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**Shek** · 02-01-2007, 22:42 PM

A few excerpts from the 911 Commission Report. These excerpts show that

1) there was no specific threat to action on, especially of a plot that involved flying jetliners into the WTC
2) the article you posted fronted a series of red herrings about the Bush vs. Clinton approach (not to mention the fact that Clarke had no specifics about 911 operatives or the operation)
3) that Clark's policy actions would not have prevented 9/11
4) that the Millenium exception was based on very specific threats during a very specific time period after highly public and open arrests of AQ operatives, a situation that didn't exist in July/Sep 01 - however, the 911 report does specifically talk about the heightened government response to the potential summer attacks based on the chatter, chatter that went silent in August 01

pages 262-3

Quote:

Most of the intelligence community recognized in the summer of 2001 that the number and severity of threat reports were unprecedented. Many officials told us that they knew something terrible was planned, and they were desperate to stop it. Despite their large number, the threats received contained few specifics regarding time, place, method, or target. Most suggested that attacks were planned against targets overseas; others indicated threats against unspecified “U.S. interests.” We cannot say for certain whether these reports, as dramatic as they were, related to the 9/11 attacks.

page 347

Quote:

1. The CTC did not analyze how an aircraft, hijacked or explosives-laden, might be used as a weapon. It did not perform this kind of analysis from the enemy’s perspective (“red team” analysis), even though suicide terrorism had become a principal tactic of Middle Eastern terrorists. If it had done so, we believe such an analysis would soon have spotlighted a critical constraint for the terrorists—finding a suicide operative able to fly large jet aircraft.They had never done so before 9/11.

2. The CTC did not develop a set of telltale indicators for this method of attack. For example, one such indicator might be the discovery of possible terrorists pursuing flight training to fly large jet aircraft, or seeking to buy advanced flight simulators.

3. The CTC did not propose, and the intelligence community collection
management process did not set, requirements to monitor such telltale indicators.Therefore the warning system was not looking for information such as the July 2001 FBI report of potential terrorist interest in various kinds of aircraft training in Arizona, or the August 2001 arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui because of his suspicious behavior in a Minnesota flight school. In late August, the Moussaoui arrest was briefed to the DCI and other top CIA officials under the heading “Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly.”24 Because the system was not tuned to comprehend the potential significance of this information,the news had no effect on warning.

4. Neither the intelligence community nor aviation security experts analyzed systemic defenses within an aircraft or against terrorist-controlled aircraft, suicidal or otherwise. The many threat reports mentioning aircraft were passed to the FAA.While that agency continued to react to specific, credible threats, it did not try to perform the broader warning functions we describe here. No one in the government was taking on that role for domestic vulnerabilities.
Richard Clarke told us that he was concerned about the danger posed by aircraft in the context of protecting the Atlanta Olympics of 1996,theWhite House complex,and the 2001 G-8 summit in Genoa.
But he attributed his awareness more to Tom Clancy novels than to warnings from the intelligence community. He did not, or could not, press the government to work on the systemic issues of how to strengthen the layered security defenses to protect aircraft against hijackings or put the adequacy of air defenses against suicide hijackers
on the national policy agenda.

page 348

Quote:

The existing mechanisms for handling terrorist acts had been trial and punishment for acts committed by individuals; sanction, reprisal, deterrence, or war for acts by hostile governments.The actions of al Qaeda fit neither category.Its crimes were on a scale approaching acts of war,but they were committed by a loose,far-flung,nebulous conspiracy with no territories or citizens or assets that could be readily threatened, overwhelmed, or destroyed.

***

Perhaps the most incisive of the advisors on terrorism to the new administration was the holdover Richard Clarke.Yet he admits that his policy advice, even if it had been accepted immediately and turned into action, would not have prevented 9/11.27

pages 351-2

Quote:

The high price of keeping counterterrorism policy within the restricted circle of the Counterterrorism Security Group and the highest-level principals was nowhere more apparent than in the military establishment.After the August 1998 missile strike, other members of the JCS let the press know their unhappiness that, in conformity with the Goldwater-Nichols reforms, Shelton had been the only member of the JCS to be consulted.Although follow-on military options were briefed more widely, the vice director of operations on the Joint Staff commented to us that intelligence and planning documents relating to al Qaeda arrived in a ziplock red package and that many flag and general officers never had the clearances to see its contents.33

At no point before 9/11 was the Department of Defense fully engaged in the mission of countering al Qaeda, though this was perhaps the most dangerous
foreign enemy then threatening the United States.The Clinton administration
effectively relied on the CIA to take the lead in preparing long-term offensive plans against an enemy sanctuary.The Bush administration adopted this approach, although its emerging new strategy envisioned some yet unde-
fined further role for the military in addressing the problem.

pages 359-360

Quote:

After the millennium alert, the government relaxed. Counterterrorism went back to being a secret preserve for segments of the FBI, the Counterterrorist Center, and the Counterterrorism Security Group. But the experience showed that the government was capable of mobilizing itself for an alert against terrorism.While one factor was the preexistence of widespread concern about Y2K,another,at least equally important,was simply shared information. Everyone knew not only of an abstract threat but of at least one terrorist who had been arrested in the United States.Terrorism had a face—that of Ahmed Ressam—and Americans from Vermont to southern California went on the watch for his like.

In the summer of 2001, DCI Tenet, the Counterterrorist Center, and the Counterterrorism Security Group did their utmost to sound a loud alarm, its basis being intelligence indicating that al Qaeda planned something big. But the millennium phenomenon was not repeated.FBI field offices apparently saw no abnormal terrorist activity, and headquarters was not shaking them up.

Between May 2001 and September 11, there was very little in newspapers
or on television to heighten anyone’s concern about terrorism.Front-page stories touching on the subject dealt with the windup of trials dealing with the East Africa embassy bombings and Ressam.All this reportage looked backward, describing problems satisfactorily resolved.Back-page notices told of tightened security at embassies and military installations abroad and government cautions against travel to the Arabian Peninsula.All the rest was secret.