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Senior Contributor
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Russian RAM, FWIW
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Why Aren't the Stealth MiGs Flying?
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Reports in the highest ranks of the U.S.A. Department of Defense, which were made during the presidential election campaign of 1980, served as the push for the creation Soviet stealth aircraft ((NEVIDIMYY SAMOLET)). True, not without the prompting of then president Carter, Secretary of Defense Brown informed the public that the U.S.A. had attained significant successes of defense significance and could build an airplane that was practically invisible to PVO systems.
The Soviet Union took immediate notice of this announcement. In that same 1980, the government resolved to perform corresponding experimental design work. The Moscow Zenit Machine Building Plant (MMZ) (now the Russian Aircraft Building MiG Corporation) undertook the creation of stealth tactical fighters.
The Americans hid the airplane using the creation of a nearly undetectable shape ((MALOZAMETNAYA FORMA)). Our scientists and engineers proceeded from the fact that any well streamline airplane is already undetectable. And therefore, they began to study the fighter's radar signature ((RADIOPORTRET)). A production process ((TEKHNOLOGIYA)) for the lowering of detectability was developed based on the application of a thin-layer radar absorbing ((RADIOPOGLOSHCHAYUSHCHIY)) material.
In 1982 - 1983, 10 assorted institutes were working on the creation of such a material, including also the Academy of the Chemical Protection Troops (VAKhZ), in accordance with a government resolution. VAKhZ specialists were the first to make an experimental batch in large enough quantity to cover an airplane. They treated a serial MiG-23 aircraft with a spray gun with the material they had obtained. After this, there were tests of the MiG-23 on the ground and in flight. The level of radar detectability of the tested MiG was 8.6 decibels lower than the level of detectability of a standard MiG.
Tests of the stealth MiG took place at the 21st Institute of the General Staff's Directorate of Radioelectronic Countermeasures and Automated Control Systems (REhP ASU) insofar as it possessed a more complete radar measuring complex than air force institutes.
In 1984, Zenit set about the creation of a second low-detectable fighter, but of a different modification - a MiG-23ML, using six various types of material to cover it, which were developed by the All-Union Institute of Aviation Materials (VIAM). Tests of the new fighter, which were performed in August - December 1985, showed that its radar detectability in "X" band in the forward and rear hemispheres was 10 decibels lower than a normal MiG.
At the next meeting, where air force representatives were absent, the chief of the General Staff's REhP ASU directorate was unable to remain silent about Zenit's achievements, but he declared that 10 decibels is by far not enough.
In 1985, the air force was to have allocated funds for radar-absorbing coatings for its airplanes. But as far as the given research area went in relation to REhP ASU, the air force Chief of Staff never learned of the existence of the experiment stealth fighters...
In 1987, the developers from Zenit were planning to make a stealth MiG-29, but Zenit never received the money for the stealth MiG-29, and work on it was stopped.
In 1992, the Zenit MMZ was reformed into the MiG Aviation Scientific and Production Complex (ANPK). The ANPK management decided to start work in the external marketplace, providing services for the reduction of the detectability of its fighters. The commercial structure MiG-Service was to have organized this work. MiG-Service found the money for continuation of the work for the construction of a stealth MiG-29. The ANPK developers proceeded to labor over the fighter in company with the EhnergoIVTAN NTO ((Scientific and Technical Section)). In fact, staff from the very same VIAM laboratory, which had created the coating for the MiG-23ML, transferred to IVTAN. However, the measurements performed in 1992 at the General Staff's test facility showed that it was unable to reach the required level of detectability. The developers suspected that the NTO did not comply with their requirements for the coating material.
In 1994, in the process of the structural reorganization they moved brigade 1016 from one department to another, but along the way it was "lost." That, by the way, did not interfere with the management entrusting in 1997 the non-existent brigade with bringing the work on the MiG-29 to a triumphant conclusion.
Once again being occupied with the MiG-29, the developers found out extremely unpleasant news. The domestic enterprises ceased production of the necessary bindings for the materials, from which the coatings are made. But the ANPK developers found a way out. Together with the St. Peterburg State University for Telecommunications and NVP Panatron they developed the Lak-3-10 coating from bindings that were not in short supply. In 1999, tests of a MiG-29 with the new coating showed that its detectability had decrease by 13 times.
In the worldwide market place our undetectable MiG-29 would not have a competitor. A team of five men can apply the coating in 2 weeks. A good owner would long ago already have coated several aircraft for testing, organized an advertising campaign, and would have tried to sell the "stealth." But in the MiG corporation, it looks as if no one cares.
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Karmani Vyapurutham Dhanuhu
My bow is stretched for its task
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