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Kosovo
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Kosovo: Ahtisaari or bust
UN envoy for Kosovo Ahtisaari speaks during news conference in Pristina
As the details of the Ahtisaari's Kosovo plan are revealed in Belgrade and Pristina, diplomats say attention will turn to Brussels and Moscow. Meanwhile, Belgrade threatens to reject an independent Kosovo but ethnic Albanians will likely get it anyway.
By Tim Judah in Pristina and Belgrade for ISN Security Watch (02/02/07)
When Martti Ahtisaari touches down in his chartered plane first in Belgrade and then later Friday in Pristina, nobody will be holding their breath wondering what he will have to say. Officially, the former Finnish president, who was charged by the UN with either negotiating a solution to the Kosovo problem or, failing that, coming up with a proposal of his own, is visiting to hand his document over. In fact, everyone already knows what is in it.
For months, the broad outlines of the Ahtisaari proposal have been clear. However, this week the details emerged when the Kosovo daily Lajm on Wednesday published four blank pages. It had been intending to publish details from a leaked copy but had then been pressured by "different circles" not to do so. Later in the day, Reuter's news agency revealed what Lajm had been prevented from doing.
Technically, Kosovo remains a part of Serbia. However, since the end of the war there in 1999 it has been under the jurisdiction of the UN. Of its some two million people, about 90 percent are ethnic Albanians who will settle for nothing less than independence. Serbia rejects this and has offered it "more than autonomy but less than independence."
Ahtisaari's plan does not mention the word "independence" but nor does it mention Serbian sovereignty either. It is clear, however, that what it describes is an independent country, albeit with some conditions, at least to begin with. Under the terms of the plan, Kosovo would be allowed to join international organizations, including the UN, and it would have a lightly armed Kosovo Security Force. According to diplomatic sources, this will number around 2,500 men plus 800 reservists.
The plan foresees that the current UN mission in Kosovo be replaced by an EU-led one, which would concentrate on the fields of police, the judiciary and customs. There would also be what is being called an International Civilian Office (ICO). The person who heads this office, the international civilian representative, would have considerable political powers, much like the international community's high representative has had in Bosnia. The likelihood is that the EU mission and the ICO would be headed by the same person, again as in Bosnia.
The Ahtisaari plan also foresees that Kosovo's national symbols, its flag and so on, should reflect its multinational character, which means that new ones will have to be created. In fact, in anticipation of this, work has already begun. The new state also will control its own borders. Annexes of the plan propose extensive decentralization for Serbian areas, which amount to considerable autonomy and would give them the right to links to Belgrade.
The current NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo would stay, as would the mission of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
Although Kosovo Albanians will be disappointed by some elements of the plan, since it proposes, in effect, an independent state, they are unlikely, bar certain hardliners, to complain too much.
The reaction in Serbia will be different. Indeed, Vojislav Kostunica, Serbia's caretaker prime minister, has already said he would not see Ahtisaari on Friday, claiming that he did not have the authority to do so in the wake of Serbia's 21 January elections, since a new government has not yet been formed.
More significantly though, Kostunica is trying to lay down a condition about Kosovo for all potential coalition partners. Although not saying so explicitly, it leaves the door open for the cutting of diplomatic relations with any country that recognizes an independent Kosovo. This could have considerable negative ramifications for both Serbia's bids to eventually join the EU and NATO and of course for regional cooperation, which, if such a rule was enforced, would grind to a halt.
On Wednesday, Leon Kojen, a member of Serbia's Kosovo negotiating team, effectively rejected the Ahtisaari plan, saying on television, "nothing [..] will be solved as Ahtisaari says until Belgrade agrees to it."
While the media focus is now on Belgrade and Pristina, the diplomatic focus is far from there. Indeed, that is now in Brussels and Moscow. The reason for this is clear: As Ahtisaari has now produced his plan the diplomats are working on the next stage of the process, which is coming up with a formula of words acceptable for all for a new resolution to be passed by the UN Security Council.
Today, the UN's jurisdiction in Kosovo derives from Resolution 1244 of June 1999, which ended the Kosovo war. Although the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians will be given an opportunity to react to the plan and indeed to meet and discuss it in Vienna, where Ahtisaari has his headquarters, little is expected to emerge from this. At the end of that process, Ahtisaari will, according to diplomatic sources, then present his plan to Ban Ki-moon, the UN secretary-general and, unlike in the proposal itself, he will write a covering letter in which he says explicitly that he is talking about an independent Kosovo.
US and UK diplomats especially would then like the Security Council to replace Resolution 1244 soon after this, perhaps in April.
Although the new resolution itself need not mention independence, in its wake, Kosovo would declare independence, and four months later the ICO would take up the reins from the UN on so-called status day, at which point other states would begin recognizing Kosovo as an independent country.
Whether Kosovo's independence is in fact achieved like this remains an open question, however. Until now, Russian officials have said that they would not consent to anything that Belgrade did not agree to. In private, however, they are saying that "all options" are on the table. Since independence is one option that means it has not been ruled out. ISN Security Watch's diplomatic sources say that Russia has been hardening its stance against independence recently, but says one diplomat: "It is not really Russia as such. It is going to be what Putin eventually decides."
Quite apart from what Putin decides to do, it is clear that from the diplomatic point of view Kosovo will be an important test for Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). At the moment, there are several EU states that have expressed reservations about Kosovo's independence. They include Romania, Slovakia and Spain.
Although diplomatic sources say they believe an EU consensus will be reached, there might be chaos if it was not and they also believe that there is a far greater chance of Russia either agreeing to a new Security Council resolution, or at least not opposing one, if there is EU unity coupled with trans-Atlantic agreement on the question too.
While Kostunica may hope that Russia can succeed in stopping Kosovo from becoming independent, this in fact is a forlorn hope. If Russia blocks a UN resolution then the so-called "nightmare scenario" would more than likely become reality.
If it is absolutely clear that Kosovo will not gain independence via the Security Council, then Kosovo's Albanians will move to declare independence anyway. The US and Britain would probably recognize the new state and EU unity on the question would risk being wrecked. Since there would be no UN resolution, there would be no EU-led follow on mission either, as EU members would be unlikely to agree on this without a resolution. Kosovo Serbs would also not have the protections foreseen by the Ahtisaari proposal, as it would now be a dead letter.
In such circumstances, the likelihood of violence would increase exponentially. The Serbian dominated north of Kosovo would secede and the some 60,000 Serbs in the enclaves across the rest of Kosovo might well flee or be ethnically cleansed.
Violence may come anyway in the wake of the Ahtisaari proposal, but for the moment, the chances of containing both Albanian and Serb frustrations remain higher than they would if the issue was no longer in the hands of the diplomats.
Tim Judah is the author of Kosovo: War and Revenge and The Serbs: History, Myth and Destruction of Yugoslavia.
ISN Security Watch - Kosovo: Ahtisaari or bust
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Neither independent not dependent!
Typical chicanery to keep the pot boiling.
Pontius Pilate resurrected.
A disgraceful situation indeed! 
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