Brigadier,
"What do you make out of it since you are an American officer and can put two and two together."
A couple of small points. I no longer hold a commission and am, as such, entitled to gross speculation. I'm not certain that, in any case, there's a direct correlation between my commissioning and my basic math skills, so don't be surprised if my answer is "three"!
Sir, the POTUS speech about Iraq caught me by surprise when mentioning the STENNIS CSG and the Patriot deployments. THOSE are unusual within the specific context of Iraq. I've generally seen Patriot deployments to this region to be a specific intelligence indicator of an imminent strike. Of course I could be wrong (yet again). I've also believed that no attack upon Iran would occur before the Mahdi Army, Badr Brigade and other associated Iranian-supported elements are neutralized within Iraq. We'll know much more there by the end of February.
That Galrahn has connected the use of AEGIS as a guidance system for PATRIOT is interesting, as well. Clearly, a strike upon Iran from the sea precludes the need for permission to use host-nation facilities within the region. A retaliatory strike by Iran upon our deployed vessels would, however, permit us to bring to bear ALL of our regionally available forces in their defense. This would enable the use of shore-based PATRIOT in a fleet BMD role.
Sir, I just don't know. It's difficult for me to imagine this POTUS allowing Iranian nuclear weapons to remain on the table for the next administration. I absolutely do not believe that Israel possesses the means to effectively neuter such a capability, short of nuclear weapons-which I cannot as yet imagine.
I do believe that Iran is vulnerable to a sustained and extensive air campaign that is directed at their national infrastructure. Hardening, dispersing, and making redundant their nuclear facilities, SASPs, and research locations doesn't make their electrical, communications, water, and sewage facilities/grids any less vulnerable.
I've long been confused by the particular Iranian calculus that's generated a policy of such extreme brinksmanship. It only makes sense where the end goal is to possess nuclear weapons as a tool of strategic leverage, not defense. This seems clear in light of Iranian recalcitrance during the EU-3 negotiations and even the eventual Russian offer to provide secure reactor fuel.
As such, I think most are agreed on Iranian intent to obtain nuclear weapons as a matter of advantage. It seems the question now is whether this is permissable/tolerable. According to N. Korea, it is. According to Galrahn's info, that may be subject to further discussion also.
Brigadier, it's been a long time coming and I wouldn't be surprised one bit were events to taking an interesting turn in the skies over Teheran and Pyongyang. Perhaps Baghdad, Seoul, Tokyo, Tel Aviv, and Riyadh as well. This pot keeps coming to a boil and it's going to overflow at some point.