Quote:
|
In the end, it was a conventional force, armed with tanks and anti-tank missiles, that defeated SVN in 1975. It was not an insurgency.
|
Shek,
It was rather extraordinary that NV could do so, given that the SV were better equipped and trained (at least that is what is the general impression).
If NV and PRC was to move in and make the "liberation" of the south a fait accompli before the US could move in and stabilize the situation in the south, what prevented the US to beating the clock? The US did have resources to do so or didn't they?
How much did the political situation, apart from corruption in SV, play a role in the military operations?
S2,
The clubbing of villages to isolate the resources from the insurgents is an aspect that is of interest to me. I am not totally aware of its success in VN, but we borrowed a leaf from it and applied it to Mizoram. It proved to be quite a success, so much so that today we have no insurgency in Mizoram, even though it was one of those raging one in those days.
Yes, those were interesting times, politically as also militarily.
__________________
"Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."
I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.
HAKUNA MATATA