFS station ships may or may not.

Maybe the GFS should be considered not a new type of platform and force package, but rather a new type of deployment. We have strike group deployments (tip-of-the-spear warfighting capability), GWOT surge deployments (smaller units, smaller missions such as anti-piracy), and GFS deployments (small units, low-end partnership-building, 1000-ship navy supporting activities). Many platforms, properly loaded, could do any of these (think LSD). Some platforms could do the GFS deployment every once in a while then go back to their standard function (think Emory Land). The particular deployment would be filled with activities tailored to the platform’s strengths and the region’s needs at the time. This is essentially how we’re doing things now with the pilot programs. The lessons learned from these deployments won’t lead to some ideal platform description, but rather to an understanding of how a force package should be configured to do these sorts of deployments, independent of platform. This seems a more reasonable way to achieve some of these effects without necessarily buying new platforms for the mission.

Comments?

04-23-2007, 18:25 PM	#39 (permalink)
pincer New Member Join Date: 04-22-07 Posts: 3 Country:	ank you for an excellent conversation. I am new to the site but have been following this thread with interest. First, there’s another useful document out there that I think has not been mentioned explicitly: The Navy White Paper on Global Fleet Stations (Inside Defense, March 2006, subscription required). It’s a bit dated now, but worth the read if you haven’t already. A few thoughts/questions for the group: First, perhaps trivial, is the name: what's global about any of the current concepts? I believe this name emerged from an early concept of maintaining land-based logistics and support stations for persistent regional forces in remote areas. These would have been nodes for combat logistics feeds, maintenance bases for small craft (e.g. PCs), and a source of support and supplies to expeditionary forces in the region engaged in Shaping operations. More recently, the concept has evolved to something closer to rickusn's "Littoral strike group" (nice name) I think. The idea is to seabase a set of capabilities that reside somewhere in the Phase 0 / Shaping / GWOT / TSC regimes. My next question is: Are we proposing anything new? How will GFS differ from UNITAS, WATC, or the many PACFLT deployments for HA/DR? How will it differ from AFSBs (like the Stockham)? Is it more than the training engagements with host nation security forces we already routinely schedule? We already do a lot of low level engagement. Is GFS a new name for this activity or are we adding missions we are not currently doing? Also, How does the GFS fit in to the larger picture of everything else the Navy needs to do? As rickusn just pointed out, we’ve got primary war fighting readiness to think about. If we tailor platforms for these low level missions, are we stealing money (and training time and energy) from the Navy’s core missions? It seems to me that in the past we’ve done community relations, fostered goodwill, forged enduring relationships etc (some of the GFS effects) with the assets we bought for war fighting. In that context, slight modifications of a prepo ship makes a lot of sense. Buying and dedicating JHSVs as GFS station ships may or may not. Maybe the GFS should be considered not a new type of platform and force package, but rather a new type of deployment. We have strike group deployments (tip-of-the-spear warfighting capability), GWOT surge deployments (smaller units, smaller missions such as anti-piracy), and GFS deployments (small units, low-end partnership-building, 1000-ship navy supporting activities). Many platforms, properly loaded, could do any of these (think LSD). Some platforms could do the GFS deployment every once in a while then go back to their standard function (think Emory Land). The particular deployment would be filled with activities tailored to the platform’s strengths and the region’s needs at the time. This is essentially how we’re doing things now with the pilot programs. The lessons learned from these deployments won’t lead to some ideal platform description, but rather to an understanding of how a force package should be configured to do these sorts of deployments, independent of platform. This seems a more reasonable way to achieve some of these effects without necessarily buying new platforms for the mission. Comments?