Defcon 6

2003 CONOPS, Chapter 4: COMMAND AND CONTROL



4.0 COMMAND AND CONTROL

This chapter provides an overview of the command and control issues associated with conducting surface combatant land attack missions. It also presents examples of the flow of command and control information in each of the five surface combatant roles.


4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter sets forth general and specific guidance regarding command and control (C2) functions as they apply to surface combatants conducting naval fires operations. It begins with a summary of several factors and considerations affecting C2, and then provides an overview of the joint and naval organization and structure within which surface combatants operate. It covers the various types of command relationships with emphasis on the supporting and supported relationships that could be most common and relevant for surface combatant commanding officers. The command relationships discussion is followed by a summary table of the inherent responsibilities of a surface combatant in each of the five surface combatant naval fires roles. The final section of the chapter presents specific illustrative examples, to include detailed diagrams, of how a fire mission would be processed in each of the five roles. These examples were developed during the workshop referred to in Chapter 1.1

Footnote 1: The October 2001 workshop examined four specific tactical situations, each highlighting one or more surface combatant roles. The primary goal was to trace the flow of command information required to deliver fires in each specific situation to develop generalized conclusions regarding command and control of fires. A secondary goal was to develop operational sequence diagrams (OSD) that depict the agencies involved in conducting fire missions and to highlight the actions that would be performed. Section 4.5 provides a detailed discussion of the four OSDs.


4.2 FACTORS AND CONSIDERATIONS

The organization, structure, and command relationships are normally established by a common superior commander or establishing authority based on mission, nature, and expected duration of the operation, forces available, force capabilities, C2 capabilities, battlespace assigned, and recommendations from subordinate commanders. The increased capabilities of naval surface fire support (NSFS) and naval surface strike (NSS) weapons, the demands for shorter response times, and the added complexity of future command and control systems suggest a re-evaluation of the organization, structure, and command relationships and the many factors and considerations involved. A notional C2 structure for the future is presented in section 4.3.

4.2.1 Definition

Command and control (C2) is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. C2 functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by the commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.2

Footnote 2: Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

Command and control responsibilities extend beyond direct control of forces and weapons to include the coordination of various weapons throughout the battlespace. This control and coordination not only creates the desired effects on the enemy through the decisive and combined use of firepower, but also avoids physical conflict between weapons or delivery systems, and prevents friendly casualties. Coordination is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

4.2.2 Rules of Engagement (ROE)

Rules of engagement (ROE) are the directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. ROE implement the inherent right of self-defense, define use of force for mission accomplishment, and apply throughout the spectrum of conflict. New systems will enable fast, efficient command and control to be exercised from any level, tactical through strategic. Commanders may have access to a much broader array of weapons. Consequently, the ability to rapidly amend ROEs, to include guidance on weapons release authority, will become increasingly important.

4.2.3 Establishing Directive

A superior commander establishes support relationships between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. A support relationship is often appropriate for amphibious operations or on other occasions when surface combatants are supporting ground forces.3 An establishing directive is normally issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken. It should identify responsibilities for strike planning and execution, and fire support planning and coordination among commanders involved in the support relationship (e.g., an amphibious operation). The role of a surface combatant may change throughout the course of the operation, as it moves from first on scene to part of a larger force, shifting between strike and fire support missions. The establishing directive must support these changing roles by articulating clear, responsive command relationships, NSFS/NSS priorities, and procedures for conflict resolution.

Footnote 3: See Joint Pub 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, for a detailed discussion of command relationships in amphibious operations.

4.2.4 Task Organization

Task organization establishes the supporting and supported relationships essential to creating unity of command, synchronizing operations, preventing fratricide, and maximizing the effects of fires. The organization of forces, especially in a joint environment, directly affects command and control, responsiveness, and versatility during land attack operations. Forces are organized based on mission, commander’s vision, and overall concept of operations. Other factors include forces available, unity of effort, and provision for centralized planning and decentralized execution.

Centralization of key functions should not restrict the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. Sophisticated command and control networks and the increased range and accuracy of weapons provide commanders access to a broad array of forces and weapons systems from outside the operations area. This ready access blurs the distinct lines that once separated forces assigned to surface strike from those assigned to fire support. For example, a surface combatant may be tasked to execute a strike mission while performing a fire support mission. The command and control systems, both internal and external to the ship, should be able to accommodate this situation.



4.3 ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE

Surface combatants are elements of the joint and Navy operational command organizations (figure 4-1). The unified theater combatant commander designates joint force or joint task force commanders (JFC/JTFC) to conduct sustained operations or campaigns. Offensive naval forces organized into carrier strike groups (CSGs), surface and submarine strike groups, and expeditionary strike groups (ESGs) will be assigned to a joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC).



Surface combatants will operate as elements of all of the above naval groups. For either surface strike or fire support missions, surface combatants will be tasked to coordinate with and/or respond to naval and joint force fires agencies.

4.3.1 Notional External Command and Control Organization

Figure 4-2 depicts the notional command and control structure for surface combatants in the execution of NSS or NSFS missions. The JFMCC has operational control of one or more naval elements [CSG, surface action group (SAG), or ESG] that include individual surface combatants.



Naval fires coordination agencies, such as the supporting arms coordination center (SACC), force fires coordination center (FFCC), fire support coordination center (FSCC), Tomahawk strike coordinator (TSC), Tomahawk launch area coordinator (LAC), and others exist within the framework of the Navy’s traditional command and control structure. The command elements have operational control over the surface combatants, but the fires from the surface combatants, both NSS and NSFS, are controlled through the naval fires coordination agencies. Strike agencies, the TSC and the LAC, coordinate with fire support agencies, SACC, FFCC/FSCC, etc., to prevent conflict and to enhance the mission effectiveness.

The naval fires coordinator (NFC)4 as proposed in this document would have overall responsibility for coordinating both NSFS and NSS missions.

Footnote 4: NFC is more fully defined in Chapter 6.

4.3.2 Internal Shipboard Organization

On Aegis equipped surface combatants there is currently no requirement to integrate the existing Aegis weapon system and the new naval fires capabilities.5 Additionally, although the same operator working at the same console will conduct strike and naval gunfire support functions, these functions will be performed independently.

The notional naval fires command and control structure presented in figure 4-2 may require adjusting the duties and responsibilities that currently exist within the combat information center (CIC) in order to support evolving NSS and NSFS capabilities. To optimize transparency of fires, the future combat system functions must be integrated, interoperable, and collaborative, facilitating control and awareness of all shipboard fires functions by systems operators, supervisors, and battle watch staff. The ship’s commanding officer must be able to maintain situational awareness over the multi-warfare tactical picture, resolve resource conflicts, manage weapons and fire control, and ensure compliance with commander’s guidance and ROE.

Footnote 5: Desirability of integrating [AEGIS and naval fires] is recognized by OPNAV, but has not been funded due to fiscal constraints.



4.4 COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

The naval component commander exercises operational control through the numbered fleet commanders or other subordinate task forces. These forces are task organized as battle forces, task forces, task groups, task units, and task elements composed of individual units necessary to accomplish specific operational missions. The officer in command of any of the task organizations is designated as the officer in tactical command (OTC) and has primary responsibility for executing that may create as many task groupings as necessary, assigning OTC responsibilities as deemed appropriate. The naval component commander retains critical theater level perspective on naval operations. To facilitate execution and establish combat responsibilities the Navy uses a C2 arrangement referred to as the composite warfare commander (CWC) concept integrating ships, submarines, aircraft, and land based forces.

The Navy employs the CWC concept as the doctrinal cornerstone of its task force operational and tactical C2 system. The CWC concept enables the OTC of a naval force to conduct combat operations in functional areas against air, surface, subsurface, and land threats while contributing to the overall campaign of the JFC. The CWC uses OPGENs6 to set actual at-sea arrangements for operational control, tactical control, supported, and/or supporting relationships.

Footnote 6: Stands for operational general matters and is a message format within the maritime tactical messages system, a standardization of Navy general operating instructions, NWP 5.

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INSET BOX:

Overview of Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) Doctrine and Organization (NWP-3-56 (Rev. A), Chapter 2) CWC Doctrine

The CWC doctrine embodies a basic organizational structure that is responsive to the demands of modern Naval warfare and provides a body of operational principles with associated supporting procedures. Use of this doctrine enables the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) to wage offensive and defensive combat operations aggressively against air, surface, undersea, and land-based threats while carrying out the primary mission of the force. The OTC may implement CWC procedures whenever and to whatever extent required depending upon the composition and mission of the force and the nature and severity of the threat. Flexibility of implementation, reinforced by clear guidance to subordinates, is the key element of this doctrine.

The CWC doctrine offers a methodology for effective decentralized C2 by recognizing that the magnitude of some threat scenarios requires dividing up the C2 work among several commanders to achieve effective spans of control.

The CWC doctrine also recognizes that timing or communication limitations may not allow commanders and units to seek and obtain clearance from their seniors before responding to certain threats. A negative aspect of decentralized C2, however, is the risk of improper execution of policies and misinterpretation of guidance from higher authority.

CWC Command Organization

The OTC will always be responsible for accomplishing the mission of the forces assigned. He may delegate authority for the execution of various activities in some or all warfare areas to designated subordinate warfare commanders. The OTC is normally the CWC. However, the CWC concept allows an OTC to delegate tactical command (TACOM) to the CWC. The CWC would exercise TACOM of the Principal Warfare Commanders who include Air Defense Commander (ADC), Antisubmarine Commander (ASWC), Information Warfare Commander (IWC), Strike Warfare Commander (STWC) and Surface Warfare Commander (SUWC). The CWC is also over the Functional Warfare Commanders such as the Mine Warfare Commander (MIWC) and Screen Commander (SC) as well as asset and resource Coordinators such as the Airspace Control Authority (ACA), Launch Area Coordinator and TLAM Strike Coordinator (TSC). The warfare commanders are responsible for collecting and disseminating information and, in certain situations, are delegated the authority to respond to threats with assigned assets. The CWC command structure is highly flexible with the OTC assigning forces and authority based on the specific requirements of the situation.
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4.4.1 Operational Control (OPCON)

OPCON is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing forces assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command.7 OPCON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon below the level of combatant commander, however, it would be more frequently exercised at echelons higher than the individual surface combatant.

Footnote 7: JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), dated 10 July 2001, pp. III-7, 8.

4.4.2 Tactical Control (TACON)

TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands or military capability made available for tasking that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks.8 TACON is inherent in OPCON and may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of the theater commander. TACON is the most likely command relationship for the surface combatant NSFS controlling unit or the NSS multi-unit commander role.

Footnote 8: Ibid, p. III-8.

4.4.3 Support 9

Support is a command authority appropriate when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. The support command relationship is especially relevant to amphibious operations. For example, the establishing authority in an amphibious operation defines a support relationship between commanders within the amphibious force as well as other designated commanders as appropriate. The support relationships are intentionally flexible. The establishing authority will specify the purpose of the support, the desired effect, and the scope of action to be taken.

Footnote 9: Ibid, pp. III-9, 10.

4.4.3.1 Supported Commander

The supported commander has the authority to exercise the general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, the timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency. A supported commander may be designated for the entire operation, a particular function, or a combination of phases, functions, or events. If the operation is relatively short, the establishing authority may select one supported commander for the entire operation.

4.4.3.2 Supporting Commander

The supporting commander determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications that will be used to provide the support. He will advise and coordinate with the supported commander on the employment and limitations of support, assist with planning, and ensure the supporting units are fully aware of the supported commander’s needs and intent.

4.4.3.3 Supporting and Supported Relationships in Joint Environments

The land and naval force commanders are the supported commanders within their areas of operations (AOs) designated by the JFC. Within these AOs, the supported commanders have the authority to designate target priorities, munitions effects, and the timing of weapons delivery to best synchronize maneuver and fires. The JFC also has the authority to establish priorities that will be executed throughout the theater or joint operations area (JOA), including within the land and naval force commanders’ AOs. Commanders designated by the JFC have the latitude to plan and execute these JFC prioritized operations and attack targets within land and naval AOs, but they must be coordinated with the land and naval force commanders.

4.4.4 Transfer of Command and Control

Surface combatants must be able to smoothly transition from one role10 to another. In response to a developing crisis, first on the scene surface combatants can operate independently until follow-on forces can be dispatched to the operating area. Operating in the NSS single unit role, the ship must be able to provide for the ship’s self defense and employ its land attack capability. If the conflict widens and additional surface combatants arrive on scene, the senior commanding officer may be assigned as the NSS multi-unit commander to commence attacks against the enemy.

During amphibious operations, a surface combatant normally begins in a NSFS supporting unit role and receives orders to fire from the SACC. As the operation progresses, the surface combatant may assume the NSFS controlling unit role if the SACC transfers authority for tactical fire direction over other surface combatants.

The surface combatant must be interoperable with joint forces when they arrive on scene. Upon arrival of a more senior commander, the combatant will transfer command and control functions as directed. Joint interoperability and connectivity of command and control systems must be achieved for surface combatants to operate effectively in the land attack roles.

Footnote 10: See Chapter 1 for definitions of the five roles.

4.4.5 Liaison Elements for Land Attack

With the evolution of the surface combatant’s land attack mission area, NSFS and NSS missions will be conducted in support of operations that have not historically included fires from surface combatants as key elements of the associated fire plans. Therefore, the need for effective liaison between the supported and supporting forces becomes more important as the capability of naval fires increases.

For NSFS, the traditional Navy and Marine Corps doctrine, procedures, and organization for naval gunfire support provide for liaison between surface combatants and the supported units. Key to effective liaison is the staffing of doctrinal billets 11 and the training of surface warfare officers in land attack warfare.

The current liaison structure and training for naval gunfire support may not be sufficient to respond to the expanded capabilities of both NSFS and NSS. New land attack weapons systems (e.g., ERGM and TACTOM) have flight profiles significantly different than traditional naval gunfire and require more extensive coordination than has been performed in the past by the naval gunfire liaison officer. This coordination could be effected through the establishment of a new coordination detachment within the JFACC.

This document recommends the establishment of a naval coordination detachment (NCD)12 as identified above and described in Appendix C. The NCD would provide on-site representation within the JFACC regarding surface combatant land attack matters.

Footnote 11: Naval gunfire officers and naval gunfire liaison officers. (Note: these titles should be changed to reflect the broader function of naval surface fires; e.g., NSF officer and NSFLnO.)

Footnote 12 The NCD expands on the responsibility of the naval and amphibious liaison element (NALE) as described in draft NWP 3-09.1 and could be included within or replace the NALE.

The presence of Army and coalition forces involved in land attack warfare presents additional challenges. The elimination of the air and naval gunfire liaison companies (ANGLICOs) from the active Marine Corps force structure reduced the liaison support capability naval forces can provide to the U.S. Army and coalition forces.13 Recognizing the value that ANGLICO added to the joint force, the Marine Corps has decided to re-activate ANGLICO in both I and II Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs). These active component liaison companies will become operational in 2003.

The range and precision of new land attack weapons makes them also relevant to Army operations. The Army may find it necessary to develop a liaison structure that will enhance its ability to operate with supporting surface combatants. For example, the Army could embark a liaison team onboard a surface combatant in a controlling unit role, with the necessary equipment to support an Army operation.

Special operations forces (SOF) interoperability with supporting surface combatants may require a SOF liaison detachment14 on the ship. The two main functions of the SOF detachment would be: (1) to provide or advise on communications with supported SOF units, and (2) to advise the ship’s commanding officer regarding any special considerations for the employment of land attack weapons in support of SOF units.

Footnote 13: Two ANGLICOs were maintained in the Marine Corps Reserve.

Footnote 14: The SOF liaison detachment could consist of a single liaison officer with appropriate communications. requires the surface combatant to perform specific functions and assume certain responsibilities.

4.4.6 Inherent Responsibilities for Surface Combatants

Surface combatants operate in one of the five roles described in detail in Chapter 1. Each role Shipboard command and control responsibilities must be clearly defined. The surface combatant and the agency or unit being supported must have the same understanding of those functions and responsibilities. To prevent confusion, minimize excessive voice communications, and increase mission responsiveness, a set of common practices or inherent responsibilities specifies a surface combatant’s functions and relationships with higher headquarters and supported units. These responsibilities will vary, depending on the surface combatant’s role.

Table 4-1 is based on an artillery model15 and summarizes the inherent responsibilities for surface combatants in a matrix format. It addresses several issues unique to surface combatants that:
-- operate in firing areas vice a specific geographic location,
-- have multi-warfare ship self-defense responsibilities,
-- have multi-warfare sensor capabilities,
-- are responsible to the battlegroup commander for other mission areas, and
-- have different command relationships.



The inherent responsibilities define standard tactical support responsibilities for each role to facilitate task organization, improve communications, and reduce the need for detailed coordination. The matrix defines these responsibilities regarding priority of fires, zones or areas of responsibility, targeting sources, communications, fire planning, and sensor allocation.

Footnote 15: Joint Pub 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, Appendix B, Fire Support Missions, dated 12 May 1998.


The following situation illustrates the importance of standard inherent responsibilities: Several surface combatants are assigned the Supporting Unit role to a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB).

Based on table 4-1 the ships would:

1. Answer fires tasking in priority from the MEB (supported unit) and also answer any tasking from higher HQ.

2. Have its zone of fire determined by the MEB.

3. Receive targeting from the supported unit (FFCC/SACC (ashore/afloat)). Targeting may also be provided directly by forward observers assigned to MEB maneuver units.

4. Establish communications with the supported unit (FFCC/SACC) or as assigned.

5. Have fires planned by MEB (FFCC/SACC). This means pre-planned fires will be provided to the ships for scheduling and execution as directed by the supported unit. For example, the FFCC/SACC sends informationto the ships that includes target data, weapons/munitions data, and timing data for schedules of fire. The ships would process and prepare the schedule of execution on the pre-arranged timeline.

6. Allocate assigned sensor resources in response to MEB targeting priorities.



4.5 COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) WITHIN THE ROLES

The section sets forth a specific situation for each of the five roles (note: section 4.5.4 includes two roles) and uses narrative and associated operational sequence diagrams (foldout figures 4-7, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10) to describe how a fire support or strike mission could be prosecuted in that situation. Symbols used in figures 4-3 through 4-10 are taken from FM 101-51/MCRP 5-2A, Operational Term and Graphics which is in compliance with MILSTD-2525A.


4.5.1. Naval Surface Fire Support Supporting Unit Role:
Amphibious Operation, Call for Fire

4.5.1.1 Special Situation (see figure 4-3)

An amphibious task force (ATF) has been deployed to Country ORANGE to conduct an amphibious assault. The mission of the ATF is to prevent enemy occupation of the vital port and industrial complex in Country ORANGE to facilitate the reception of follow-on forces in theater. A lead battalion of an enemy motorized rifle regiment is located 16 km east of RED Beach. Enemy forces are consolidating their positions and displacing logistics forward. Indications are that the enemy will move to occupy the port and industrial complex (10 km west of RED Beach) within the next several days.



Battalion landing team, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines (BLT 2 / 1) is an assault battalion of the landing force. Its mission is to attack across RED Beach 1 at 0600, D-Day, to seize Division Objective 1 and establish a blocking position to prevent the movement of enemy forces along Route 15, into the port and industrial complex. The BLT 2 / 1 commander’s intent is to conduct a surface assault across RED Beach 1 with two companies abreast, avoid decisive engagement on or near the beach, and move swiftly inland to seize the high ground, in zone, which dominates Route 15.

At 0530, thirty minutes before H-Hour, a reconnaissance team on Hill 300 observes an estimated platoon sized enemy mechanized unit (with two ZSU-23 / 2 twin towed AA systems) in the vicinity of Hill 84 on the left flank of BLT 2 / 1’s axis of advance. Informed of this development, the BLT 2 / 1 commander decides not to alter his scheme of maneuver, but to try to neutralize the enemy unit by fire and bypass. If that fails, he would have his left flank company (Echo Company) block the enemy advance while his right flank company (Fox Company), and reserve company (Golf Company) move swiftly to seize the objective.

The BLT 2 / 1 commander notifies the Echo Company commander of the threat. He reminds the Echo Company commander that attack helicopters are on station and available to attack the enemy mechanized forces, but that the ZSU-23s need to be suppressed before the helos go in.

The Echo Company commander immediately briefs his platoon commanders, his forward air controller, and his NSFS Spot Team of the situation. He directs the NSFS Spot Team, which is equipped with a target location designation and handoff system (TLDHS), to strive for first round accuracy in the suppression mission not only to prevent effective employment of the weapons, but also to hinder their displacement to new firing positions before the attack helicopters can complete their attack on the enemy mechanized forces.

4.5.1.2 Assumptions

-- The amphibious force is a Marine Expeditionary Brigade / Amphibious Ready Group (MEB / ARG).
-- Command is afloat and the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF) is the supported commander.
-- An amphibious objective area (AOA) has been established and is bounded by a ceiling altitude as delineated by the air control plan.
-- The tactical air control center (TACC), which is automated and co-located with the SACC, exercises airspace control within the AOA.
-- The airspace control authority (ACA) is the JFACC for the overall joint operations area.
-- The SACC has been equipped with an automated fire support and mission planning system, the core of which is the advanced field artillery tactical data system (AFATDS).
-- The primary mission of the surface combatants is fire support.

4.5.1.3 Sequence of OSD Events

(See operational sequence diagram (OSD), figure 4-7, at the end of this chapter; time sequence indicators below (Tn) correspond to the time sequence numbers on the OSD)

T0

The NSFS Spot Team with Echo Company, equipped with a TLDHS, accurately locates and designates the target and generates a fire request (FR). The data communication path is via SINCGARS radio, which interfaces with the DACT component of the TLDHS, via relay to the automated fire support system terminal located in the SACC. The FR data is also provided, via internal LAN, to the AFATDS also located in the SACC. The AFATDS updates the databases of all AFATDS ashore once they are able to receive data transmissions.

T1

The AFATDS in the SACC processes the FR by performing the following functions: target processing, target filtering, attack analysis, and mission execution. A summary of the functions of the automated fire support system in the SACC is described below:

During target processing, the FR is received and a verification of sufficient target data is performed. If required data is missing from the FR, the AFATDS operator may manually insert the missing data fields. A target number is assigned and the FR is compared against target selection standards established as part of commander’s guidance.

During target filtering,16 the target data is contrasted against the existing target list to check for duplication. A no-later-than (NLT) time for attack is determined and the target is contrasted against pre-determined mission priorities.

As part of the attack analysis, the AFATDS determines which of the several fire support ships17 is best able to deliver the desired effects on the target and the applicable fire support coordination requirements. If the fire mission violates a FSCM or airspace coordination measure, then the SACC transmits a data coordination message via the AFATDS to the agency that has established the measure. (For mission execution, see T2)

Footnote 16: Although not applicable for this operational scenario, a moving target intercept point for attacking mobile targets, and a build-up area check would be accomplished as part of target filtering.

Footnote 17: The T+N on each NSFS ship is responsible for reporting to the supported unit when they are on station and ready to receive fire missions, as well as their weapon status and ammunition inventory. The T+N must continuously update the supported unit with the NSFS ship’s location, and any change to the weapon status (e.g., local airspace fouled, gun mount casualty, etc.). The T+N must also report ammunition expenditure upon completion of every fire mission and upon request from the supported or higher unit.

T2

The mission is directed to the appropriate ship (firing unit) to execute the fire mission, based upon results of the processing and filtering of the target and the attack analysis. In this scenario, the AFATDS selects NSFS to provide suppression fires to allow attack helos to engage the mechanized force. The AFATDS in the SACC sends a data order to fire (OTF) to the TTWCS and NFCS (T+N)18 configuration aboard the firing unit.

T3

A data message to observer (MTO) is sent from the AFATDS in the SACC to the TLDHS with the NSFS Spot Team providing status of the FR.

T4

The T+N aboard the firing ship receives the OTF, via the automated digital network system (ADNS), from the SACC. A T+N operator conducts target processing functions to ensure availability of appropriate ordnance and to facilitate local area coordination. The NLT time for ordnance on target is verified. The T+N forwards the target to the Mk 160 gun computer system to conduct a trial solution19 that is monitored by shipboard personnel. After validation of the trial solution, the mission is scheduled and forwarded as an engagement order to the Mk 160 for execution.

Footnote 18: T+N is a configuration that allows the naval fires control system (NFCS) to share the Tactical Tomahawk weapons control system (TTWCS) consoles. Operator must toggle between NFCS and TTWCS to view each system’s display. See Appendix B for individual system descriptions.

Footnote 19: A trial solution message is submitted from NFCS to the Mk 160 GCS to assist in mission planning. For a trial solution NFCS provides ownship location data, target location data, environmental data and desired ammunition type (e.g., ERGM) to GCS. GCS then automatically performs technical fire control computations based on these input parameters and returns pertinent trial solution data to NFCS. Trial solution data includes munition trajectories, minimum and maximum times-of-flight, MRSI capability and failure mode hazard areas. The trial solution computations are conducted as background processing within the GCS and do not affect normal GCS processing.

T5

The T+N operator also sends a message to the NSFS spot team acknowledging receipt of the mission.

T6–T8

After the firing ship acknowledges receipt of the mission to the NSFS spot team, data communications flow directly between the NSFS spot team and the firing ship with other interested agencies (SACC, landing force operations center (LFOC), Bn) monitoring. When the firing ship executes the mission, an observer mission update report is sent by T+N to the TLDHS held by the NSFS spot team with a shot report and projected time the ordnance will arrive on target. Additionally, five seconds prior to impact, the T+N aboard the firing ship generates an observer mission update splash report, which is then sent to the TLDHS held by the NSFS spot team. An end of mission (EOM) message with battle damage assessment (BDA), from the NSFS spot team, ends the mission. A mission fired report (MFR) is generated by the firing ship T+N and sent to AFATDS in the SACC. The AFATDS in the SACC updates the firing unit ammunition inventory based on the expenditure reported in the MFR.

4.5.1.4 Insights and Observations

-- Replacement of voice communications with data communications for “splash” reports and, to a lesser extent, “shot” reports may require special procedures. Data connectivity will not produce the instantaneous transmission of reports, as is the case with voice communications. Voice splash reports conveyed to observers five seconds prior to ordnance impact are self-confirming as far as receipt and acknowledgement by the observer. The transmission of a data splash report five seconds before impact, however, will not guarantee that it is received, much less acknowledged, before impact. A possible solution may be to send the splash time along with an earlier data observer mission update so that the observer’s forward entry device could keep track of the predicted impact time and notify the observer several seconds before impact. Other similar anomalies between data and voice processing of fire missions may arise requiring adjustments in techniques and procedures.
-- The SACC needs to know that a ship will be able to execute a fire mission the SACC assigns to it. All ships assigned to the general NSFS mission are assumed to be ready to fire unless the ship’s commanding officer informs the SACC that he cannot accept a mission for a specific reason (e.g., someone has fouled his ship’s local airspace; gun casualty).
-- Voice communications provide fire support coordination agencies, ships, supported units, and observers, with the capability to monitor appropriate nets to maintain situational awareness. Data communications, however, require that all necessary agencies are subscribers in the network in order to receive the data being transmitted. The data subscriber network must be configured so that all firing units have all of the unique reference numbers (URNs) of the artillery forward observers, NSFS spot teams, and anyone else who may be involved in fire missions that the firing unit may be assigned.



4.5.2 Naval Surface Fire Support Controlling Unit Role:
U.S. Army, Operations in Urban Terrain, Call for Fire

4.5.2.1 Special Situation (see figure 4-4)

The CJTF attack on ORANGE forces in BLUE Capital City has begun with the objective of regaining control of the city and removing ORANGE forces. Various elements of the ORANGE forces form mobile fire teams of platoon and company-size throughout the city hoping to prolong its occupation of the BLUE capital until world opinion and diplomatic channels force all parties to the peace table rather than fighting a static defense. These mobile fire teams will conduct hit-and-run attacks on allied forces, reinforce or provide fire support to ORANGE positions, and support localized counterattacks.



The Army’s response to this tactical threat consists of a three-phased plan: first, detect and track the dispersed mobile ORANGE teams; second, target them; and third, destroy them through a combination of supporting arms and a combined arms quick reaction force.

After ambushing a BLUE mechanized infantry platoon, one such mobile ORANGE team is tracked moving into the U.S. Army’s zone of action, then maneuvered into an area by quick reaction forces, and eventually surrounded. The area is isolated from reinforcements. The surrounded mobile ORANGE team refuses to capitulate. Instead, it attempts to break out of its situation by counterattacking in the direction of the closest ORANGE position.

As the mobile ORANGE team counterattacks, it runs into a blocking position established by 2nd Platoon, Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry. At time T = zero (T0) the platoon leader calls for a fire mission on the ORANGE force. The urban terrain the two opposing forces find themselves in is very mixed in shape and layout with high-rise apartment buildings and office skyscrapers, wide and narrow city streets, park areas, and one and two story structures intermingled. 1st Battalion 22nd Infantry has been assigned priority of fire by the brigade commander. All fire requests are routed through the brigade fires and effects coordination cell (FECC) because of concerns regarding collateral damage, coordination with adjacent allied forces, and ammunition levels.

4.5.2.2 Assumptions

-- The Army has adopted the fires and effects system concept20 as a modification to current doctrinal fire support C2 agencies.
-- The Army has one corps (three divisions) fully digitized.
-- A surface action group composed of a CG and three DDGs is providing naval fires in support of the Army units. The CG is the controlling unit.
-- NFCS has a controlling unit capability.

Footnote 20: Fires and effects coordination is the continuing process of planning, integrating, and orchestrating full-spectrum fires and effects in support of the combined arms operation to achieve the commander’s desired end state. This process includes the management of delivery assets and sensors, and direct coordination with the combined arms commander. Effects-based fires focuses on achieving a desired effect against a target in the battlespace for a specified purpose in the combined arms operation.

4.5.2.3 Sequence of OSD Events

(See operational sequence diagram (OSD), figure 4-8, a the end of this chapter; time sequence indicators below (Tn) correspond to the time sequence numbers on the OSD)

T0

The platoon forward observer transmits the call for fire, via voice or data, to the company fire support team (FIST) using Force XXI Battle Command Brigade-and-Below System (FBCB2)21 communications capability. The FIST forwards the call for fire digitally to the brigade using the forward entry device (FED). The platoon forward observer receives feedback on the status of his request (e.g., the request for fire was accepted and is being processed, additional information is required, or fire support cannot be provided with a reason why).

The request for fire goes directly to the brigade FECC22 with the battalion fire support element (FSE) receiving simultaneous notification so that it can monitor the request.23 The battalion commander has veto authority over the fire mission. By monitoring the situation and transmission, the battalion FSE ensures compliance with ROE and meets the commander’s intent for fires.

Footnote 21: FBCB2 is a digital battle command and control information system that will provide on-the-move, near real-time battle command and situational awareness, and the ability to generate spot reports, calls for fire, and operation overlays.

Footnote 22: The brigade fires and effects coordination cell (FECC) performs all capabilities of a Fire Support Element (FSE) plus it has the ability to integrate available non-lethal capabilities into targeting, to establish a link to the Common Ground Station, manage counterfire, execute information operations, and establish improved joint fires connectivity.

T1–T6

The AFATDS receives the fire support request and filters, screens, and processes the request. AFATDS prioritizes the request for fire based upon different factors, data, and criteria predefined and uploaded into the system. If AFATDS recommends supporting arms attack the target, it will also recommend an available weapon system to engage the target. In this scenario, NSFS (ERGM unitary warhead) is recommended to attack the target because enemy counterfire radar renders artillery and rocket fire particularly vulnerable. AFATDS generates a fire request and recommends an attack method for the ERGM. The brigade effects coordinator (ECOORD) concurs with AFATDS recommendation.

Footnote 23: An intervention point has been established at the brigade FECC for all its subordinate units’ fires because of concerns about collateral damage, the need to coordinate with adjacent allied forces, and the need to monitor ammunition inventories across the force.

T7–T11

The recommended use of ERGM requires coordination with the JAOC due to the clearance of fire criteria in effect for coordinating airspace. These criteria are resident in the logic tables of AFATDS. Following input of weapon platform information from the NSFS controlling unit, AFATDS sends an airspace coordination request to the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) located in the joint air operations center (JAOC). The request is sent through the chain of command (division and corps) via the tactical internet that predominately relies upon EHF radio and SATCOM as communication media. The corps FECC coordinates airspace ashore within its designated boundaries.

The JAOC coordinates all other airspace. With the brigade FECC having selected “Warning Order” in AFATDS for method of control, the fire request is transmitted from the brigade FECC to the controlling unit (CG). The controlling unit forwards the warning order to the firing unit(s) to prepare for the mission. NFCS returns weapons readiness status on all ships through the AFATDS network to the requestor.

The FECC organization includes a NSFS team liaison that advises the ECOORD on the employment of naval fires and communicates the brigade combat team commander’s maneuver plan to the controlling unit.

T12–T14

JAOC notifies the corps FECC when the airspace coordination is accomplished. An order to fire (OTF) is then transmitted from the brigade FECC via the controlling unit to the firing unit(s) for execution. The controlling unit has the capability to intervene as required.

T15–T19

T+N in the CIC on the firing ship(s) receives the OTF with targeting data from the controlling unit. Local airspace coordination is conducted within CIC and potential conflicts identified. (Conflicts that preclude mission execution are provided to the controlling unit.) When authorized by the firing ship’s commanding officer or his designated representative, the mission is executed.

T20–T21

After the controlling unit receives the OTF, a digital data message to observer is sent to the company FIST. This information is transmitted through the different levels of command. Since it is data being transmitted digitally, the message is monitored simultaneously at all command levels. It does not stop at each level of command to be acknowledged and then forwarded.

The FIST communicates fire mission information to and from the platoon forward observer. Thereafter, the FIST communicates digitally with the controlling unit through the tactical internet systems. The various command levels involved monitor these digital communications simultaneously rather than serially acknowledging them and forwarding them to the next echelon. To conclude the mission the observer sends an end of mission message that includes BDA to the firing ship(s). At end of mission, the firing ship(s) send a mission fired report to the Brigade FECC.

4.5.2.4 Insights and Observations

-- Local airspace coordination is the responsibility of each firing ship. All other coordination is performed by the FECC.
-- An NSFS liaison team is required at the brigade FECC and Army representation may be required aboard the CG to ensure effective mission execution.
-- The U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team must have the capability to communicate directly with a firing ship operating over-the-horizon.
-- Digital data communication between the brigade FECC and the controlling unit, which is over the horizon, may have to be relayed. This requirement for a relay could occur if organic over-the-horizon communication equipment below the division command level is not available to provide a direct communications link.
-- Digital data communication from the FIST to the firing ship through various command nodes (via tactical internet systems) is nearly simultaneous vice sequential.
-- Digital data communication transmissions received at command nodes, acting as servers, will be forwarded via a digital path of least resistance. This path may differ with each transmission and is transparent.
-- Digital data systems do not eliminate the need for voice communications.



4.5.3 Naval Surface Strike Single Unit Role:
Strike Mission Against Rebel Forces Attacking a U.S. Embassy

Although it is recognized that funding for the production of the vertical takeoff unmanned aerial vehicle (VTUAV) has been withdrawn, this scenario is included to demonstrate the NSS single unit role and illustrate the requirement for an organic targeting capability on surface combatants.

4.5.3.1 Special Situation (see figure 4-5)

Rebel forces, supported by a neighboring enemy government, have successfully maintained a state of unrest in the friendly country of PURPLE for several years. Rebel forces have conducted raids and terrorist attacks and are threatening to overthrow the PURPLE government. Cease-fire and peace negotiations led by a third party have failed to make any progress in reducing the level of rebel activity. In fact, the rebel forces have grown in strength and the level of activity has been increasing.



Recently, the rebel forces have been observed moving from the more remote countryside toward the capital city. The presumed intent of this action is to launch a consolidated attack on the capital city, take control of key facilities, and to attempt to overthrow the PURPLE government. Because of the western support for the PURPLE regime, the rebels have been making strong threatening statements towards the U.S. Embassy. The PURPLE government has made it clear that it will not be able to guarantee the safety of the embassy in the event of a significant rebel assault on the capital.

With evidence mounting that the rebel forces are in fact preparing for a major operation, the United States decides to move the nearest Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) into the area. The MEU is involved in split-ARG training operations. Logistic demands of reembarking troops and equipment from disparate locations and the relatively slow speed of amphibious ships could preclude arrival of the ARG / MEU offshore PURPLE before rebel forces mount what appears to be an imminent attack.

To expedite responsiveness, a reinforced rifle platoon from the MEU is embarked aboard a DDG, which proceeds to the vicinity of the PURPLE capital city at maximum speed. The remainder of the MEU and associated assets follow.

The DDG with a tactical UAV detachment embarked arrives first on scene and 36 hours before the rest of the force. The rifle platoon is shuttled to the embassy to protect American lives and to make preparations for potential evacuation of the embassy should it come under attack by the rebel forces.

The platoon also deploys reinforced squads within the city along avenues of approach to the embassy. The intent is to provide intelligence on rebel activity and movement and to disrupt or delay any rebel attack on the embassy. Soon after arrival on site, rebel activity and SIGINT indicate that the rebel forces intend to attack the U.S. Embassy, possibly before the remainder of the U.S. force can arrive on scene.

The tactical UAV is employed to provide surveillance of avenues of approach, where preplanned targets have been established. These preplanned targets were selected based on surrounding urban terrain and the desire to limit collateral friendly casualties and damage. Rules of engagement provide the DDG commanding officer authority to initiate engagement of the enemy when the rebel forces threaten the embassy.

Figure 4-5 provides a map of the operations area in the vicinity of the U.S. Embassy. The primary rebel force concentrations are to the northeast of the city with lesser force concentrations to the southeast.

4.5.3.2 Assumptions

-- The ARG and MEU staffs, aboard the amphibious command ship (LHD), conducted considerable mission planning prior to detaching the DDG and associated advanced forces. This pre-planning included (1) resource identification, (2) rules of engagement (ROE), and (3) command relationships. Resource identification dealt with communication plans and equipment, NIMA map/chart products, target acquisition equipment, supporting assets including UAVs or LAMPS. All operation area maps, charts, commander’s criteria, and preplanned targets were loaded into the NFCS and TTWCS aboard the DDG prior to arrival on scene.
-- The DDG will be ‘over the horizon’ from the capital city with its operational location approximately 25–50nm from the embassy. This assumption implies that ERGM and TACTOM will be the fire support assets available for the mission and that the communications from the deployed land forces to the firing ship cannot depend upon line of sight only and will require either an airborne relay or UHF SATCOM capability to maintain connectivity.
-- The DDG will have full responsibility for all tactical area surface and air coordination. The ability to effectively perform this task is limited by and to ship assets. There is no immediate support available from AWACS or other non-organic assets in the operational area.
-- Necessary C4ISRT assets are in place to support situation awareness (SA), intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), planning, cueing and battle damage assessment (BDA)

4.5.3.3 Sequence of OSD Events

(See operational sequence diagram (OSD), figure 4-9, a the end of this chapter; time sequence indicators below (Tn) correspond to the time sequence numbers on the OSD)

Figure 4-9 provides the operational sequence and command and communication relationships for this operation. Because the ARG / MEU is not on scene, the task force (element) commander is the DDG commanding officer. A rifle company XO is deployed with the forces at the embassy. A tactical command net is established between the DDG and the embassy (company XO and rifle platoon). A Marine fire support liaison officer is provided to the ship’s CIC.

T1–T3

The Marine platoon commander is able to communicate directly with the NFCS aboard the DDG to conduct strikes against preplanned targets. The platoon commander conducts security patrols throughout the urban area surrounding the embassy, identifying likely rebel avenues of approach to the embassy and choke points along those approaches. The platoon commander also collects information that helps define no-fire areas (NFAs) and validate friendly forces locations. Information gathered by the platoon becomes the key planning factor in determining tactical UAV surveillance missions.

T4–T6

On the DDG, T+N provides mission planning for targets nominated by the rifle platoon or from other sources. The tactical UAV controlled via TCS on the DDG flies surveillance over routes determined by prior intelligence gathering (reconnaissance patrols, map studies, aerial photos, interviews of local population). The tactical UAV detects rebel troop movement toward the embassy and transmits real-time surveillance data via TCS to the DDG. The DDG commanding officer designates targets to be engaged to prevent or delay a rebel advance on the embassy.

T7–T9

The DDG CO is responsible for airspace coordination for the entire operations area in preparation for naval fires missions. Special attention must be paid to any evacuation operations that may be underway. Once airspace coordination has been completed, the CO approves the fire order(s). The T+N passes necessary information to the weapon control systems to launch missiles and/or fire the gun in support of the strike mission(s). The higher headquarters (HHQ) and the embassy are notified when weapons are fired.

T10

The tactical UAV collects battle damage assessment (BDA) and continues surveillance of planned areas. The rifle platoon may also be employed to collect BDA. A mission fired report to HHQ and the embassy concludes the mission.

4.5.3.4 Insights and Observations

-- Organic targeting capability is required for a surface combatant to perform the NSS single unit role. Note: if no organic targeting capability is available, a significant reachback capability (e.g., naval fires network (NFN))24 must be provided. The reach back requirement will also necessitate an expanded communications capability onboard the surface combatant.
-- An ability to communicate at beyond line-of-sight ranges requires an airborne relay or satellite connectivity.
-- Preplanning of targets with the assistance of external agencies will enhance effectiveness of this role.
-- The single unit commanding officer needs clear cut lines of authority and ROE to accomplish the mission.
-- Liaison officers should be exchanged between the embassy and the ship.

Footnote 24: NFN is aggregate of the following systems: GCCS-M,TES-N, and JSIPS-N as described in Appendix B.

4.5.4.1 Special Situation (see figure 4-6)

Joint task force (JTF) follow-on forces have entered the area of operations and have built up sufficient forces to conduct offensive operations to restore the territorial integrity of the invaded country. During the build up of CJTF forces, the enemy has been able to install a sophisticated and integrated air defense system. The enemy has deployed combined arms forces arrayed in mobile defense with mobile SAM assets linked via shared command and control to coordinate engagements against CJTF air assets. Enemy tactics are to move SAM batteries every two hours unless they have fired on incoming aircraft. An individual battery moves as soon as possible after it fires. Radar is used in brief periods from multiple sites to confuse true locations and to abate the HARM engagement attempts.



In order to conduct ground offensive operations, local air superiority must be achieved. Multiservice assets will be used to detect targets. JFACC will provide available target information for engagement. A SAG consisting of a CG (multi-unit commander) and two DDGs (firing units) is directed to respond to time critical targets detected by JTF sensors.

The JFACC ashore is coordination authority for all fires and aircraft in the zone of action. The multi-unit commander coordinates local airspace when conducting naval fires. A dedicated EHF SATCOM data channel has been established between the joint air operation center (JAOC) and the multi-unit commander.

A JSTARS aircraft has been monitoring an area of interest for likely transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) positions approximately 25 miles inland in the vicinity of hills 210 and 200. Route 15 runs east to west between the hills and through a forested area about 15 miles long. A mobile SAM system, detected by onboard sensors of the JSTARS aircraft, has been located at the eastern edge of the forested area. The SAM is providing air defense coverage for the TEL and would impose a high risk to tactical aircraft attacking the TEL. The SAM would also be effective against missiles such as TACTOM.

4.5.4.2 Assumptions

-- JAOC has the systems and manning necessary to coordinate fires in the battlespace in near real-time.
-- A naval coordination detachment (NCD) has been established and collocated in the JAOC as part of the joint fires cell.
-- The multi-unit commander (CG) has an NFNlike capability.
-- Sensors can provide timely and accurate target locations needed to effectively employ precision munitions.
-- TACTOMs have been allocated to support this mission.
-- The command and control capability exists to be able to distribute and assign targets.

4.5.4.3 Sequence of Events

(See operational sequence diagram (OSD), figure 4-10, at the end of this chapter; time sequence indicators below (Tn) correspond to the time sequence numbers on the OSD)

Up to T0

Based upon the commander’s guidance, the JAOC tasks the JSTARS aircraft and its target acquisition sensors. The sensors must be able to identify and classify the number of contacts in relation to time. These sensors are required to give locations of the targets and provide the mapping frame of reference, to give the target location error associated with the contact, and to indicate if there is any movement detected within the target area.

The JSTARS mission is to detect and identify potential targets or target sets and downlink this information to the Army common ground station (CGS) collocated with the JAOC ashore. This information is transmitted via a surveillance control data link (SCDL).25

Footnote 25: SCDL is a time division multiple access data link incorporating flexible frequency management. The system employs wideband frequency hopping, coding, and data diversity to achieve robustness against hostile jamming.

T0

The JSTARS detects a suspected TEL and SAM.

T1–T2

The JAOC initiates the targeting process upon receipt of the target detections from JSTARS, focusing initially on validating the target(s). The JAOC joint fires cell confirms target identification and determines the specific target locations based on the best available target information. Key items of information used in mission planning are the commander’s guidance, the rules of engagement, fire support coordination measures, and other battlefield geometry along with the air control order and air tasking order. JAOC designates the TEL and SAM as time critical targets and determines that the best engagement option is to attack them with naval fires.

T3–T4

The JAOC has a joint fires cell that includes an NCD to assist in planning and executing naval fires. The NCD would be a small liaison element with enough personnel to maintain 24-hour operations. In this scenario, the NCD recommends to the JAOC that this mission be assigned to the NSS multi-unit commander. The JAOC joint fires cell passes the validated target information to the NSS multi-unit commander with instructions to destroy the TEL.

T5–T8

Upon receipt of mission tasking, the NSS multi-unit commander augments information received from the JAOC with information available from NFN to refine targeting data. The NSS multi-unit commander plans for a coordinated strike to suppress the SAM and destroy the TEL. The NSS multi-unit commander then conducts weapon-target pairing and decides to suppress the SAM with ERGM while attacking the TEL by providing an aimpoint update to a loitering TACTOM under control of one of the DDGs. The NSS multi-unit commander coordinates local airspace for itself and the firing units, and issues tasking orders to the two DDGs. DDG(1) is instructed to prepare a new aimpoint (the TEL) for its loitering TACTOM to be executed upon command of the NSS multi-unit commander. DDG(2) is instructed to suppress the SAM with ERGM upon command of the NSS multi-unit commander.

T9–T13

Both firing units (DDGs) receive their tasking orders from the multi-ship unit and prepare their missions, reporting computed time on target back to the NSS multi-unit commander. The NSS multi-unit commander plans for the coordinated suppression and destruction missions and provides orders to fire to the DDGs with precise time on target requirements and, for the suppression mission, a duration of fire. Once final airspace coordination is effected, the NSS multi-unit commander transmits the command to execute the coordinated attack.

T14–T15

Via NFN, the NSS multi-unit commander obtains BDA confirming destruction of the TEL. A mission complete is transmitted to the firing units, the JAOC/JFACC, and the NCD.

4.5.4.4 Insights and Observations

-- Sensors must be able to provide significant information about the enemy TEL and its protective SAM. This information would include identification and classification of the targets with respect to time, target location along with the accuracy of the location (i.e., target location error), and indication of expected target dwell time (e.g., the time the TEL is expected to remain in its current location).
-- The NSS multi-unit commander must have an NFN-like capability in order to conduct this mission.
-- The process of performing BDA needs to be planned in advance to determine if reattack is required.
-- Airspace coordination is a shared responsibility. Target area coordination was the responsibility of the JAOC. The launch and over-water coordination was the responsibility of the NSS multi-unit commander.
-- An agency (i.e., cell, detachment, element) is required to plan and coordinate joint fires for the JTF. This agency should be composed of members of the JFC’s staff, representatives of the component commanders, and other experts as needed. This agency would provide the capability to accomplish joint fires planning and coordination functions. A joint fires cell concept has been experimented with as part of several Fleet Battle Experiments in several different shipboard and shore based configurations. Air Force experimentation has examined different internal organizational architectures for a fire cell within the JAOC. Experimentation involving Marine Corps and Army fires element organization has also taken place. The common thread in each of these efforts is functions and not systems.