Quote:
Originally Posted by zraver
Shek,
Great read and I detect a similar goal in the original US plan. However the Malay situation didn't have the level of inter-group animosity to contend with. it also did not face 10's of thousands of combatants from myraid politcal and religious groups. Iraq is not going to work as a federal state and the groups have to be seperated, and unified only so mfar as national security and resource sharing. Existing in an automous system in other areas, and Irans voice has to be squelched.
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I fully agree that Iraq is much more complex - one cannot simply cut and paste solutions from history as a template. Malaya was an essentially isolated country (tough on external support) fought in a rural environment. Thus, one must be careful and determine which lessons can be applicable.
Some that you can gather from Malaya are: unity of command between the military and civilian components are a must (the arrival of Sir Templer marked this era in Malaya - we suffered from a disjointed effort under the not so dream team of Sanchez/Bremer). A political outcome
that achieves buy-in will take the wind out of the sails of an insurgency (in general, most confused voter turn-out with buy-in in Iraq).
In the end, religion has been the wild card in Iraq, whether it's the ease at which it can be exploited to the various insurgent groups' advantage, or whether because of the multitude of religious militias, some of which have experienced their own splintering. Whether Iraq has experienced a Balkanization to the point that reconciliation is irretreivable, I don't think so - not quite, yet. However, we are no doubt much closer to that edge than we were in the summer of 2003 and enjoyed the initiative, and the task of developing a legitimacy for a central government.
I would wrap up by stating that we must come back to the ends and means of Iraq. The means of achieving the ends (a democratic Iraq that facilitates a democratic Middle East) must not be self-contradictory (i.e. using a ruthlessness that stirs up a flavor of Saddam rather than a flavor of freedom). However, I think that there are strong arguments that point to the fact that the ends may no longer be achievable, and so there may come a time where your means to support a different end could be necessary.