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Hi Guys,
It seems to me that the real trouble with the Iraq expedition (outside of going in the first place, as Snow Leapord has pointed out) exists at the strategic/planning rather than any operational level.
In a nutshell: the overall objectives were unrealistic and not limited enough in scope as to be readily acheivable via the chosen means.
It was decided to do what we wanted, not what we could.
The U.S. record on nation building shows that the odds of success for such activity in Iraq were at at least 4 to 1 against and taking the risks that Mr. Bush chose to take in the Middle East at 4 to 1 when the "supreme interests" of the United States were not at stake was not a sound propostion.
A better strategy is pretty much as Snow Leapord articulated: isolate and contain on a regional level. I would back it up with continued, limited objective low level military activity to keep Saddam off balance, multi national efforts to break up his clandestine networks, attempts to engineer a coup, perhaps some sort of MEPALS (Middle East Partnership Against Limited Strikes) to offset missle/WMD issues, etc.
Limited, readily definable objectives was the hallmark of ODS that appears to have been missing in OIF and any search for a "newer/better/alternate etc., etc." Iraq strategy is probably best started here.
Regards,
William
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Pharoh was pimp but now he is dead. What are you going to do today?
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