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Originally Posted by ExNavyAmerican
IIn regard to your comment before the one above: I already countered most of it, and you're playing the liberal (whether or not you are liberal) game of trying to distract me with reiterating my previous arguments. That's what I hate about the Iraq argument in particular; it turn into a, "is not; is to" argument. I will, however, argue the inconclusive point of the parliamentary system. Let's look at it this way. That aside, say we put constitutional provisions in the Iraqi constitution protecting the minority; it wouldn't matter. Why? Because a parliamentary system puts a single party into power: i.e. the majority party elects the associate executive that holds the most power, the Prime Minister. That Prime Minister is of the majority party, and, being a member of parliament, he can stay there indefinitely as long as his party remains in the majority. Human corruption would far out weigh any safeguards in the system. Also, this is deeper, but it also invites universal loyalty to the majority party because a change in government causes chaos. In a nutshell, the parliamentary system is corrupt, and worse than other democratic/republican forms, but you can't attribute that corruption to a failure of the system. Now, back to the thread topic...  |
I am well aware of how the Iraqi government is setup and that the executive is elected by the parliament (and you are incorrect that a parliamentary necessarily puts a single party into power - unless you have vote rigging, it tends to require a ruling coalition, just as you have in Iraq, to have the power). I would also tend to agree with you that a parliamentary system is probably more corruptable based on the relationship between the parliament and executive. However, let's say that Iraq instead had an executive that was elected independently of the legislature. Given Iraq's demographics, and the fact that unlike typical elections where candidates run, parties were the basis of the elections, do you think that a representative government that mimics the US' structure would have resulted in a different outcome? Not likely. The counterfactual to a parliamentary system ends at the same result. Regardless, as per my Allawi example demonstrates, because the central government doesn't have central authority, you cannot simply attribute the ethnic cleansings to the PM. Would a secular Allawi be able to penetrate and enforce his decisions within the religious control exerted in Basra?
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Originally Posted by ExNavyAmerican
I didn't say that it proves the surge is working. Catch your breath: it may not work. Whether or not you want it to; you sound like you don't. I'm saying that evidence suggests that it is working. But I didn't jump to a conclusion. I love the way you give those cowards, aka our enemy, any credit! It's appalling. You do this while contemplating, in a very skeptical manner, that the plan that would assure our victory is failing? Why do you do that? They don't have much of a strategy, except for the losers trick: suicide bombings, and attacks. Anyway it is too early to tell, but so far it looks like the surge is working. Don't freak out; it might not.  |
You did make a conclusion by stating that it appears to be working and then citing the reduction in violence. I stated why you cannot make a causal link between the reduction in violence and the surge. In other words, it is quite plausible, and in fact, most likely, that this initial reduction in violence is the action-reaction-counteraction cycle that always happens as the situation on the battlefield changes. We know that the Mahdi Army is doing exact this.
Next, I do give the "insurgency" credit. Why? Because after billions of dollars and nearly four years, we are further from our objectives than we were in the summer of 2003. The moment you begin to underestimate your opposition is the moment they take advantage of this. At the tactical level, that moment is when you let your guard down and end up dead. At the strategic level, it's when you call them dead enders and instead of mobilizing all the elements of national power, you keep dumping everything in the laps of the military and end up where we are today.
As far as suicide attacks being a "loser's trick," it seems to have been very effective in getting the US and France to quit Lebanon over two decades ago (and they seem to be in an ever stronger position in Lebanon these days). While this is the clearest case of suicide attacks being a "winner's trick," there are several other suicide campaigns where moderate successes were achieved by the organizations employing suicide terror as a weapon. To claim that it is a "loser's trick" is simply not accurate, and once again, underestimates the enemy.
Lastly, probably the biggest reason to not try and either claim success or failure for the surge is that the MNF-I Commander has publically stated that it won't be clear until late summer. If the person with the best vantage point to make the judgement won't do so until another 5-6 months has passed, how can others do so?