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Ray,
I actually have Moyar's book. I bought it last week. Unfortunately it is quite lengthy, so I won't have time to read it properly anytime soon. A couple of things I have read so far are worrying, however:
*Moyar is a little too self-consciously 'revisionist' for me. He makes a big point of it in the book's intro. people who feel they are tryong to argue against 'accepted wisdom' are often over-zealous in 'proving' their case. You'll notice how keen he is to big note his own work. Always a red flag.
*He takes the admittedly unique approach of blaming the press for Diem's downfall. This is a variation on an old theme, and it smells just as bad in this context. We are talking about reports from a literal handful of reporters on a conflict few Americans had heard of. And this swayed the US govt to help remove Diem? I remain to be convinced.
*He focusses on 3 books. I own all 3, though it is years since I read them.
- Halberstam's 'Best & Brightest' is almost entirely focussed on the goings on in Washington & the US Embassy in Saigon. Discussion of the Diem regime limited by comparison. The book has been important in framing discussion of these issues, but it has not gone unchallenged.
- Sheehan's book is very heavily influenced by his relationship with its central figure - John paul Vann. This is clear throughout. It also contains some very insightful comments on the failures of US doctrine, including the experience of Victor 'Brute' Krulak in unsuccessfully trying to change it. A worthwhile read, but to suggest that it has somehow framed understanding of the war is a wild overstatement.
- Karnow's book is probably the most influential of the three. It has become one of the standard 'general' histories of the war aimed at the ordinary reader (along with Herring's 'America's longest War'). It has the flaws inherent in all such works, but I will have to read Mpyar, Karnow & others to get an idea of the validity of his objections.
*A real concern is one of the few pages of the book I did read. It was part of a discussion of the 1963 'Buddhist Crisis'. In trying to minimize the significance of Buddhism in the RVN it tried to divide the nation of 15 million up into distinct religious groups: Buddhist 3-4 mill (50% practising & 50% non-practising); Catholic 1.5 mill; Cao Dai 1.5-2 mill; Hoa Hao 1.5-2 mill; Confucian/Ancestor worship 4 mill. The purpose of this was to claim that journalists in particular exaggerated the importance of Diem's anti-Buddhist campaigns to ordinary Vietnamese.
While he mentions briefly the 'loose' affiliation of the majority of Vietnamese with Buddhism, his insistence on imposing Western ideas of religion being 'either/or' is deeply misleading. First, the Hoa Hao was a Buddhist sect. Violently anti-communist after they executed its founder in 1947, they turned on Diem after he began persecuting Buddhists. The Cao Dai venerate the Buddha and many aspects of their faith are influenced by Buddhism. In addition to this, many Confucians also follow some buddhist teachings. The combination of Confucian, Ancastor worship & Buddhist beliefs is common throughout Vietnam. Buddhist monks are (or were) highly respected figures within Vietnamese society, even among non-Buddhists. If Moyar was unaware of these facts his competence is in question. If he was aware & chose to ignore them, his motives are.
I'll try to skim a bit of the book & get back to you on it.
Just one other point. Shek mentioned that the NLF estroyed itself during Tet. This is only partly true. It did cripple its combat strength, but the bulk of those who died were combat personnel rather than the more important organising cadre. These survived to mount even less successful 'mini-Tet' offensives later in the year (May & August I think). This finally crippled the NLF structure, along with much improved US tactics.
Sorry if I've gone on a bit.
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