I wrote a small piece dealing with RN commiitments, operational considerations and assets almost two years ago now. It is somehat dated now of course and Im sure some will find flaws in it. Nonetheless it may be useful as a starting point for discussion.
Navy Matters | RN Commitments and Operations
In particular the recent news that two Leaf class oilers that were to remain in service until 2009 and 2010 will go away this year and one AOR placed in extended readiness.
I find this more troubling than surface combatant draw-downs.
Its interesting to note that a drop to to as few as 16 ships was considered. The thought being that the RN would then not be able to carry out a medium or large intervention scenario.
However there are ways around this.
Lets also remember taht while Invincible is essentially decommissioned the RNs official site is admant that she is still part of the fleet and will remain so until at leats 2010.
Pubfather as always made excellent points and I will attempt to expand on one.
But first as for OPVs the RN has one deployed to the Falklands this is deemed insufficient and part of the reasoning for the APT-S patrol medium endurance operation. Im sceptical on more OPVs(such as the Clyde or River class) being helpful to the RN as I am to such a ship being a replacement for the USNs OHPs as some have suggested.
USN CSG & ESG parlance plus its FRP initiative to see how it can be fitted with existing RN assets, enduring operations and committments.
The scenarios discussed in the white papers linked and discussed in the short article I wrote preclude the ships earmarked for the "enduring operations/standing commitment" being available for the "intervention scenarios".
But where in fact are those scenarios to be played out?
IMHO most likely where a ship is already on patrol.
Also with an FRP initiative such as the USN(my apologies if the RN already had or has implemented such a plan) could quite easily surge a # of assets. Although this would require that the "extended readiness" status for surface combatants be eliminated.
Plus the UK patrol/defence(FRE)(Fleet Ready Escort) could easilly allow that ship to be replaced by a unit in surge and staus and actually fulfill the implied connotations of its designation.
Back to the ESG/CSG concept.
With Ocean/Ark Royal as LPHs and Illustrious/Invincible as Harrier carriers the RN has potentially the ability to deploy two CSGs and two ESGs.
The USN now has three escorts assigned to each CSG/ESG. Although some USN CSGs have recently deployed with four.
This for the RN would mean 4x3=12 escorts should be available but this should not preclude ships on patrol being seen as a part of a task group as seems to be the outlook now. In particular as two of the High-Value-Units will at least for the short trem be in a nominal "exteneded readiness" state or refit.
Even a draw-down to even 18 ships will still provide six other ships for other taskings. Allowing two "enduring operation" patrols each with a deployment cycle of one of three escorts. Which I would earmark as APT-S and the Persian Gulf.
APT-S is important not only for the Falklands but consistent and persistent engagement with the continent of Africa.
All other commitments such the APT-N(Atlantic/Carribean, FRE,SNMG-1(Atlantic/NATO)(withdrawn), SNMG-2(MED/NATO), JRRF(European Union), IO(Indian Ocean), FE(Far East) should and could be filled by the assets of the CSGs and ESGs.
Therfore while not optimum 18 escorts is certainly doable. Although sustaining combat operations for any length of time could become problematic.
But then the USN has been battling such a predicament since the early 1990's. Leading increasingly to the use of task group assets for independent taskings away from the group. Although sixteen of 30 OHPs have proven to be a useful insurance and have been utilzed for other than war ops and Homeland water patrol its not likely that the LCS program will provide such a luxury.
But those 16 ships have been increasingly marginalized even the 14 still used in CSG/ESG/SSG taskings because they basically now are nothing but glorified OPVs.
Their main utility being able to house and suport two helicopters to complement the helo-less DDG 51 I/IIs.
I know my extended mentioning of the USN will ruffle some feathers as this is an RN thread but Im really only trying to compare/contrast different possibiliies that did, are or may occur.