Defcon 6

2003 CONOPS Chapter 3:
REQUIRED CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT OBJECTIVES



3.0 REQUIRED CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT OBJECTIVES

This chapter addresses the required capabilities and employment objectives of naval fires within the context of the naval surface combatant.


3.1 INTRODUCTION TO FIRES

Fires is defined as the effects of lethal and nonlethal weapons. Joint fires are fires produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action toward a common objective. Fire support is fires that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to engage enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in pursuit of tactical and operational objectives. Joint fire support consists of joint fires that assist land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, and key waters.1

Joint doctrine defines strike as an attack that is intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective.2 Broadly characterized, this definition encompasses all offensive actions that can be taken by air, naval, or ground forces to produce an effect (damage) on a defined objective. The naval services have refined this definition to narrow its scope in an attempt to differentiate between strike operations and fire support.

Footnote 1: Joint Pub 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.

Footnote 2: Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.


3.1.1 Subsystems of Fires

Fires is the synergistic product of three subsystems: target acquisition, command and control, and attack resources.3

-- Target Acquisition (TA). The goal of the target acquisition system is to provide timely and accurate information to enhance the attack of specified targets. Target acquisition systems and equipment perform the key tasks of target detection, location, tracking, identification, classification, and battle damage assessment. This is further discussed in Chapter 7.

-- Command and Control (C2). Employing command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence systems with unity of effort is key to effective coordination of fires, and includes the vertical and horizontal coordination accomplished by fire support coordinators, agencies and liaison elements. Successful C2 of fires integrates planning and coordination, technical and tactical fire direction procedures, and air operations to achieve the supported commander’s desired effects. C2 is further discussed in Chapter 4.

-- Attack Resources. Attack resources include air-to-surface, surface-to-surface, and subsurface- to-surface delivery assets. Fires also includes nonlethal and disruptive operations, such as psychological operations and electronic warfare. Detailed airspace and ground coordination is required regardless of the attack system employed. Coordination is further discussed in Chapter 6.

Footnote 3: Joint Pub 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.


3.1.2 Naval Surface Fires

Naval surface fires must be fully integrated with the fires of all services to provide a full spectrum capability designed to unbalance and rapidly defeat an increasingly sophisticated, dangerous, and more complicated adversary. Often as the first on-scene force, surface combatants are capable of providing initial joint command and control of fires. When additional forces can be brought to bear, surface combatants will provide naval fires as part of a combined arms operations in joint campaigns.

Naval surface strike (NSS) has been defined in Chapter 1 as the destruction or neutralization of enemy targets ashore through the use of conventional weapons provided by surface combatants.

These targets consist of strategic, operational, and tactical targets capable of conducting hostile operations against U.S. or Allied forces. These missions are characterized by attacks on strategic centers of gravity, war-making capacity, will to make war and military targets not directly in contact with friendly forces. NSS, usually conducted independent of ground maneuver forces, can generally be characterized within the joint fires framework as fires or joint fires. Naval surface fire support (NSFS), also defined in Chapter 1, encompasses fires provided by Navy surface gun, missile, and electronic warfare systems in support of a unit or units tasked with achieving the commander’s objectives. NSFS is usually associated with support of ground maneuver forces. Surface combatants tasked with providing NSFS must remain cognizant of the four basic tasks that are the focus of fire support plans: support to forces in contact, support the concept of operations, synchronize fire support, and sustain fire support operations. NSFS can generally be characterized within the joint fires framework as fire support or joint fire support.

Achieving rapid and decisive effects against our adversary will require a shift from our current sequential approach4 to warfare. Future naval fires will support opportunities for simultaneous operations. The Navy will conduct strategic, operational and tactical fires throughout the littoral area that can be integrated with the direct insertion of highly mobile ground forces. Providing fires in support of simultaneous operations will require a fires system capable of providing the rapid application of integrated fires from dispersed formations throughout the battlespace. Achieving rapid, integrated fires requires a fully netted digital fires network capable of combining sensors, command and control, and fires.

Footnote 4: This sequential approach begins with strikes against air defenses and military and industrial infrastructure sites and transitions to support of ground forces only after significant degradation to the adversary’s capabilities.

Effective naval fires also require advances in existing support capabilities. These include at sea replenishment, joint and coalition interoperability, data transfer, organizational adaptability, and training.5

Footnote 5: Detailed land attack warfare training requirements are provided in the Training Requirements Document (TRD), dated 26 January 2001.


3.1.3 Time Sensitive Targeting (TST)

Time sensitive targeting (TST) is a recently defined targeting and engagement process that is primarily being performed by air assets. Surface combatants with their improved land attack capabilities will also be able to conduct time sensitive engagements. TST has its foundation in Joint Vision 2010, from which the idea of precision engagement flows.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TEXT BOX: Definitions of Time Sensitive and Time Critical Targets (6)

Time sensitive targets (TST) are defined in Joint Publication 1-02 as “those targets requiring immediate response because they pose (or will soon pose) a clear and present danger to friendly force or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity.” Key factors include value, mobility, and time sensitivity. Although not currently approved by joint doctrine, many joint commands use the term “time critical target (TCT)” as a sub-category of TST. These TCTs are deemed to pose such a threat to friendly forces that they are afforded distinctive ROE by the joint force commander (JFC). The JFC determines those situations, if any, where immediate engagement of the TCT threat outweighs other operational considerations. Joint TCTs are normally based upon adversary capabilities. In other words, a joint TCT is a target of great immediacy that possesses such a significant threat to the joint force that it is specifically designated by the JFC for immediate engagement in order to prevent damage to friendly forces.

Footnote 6: Commander’s Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting, Appendix F, dated 22 March 2002.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The current goal is to identify and effectively attack a target within 30 minutes (table 3-1). To achieve this goal requires an array of dedicated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets that have been organized in accordance with an intelligence preparation of the battlespace. The rules of engagement must facilitate rapid decision making by the commander or his battlestaff. The command and control systems must be technically capable of quickly disseminating targeting information to the engagement system. Time sensitive targets are further discussed in Chapter 7. 5 Detailed land attack warfare training requirements are provided in the Training Requirements Document (TRD), dated 26 January 2001.





3.2 NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT


3.2.1 Marine Corps Required Capabilities

The Marine Corps has formally stated its requirements for naval surface fire support in the document titled, Naval Surface Fire Support Requirements for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare.7 This section summarizes those requirements.

Footnote 7: Commanding General (CG), Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) letter 3900 C428, dated 19 March 2002.


3.2.1.1 Sea-Based Fires as a Component of Combined Arms

Naval surface fire support augments the organic fires of the maneuver force with complementary, all weather fires that support the deep, close, and rear battle. The sea-based fire support system should include an all weather target acquisition capability that can produce target data for first round fire for effect. Further, a robust NSFS capability, to include counterfire detection/ engagement, is critical to support expeditionary operations during all stages of ship-to-objective maneuver.

Combined arms is the full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another. It pairs firepower with mobility to produce a desired effect upon the enemy. Marine Corps fire support doctrine is based upon this philosophy, whereby target destruction is frequently not the primary benefit of indirect fires.

Combined arms does not focus on specific percentages normally associated with damage criteria (e.g., 30% damage for destruction) but must concentrate on what fires can do to the enemy to shape the battlespace, set conditions for decisive action, and support maneuver. Fires can be used to create both some degree of hazard and the perception that the hazard is severe enough to merit deviation from a desired course of action. For example, if the enemy assumes a posture with the intent to protect himself from incoming fires he may sustain no physical damage but his cost of survival is the inability to perform his assigned mission.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
INSET BOX: Illustrative Scenario:

In the following illustrative scenario, a friendly mechanized infantry unit encounters an enemy mechanized infantry unit arrayed in a defensive position that is tied in with the terrain. The defensive position lies between the friendly unit and its assigned objective, and bypassing the position is impossible. The unit commander decides to attack through the left flank and into the enemy’s rear in an attempt to turn the position and pry the enemy out of his prepared defenses. Assuming an average rate of movement of 15 kilometers per hour, the attack will take a total of approximately 36 minutes. This rate of movement assumes that no counter-mobility obstacles will need to be breached, and that enemy indirect fire assets have been sufficiently suppressed to prevent any significant impact by these systems on the friendly force.



Fires have been planned to accomplish the following:

-- Suppress Target 1 to facilitate its attack by direct-fire ground systems and rotary-wing close air support (RW CAS).

-- Suppress and obscure Target 2 to prevent enemy force located there from effectively engaging friendly maneuver force with direct-fire weapon systems, and to facilitate its follow-on attack by friendly ground forces and RW CAS.

-- Suppress, neutralize or destroy enemy at Target 3 to prevent it from maneuvering against the flank of the attacking friendly force, and to prevent it from counter-attacking (Target 4) as the friendly force continues to maneuver to its objective.

-- Disrupt an enemy counter-attack from beyond the intermediate objective in the vicinity of Target 4 (on-call fire missions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Fires involve more than the mere delivery of ordnance on target. The psychological impact on an adversary of volume and seemingly random fires cannot be underestimated. Marines applying the tenets of maneuver warfare will continue to exploit integrated fires and maneuver to shatter the cohesion of an adversary. Volume and precision fires are equally important in achieving the desired effects on an enemy.


3.2.1.2 Operational Phases

The following provides a breakdown of the phases of an expeditionary operation to facilitate placing NSFS requirements into context.

-- Shaping the Battlespace. The emphasis in this phase will be on destruction, harassment, interdiction, and neutralization fires to degrade enemy capabilities within the battlespace. Naval fires are required for advance force and supporting operations in an uncertain or hostile environment. They will be used primarily for providing deep fires against critical fixed and relocatable targets.

-- Forcible Entry. In this phase, emphasis shifts from shaping operations to supporting the force as it maneuvers to objectives ashore. This is the most demanding phase for NSFS. Deep fires provided by naval aviation and NSFS continue to shape the battlespace while simultaneously providing close supporting fires and counterfire to forces ashore. Of primary importance will be the close supporting fires (destruction, neutralization, and suppression) in direct support of the maneuver force. During ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM), fire support must provide immediate and responsive high volume fires in support of highly mobile forces as they maneuver throughout the non-linear battlespace.

-- Sustained/Subsequent Operations Ashore. If the expected duration of the operation ashore warrants a general unloading of the landing force, organic ground-based fire support systems will provide the bulk of highly responsive, close supporting fires. NSFS will continue to provide deep and close supporting fires, augmenting organic ground-based systems.


3.2.1.3 Command and Control

Command and control (C2) for expeditionary fire support demands a system compatible with on-scene or arriving forces. Throughout the entire planning and execution process, all components of the expeditionary fire support system must be interoperable and collaborative.

Given the joint nature of future operations, a reexamination of traditional command relationships is required to make these relationships more responsive and flexible. Central to an effective naval fire support system is that the commander responsible for the mission or for a phase of an operation, has the ability to plan, allocate, control, and coordinate fires from all available systems.

Commanders exercise authority within the four dimensional limits of boundaries established by a higher headquarters. The commander has complete targeting and organic weapons release authority and is responsible for the effects of all fires delivered into or within these boundaries. Once these boundaries have been established, the command and control of fires is a function of the fire support coordinator within whose boundaries the effects of the fires will be realized.

This includes coordination with adjacent units whose battlespace is affected by the flight path or terminal effects of the weapons system/munition. NSFS controlling units support the airspace deconfliction process by providing weapons information, e.g., launch point and trajectory to the fire support coordination agency. This means that any adverse effects of NSFS delivered on a requested target are the responsibility of the requesting agency, not the commander of the ship who provided the fires.


3.2.1.4 Response Times

Ground forces require assistance in locating hostile fire support platforms in both the initial phases of amphibious operations and during subsequent operations ashore. A flexible and robust counterfire detection and location capability from the sea is a required component of the fire support system. The system should be responsive enough to achieve the first round away within 2.5 minutes of acquiring the counterfire target. The system must be fully interoperable and integrated with joint, automated, fire support C2 systems. Target acquisition will be accomplished from a combination of sensors netted together to provide the required area coverage.

The required system response times for all NSFS systems are drawn from the call for fire mission processing times specified for Marine Corps field artillery. Considering all mission types and all artillery munitions, the Marine Corps threshold requirement for NSFS execution responsiveness is 2.5 minutes. The objective requirement is to reduce response time to the limits of technology. The following diagram provides a breakdown of the fire support process with regard to responsiveness.

At extended ranges, time of flight can add minutes to the overall mission response time. A total mission time (call for fire to rounds on target) greater than 10 minutes significantly increases the probability of missing a relocatable target. Minimizing time of flight, as well as the total mission processing time is of vital importance when providing close supporting fires to maneuver forces in contact with the enemy.




3.2.1.5 Sustainability

Maneuver forces require all-weather, reliable, sustained fire support. Per the Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare Guidance Document signed by Rear Admiral Mullen on 11 September 2000, “Replenishment at sea is sustainment.” The current technical difficulties of reloading vertical launch system (VLS) cells at sea require an increased reliance on shore based infrastructure.

The availability of friendly ports for reloading VLS cells cannot be counted upon in a highly uncertain future. The limitations of a shrinking surface fleet and the numerous taskings given to multi-mission capable ships will require that those ships assigned to NSFS roles possess greater staying power to continue support of forces ashore. The rapid conduct of ammunition resupply is an essential enabler to maintain continuous fire support. Sustainability is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8.

Footnote 8: NWP 3-09.1, Navy Strike and Fire Support (Draft), dated 6 February 2002.



3.3 NAVAL SURFACE STRIKE (NSS)

Naval surface strike is a subset of strike warfare, which also includes air strike, special operations, and subsurface strike. NSS missions are designed to attack targets that comprise an adversary’s capacity to wage war, and to interdict enemy reinforcements and isolate these reinforcements from the battlefield.8 Currently, the Tomahawk missile is the only long-range weapon available to the surface combatant to perform NSS. Future weapons (such as the advanced gun system) and munitions (such as extended range guided munition, long range land attack projectile, and advanced land attack missile) will dramatically expand the choice of weapons available to perform NSS.

The basic requirements of NSS are as follows: 9

-- Provide a conventional capability against tactical, operational, and strategic targets during crisis response, regional conflicts, or a major theater war.

-- Respond to a broad range of desired terminal effects to include destruction, neutralization, interdiction, and suppression.

-- Destroy or neutralize enemy targets through the use of coordinated, precision strike weapons.

-- Deliver timely effects on target regardless of environmental conditions or time of day.

-- Engage time critical targets.

Footnote 9: Derived from the Surface Combatant Family of ShipsDD(X) CRD (Draft) (U).



3.4 MANPOWER, PERSONNEL, AND TRAINING

We can no longer afford to generate requirements or design systems without considering the impact on operator and decision maker performance and on the ability of battle groups and amphibious ready groups to train and operate in a joint battlefield environment. Today, responsibility for land attack warfare systems design and acquisition is spread across several program executive offices and program management offices in Naval Sea Systems Command, Naval Air Systems Command, and Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. The signatories of the memorandum of agreement establishing the Land Attack Warfare Capstone Organization understand that while each land attack program is managed in response to individual requirements funding, unless coordinated, there is potential to produce systems which will not meet the tests of joint and fleet interoperability, compatibility, and supportability.

Developed in isolation, any or all of these land attack warfare systems will likely result in inefficient use of scarce resources and incur higher life cycle costs.

We must not design and field individual systems without considering from day one the impact they will have on our ability to train for and execute the full spectrum of land attack operations, from an individual sailor’s ability to operate and/or maintain specific pieces of equipment to the conduct of joint operations. In short, we must fundamentally change our cultural perspective on manpower, personnel, and training through consistent application of the principles of human systems integration (HSI) to achieve optimal manning and better mission training. Our ability to effectively and successfully employ a land attack warfare system will directly reflect our commitment to these principles and processes across all land attack warfare programs.

Navy ships and attendant combat systems are complex and present enormous HSI challenges. As a matter of routine, ships prepare for and operate in all weather and climates conducting multiple and simultaneous operations quite possibly in a multi-warfare environment with systems manned and operated by crews determined by diverse personnel and manning plans.

Performance demands, including those placed on these sailors by the design of complex combat systems, are unique in the breadth of their scope and the depth of their complexity. Navy ship systems employed in the fleet today, and those being designed for future operations, make intense demands on the readiness, performance effectiveness, and mental and physical capabilities of the personnel who man them. Specifically, many of these systems are extremely demanding on the senses. They will demand that the operators develop improved motor and cognitive skills, as well as better decision making and situational awareness. Add the highly varied nature of the threat, the need to conduct multi-warfare scenarios, and the need to integrate, coordinate, and interpret information from multiple sources. Without adequate design and support, mission risk increases and responsiveness decreases due to high workload and mission demands.

Department of Defense and Department of the Navy acquisition directives mandate that HIS initiatives be pursued to optimize total system performance and minimize total ownership costs by ensuring systems are built and employed to accommodate human performance characteristics.

Accordingly, it is imperative that in development of a land attack warfare concept of operations and, in particular tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for land attack warfare systems, human performance be given top priority. Land attack warfare systems CONOPS and TTP requirements must be developed in close collaboration with all individual land attack warfare programs to identify commonalities, merge requirements, and avoid duplication. Particular attention should be given to the identification of operator tasks in order to reduce workload, facilitate situational awareness, and enhance decision making.

Systems should be designed to facilitate and support supervisory control – that is user supervision of “smarter” automated systems. Workload should be reduced or eliminated, particularly with regard to data input and manipulations done between non-congruent land-attack system components. A “system of systems” in land attack warfare is needed which produces quality and concise task products which personnel can approve or edit quickly. This result will facilitate mission execution speed and accuracy, with consistency across land attack warfare platforms. The design and production of such systems begins with thorough task and procedural analysis, and uses human factors engineering to apply quality design solutions that are tested in an iterative manner with fleet personnel.

Required operator functions/tasks must be adaptable to various training configurations inport and underway, single and multi-ship, and scalable to distance learning. These functions/tasks must ultimately be integrated into training systems that will provide operators with (1) a synthetic training environment, (2) a merged environment of live data augmented by synthetic information, and (3) segregated live and synthetic training capability to support individual and team training.

The Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare Training Requirements Document (TRD), was approved 26 January 2001 by the Land Attack Capstone Flag Level Steering Committee. It states the requirements of mission area training and provides specific guidelines to program managers for the integrated development of land attack warfare mission area training capability. The Draft Revision 1 to the TRD contains a separate chapter on HSI requirements. Brief descriptions of HSI methodologies/tools are also provided. The TRD provides the foundation for ensuring that future surface navy sailors are appropriately selected and trained to accomplish land attack warfare.