Zhang Fei

Communism was always an ideological veneer on the old command-and-control Chinese model of superiors giving orders and subordinates obeying without question. (Note that this did not mean the subordinates were meekly obeying like sheep - merely that they were rightly afraid of the consequences of disobedience). Much of what the writer attributes to Communism is really an artifact of traditional Chinese approaches to government. For instance, imperial China used to grant monopolies to favored individuals, who became fabulously wealthy, as a result. Something similar happened after Deng's reforms in the late 1970's.

Chinese triumphalism is the result of years of strong economic growth, and relative ignorance about the outside world. In this respect, Chinese are probably no different from the average Indian or American or the average citizen of an East Asian Tiger during the boom years. For instance, the average Chinese thinks that per capita income wise, China is in the upper half of the East Asian countries, when it is in fact in the lower half. They also think that China isn't really separated from the developed economies by all that much - a notion deliberately encouraged by the government via the successful conclusion of China's first manned spaceflight, and its Soviet-style sports programs and medal tallies.

Nonetheless, there are indications that substantial pockets of economic deprivation exist among the Chinese population - pockets that have led to large scale physical clashes with city- and borough-level officials involving hundreds and even thousands of people. It is clear from the tens of thousands of demonstrations that occur every year - combined with several dozen violent clashes involving deaths - that the Chinese population is no longer as trusting of the government or fearful of the government's coercive powers as it used to be. Times are about as good as they have been since the Communists took power. But the downside for the ruling clique is that the population is nowhere near as deferential as it was at the time of its victory in 1949.

My feeling is that whatever succeeds the Party, it is unlikely to be democracy. Any Chinese willing to take the risks to fight the Party isn't going to be interested in handing it over an electorate. And the ordinary Chinese is quite comfortable with the concept of winner-takes-all, especially when there's not a lot he can do about it. What is more important is that the average Chinese has lost enough respect for the Party that he is unlikely to risk death defending it. The loss of respect for the Qing government is ultimately what undid it, as provincial officials went their own way.

I think the loss of fear of the government displayed through the increasing number of violent clashes with governmental bodies is a bad sign for the government. Don't mistake the apparent placidity of the average Chinese for acquiescence. Speaking forthrightly about grievances against the government is a luxury available only to Westerners who don't risk jail, torture or execution for seditious views. Chinese have traditionally voted with their feet*, via violent revolts, not wispy opinions aired over dinner.

Obedience to your face combined with plotting behind your back is the Chinese mode of behavior, if he sees the governing authority as both powerful and ruthless. Once he loses his fear, plots begin to translate in action. There has been no shortage of political entrepreneurs in Chinese history - many of the founding members of dynasties that killed off their predecessors were themselves minor government officials - and there will be many who think they have no less a right to rule than the existing Communist Party leadership.

* This is not some kind of zeitgeist argument - I am not suggesting that the entire population of China has revolted during dynasty changes - only that those who actively participated in successful revolts got to rule those who did not.