Galrahn

GFS is a CONOP, it is a beginning built on those things you are talking about, except you framed the enforcement operation in the general by lumping it into the buzzword GWOT. At the end of the day, nothing about the GWOT is new, and neither are any of the activities you mentioned that are focused in the Global Fleet Station.

In many ways, the Navy already engages in aspects of the GFS CONOP, just in piecemeal as opposed to a coherent solution. The 2005 operations of the Emory S. Land off the west coast of Africa, last years deployment of the Mercy to Southeast Asia, or the almost never discussed operations of the USNS Gunnery Sgt. Fred W. Stockham are all good examples of components of a GFS.

However, none of those ships have the capability to put it all together, as each deals in a specialty, lacking the multi-purpose flexibility required for operations that incorporate the large variety of requirements that insures the bold CONOP contained in GFS is realized to its potential.

As an example, the strategy implies presence as a mission objective of the GFS CONOP that I think merits a discussion on platform, because the technology you take to the AOR determines the potential for exchange and potential diversity of operation. If your platform is a offshore service vessel, example, Ocean 6, or a container ship like USNS Gunnery Sgt. Fred W. Stockham, are you able to provide the mobility, flexibility, or capability to conduct operations if required? You may meet the requirements for training, humanitarian, or other non combat operations, but what about MSO, or an insertion or extraction mission that goes hot? Alternatively, if the GFS is focused on security, even if it is successful in improving security the entire GFS could be a failure if it doesn't meet demands that may occur from a humanitarian crisis. Flexibility, diversity in operation, and concurrency in support of those operations are critical to the strategy, no matter which roles are being required of the GFS. The enabler for meeting those aspects of the GFS concept is technology.

GFS incorporates a large variety of potential operational roles, with technology as the driver behind how broad that variety is. In the end, we agree on premise, GFS success ultimately comes down to people, but GFS scope will depend upon how many disparate groups of people are able to concurrently conduct business effectively in a GFS AOR with sufficient support at the operational level, with each level often having disparate requirements for support by the GFS.

To that end, technology is important, and in fact behind the specific people who will drive any specific AOR is probably the second most important aspect of the GFS strategy, because it is the critical resource that bridges the gap in the wide variety of operational requirements. I have a tremendous amount of faith in the quality of the USN officers, and believe it will be technology, not people, that will ultimately be the limiting factor that defines the scope of what is possible in the GFS strategy.

I understand Ricks frustration though. Nobody appreciates a first time poster who automatically assumes he is the most informed person in the room and characterizes not only the discussion as thoughtless, but the members of the discussion as a bunch of thoughtless nitwits who have bypassed every aspect of strategy except the technology involved. Since your new, I'll give you the benefit of the doubt, but would point out that had you engaged the discussion without the condescending attitude you might realize it is sometimes through the discussion of technology that those not familiar with GFS (or any specific CONOP) may realize the complexities of the strategy to better understand its operational implications.