Dago

The baseline sum of the individual MIW systems was 93 RQMTS. The biggest RQMTS driver was the aviation component at 57 RQMTS which is over half of the entire module RQMTS. When this sum of 93 was added to the seaframe RQMTS of 45, the MIW focused LCS has 138 RQMTS which was more than the threshold allows. Hence, further reduction must occur. Of the three approaches (Business As Usual, Reduced Manning Initiative and three Paradigm Shifts), only one was applicable here. That was the Composite Sailor paradigm shift. The Composite Sailor allowed the combination of the Operator and Maintainer RQMTS as well as the suggested rate combinations suggested earlier in Table 5 (Suggested Rate
Combination). Table 16 below summarized the suggested rate combinations for the modules.


Once all the RQMTS were analyzed for the effects of the Composite Sailor, the resulting reduced MIW module had 53 RQMTS. When added to the seaframe’s reduced RQMTS, the MIW focused LCS has 98 RQMTS which was within the threshold of 110.


The same methodology was applied to the littoral antisubmarine (ASW) and surface warfare (SUW) modules. The principal differences between these modules and the MIW module are the manned helicopter, which is the MH-60R, and the two USVs. The modules baseline and reduced RQMTS are
summarized in Figure 6 and 7.






The Navy plans to procure 56 LCS seaframes, 47 MIW, 34 ASW and 30 SUW FMPs (total of 111 FMPs). The FMPs do not include the 8 FMPs procured during the development phase. It is assumed that these 8 additional FMPs are 3 MIW, 3 ASW and 2 SUW FMPs. When these eight additional FMPs are added
with the 111, the sum is 119 FMPs (50 MIW, 37 ASW and 32 SUW). However, not all of the seaframes and FMPs will be deployable at any given time. To assign RQMTS to each FMP, even while not deployed, would be an inefficient use of critical human capital. A better way to assign manpower is by skills vice an entire module. This will allow greater flexibility in manpower assignment and reduce the overall LCS force RQMTS. Under the “Business As Usual” approach, the LCS force would be a relatively large “pre-packaged” force. “Prepackaged” means the traditional one-crew one-ship (or in
this case, one-module) assignment. The converse is the “flexed” concept where the crew is deployed as needed regardless of the module. Looking ahead to where 56 seaframes and 119 FMP modules are planned, the estimated LCS manpower force size, under the “pre-packaged” approach would be:

------------------------------------------------
56 seaframes *45 RQMTS = 2520 RQMTS
50 MIW Modules *53 RQMTS = 2650 RQMTS
37 ASW Modules *51 RQMTS = 1887 RQMTS
37 SUW Modules *45 RQMTS = 1440 RQMTs

LCS Force RQMTS = 2520 + 2650 + 1887 + = 8497 Total


8497 RQMTS was a relatively large force size, and this large LCS force size could potentially under-utilize talented human capital. Therefore, more efficient force utilization was assumed under the “flexed” concept. Lessons learned from Smart Ship and OME include changes in watchstanding philosophies to reduce the workload and, ultimately, reduce manning. Smart Ship’s innovative core/flex watchstanding philosophies permitted the ship to meet the spirit of the ROC/POE requirements while improving quality of life and better personnel management. The core/flex watch concept was again used
onboard the USS Milius for OME. Similarly, the LCS module force will be organized and “flexed” to meet operational requirements. The module personnel are organized into twelve (12) different detachments of generalists and specialists. Table 17 summarized the different detachments.


The detachments were similar to the Smart Ship “flexed” watchstanders who were called upon when they were needed. When the detachments were needed to conduct a particular littoral warfare operation, they were deployed
with the modules to the seaframe or theater. However, the number of deployable modules was much less than 119. Only 25% of the 56 seaframes will be deployable at any given time. Suppose there are 15 deployable seaframe, which is approximately 25% of the 56 seaframes planned, then the number of modules required will also be about 25% of the 119 planned. To properly determine the number of MIW, ASW and SUW modules required, first calculate the ratio of each module against the total modules planned.

MIW modules:
50 - 42%
119
ASW modules:
37 - 31%
119
SUW modules:
32 - 27%
119

Next, multiply each ratio by the number of deployable seaframes (in this case 15) to determine the number of FMP modules required.

MIW modules:42%*15 Seaframes = 13.4 ≈13 MIWModules
ASW modules: 31%*15 Seaframes = 9.9 ≈ 10 ASWModules
SUW modules: 27%*15 Seaframes = 8.6 ≈ 9 SUWModules

Therefore, 32 modules are required to support 15 deployable seaframes. The “pre-packaged” deployable LCS force for the 15 seaframes and 32 modules would have 2279 RQMTS, of which 1604 would be required for the FMPs.

15 seafram + *45 = 675
13 MIW + *53 = 689
10 ASW + *51 = 510
9 SUW + *45 = 405

Total - 675 + 689 + 510 + 405 = 2279

The “flexed” deployable LCS module force would only consist of module personnel. The seaframe RQMTS must be “pre-packaged” with the seaframe, but the module RQMTS are more flexible because they are shore-based until needed. Ashore, the module force is organized into the 12 detachments seen earlier in Table 17. Appendix V summarizes the “flexed” detachments, supported warfare and the quantity of each rate within the detachment. If a particular rate supports at least two warfare areas, thenit is considered a generalist. Otherwise, it is a specialist. To calculate the total “flexed” RQMTS, the optimization equation 11 was used.


“Flexed” option has 453 fewer RQMTS than the 1604 “pre-packaged” RQMTS. In the end, the savings is approximately $27.2M per deployment cycle. This estimate used the conservative personnel cost of $60K per RQMT. By multiplying the savings and the deployment rotational factor of 3 to 4, the potential savings range from $80M to $110M.





A. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis supported the minimally manned concept for the LCS seaframe and FMP modules. The top down manpower analysis used SMDs for legacy ships with “business as usual” approach and yielded a focus mission LCS with an
average manning of approximately 207. This estimate, though large, was used as the RQMTS baseline estimate. When reducing the RQMTS baseline, previous manning reduction initiatives like Smart Ship and OME are not enough. The Navy can have minimally manned LCS seaframes and FMP modules if, and only if, the suggested paradigm shifts of Composite Sailor, Technology Leverage and Workload Transfer are pursued. The pursuit could yield an LCS seaframe with 45 RQMTS and the mission-package RQMTS of
45 to 53. The result is a focused mission LCS that meets the threshold limit.
However, the means to reduce the total RQMTS for a focused mission LCS to 75 or less was not readily identifiable. Additionally, this study has also demonstrated that a “flexed” concept of module personnel management could
potentially yield manpower annual cost savings of 25% to 30% or roughly $80M to $110M over the one-crew per module or “pre-packaged” concept.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

The minimally manned LCS seaframe and modules can be realized if, and only if, the assumed paradigm shifts with 76 the supporting technologies are pursued. The Smart Ship technologies have proven they can advance changes in policy and operations especially in the areas of ship operation,
training, maintenance and administrative support. Recommendation: Pursue the Composite Sailor, Technology Leverage, and Workload Transfer paradigm shifts as well as advancing the technologies assumed in this study. The technologies appear readily available to support the minimal manning concept intended for LCS. Recommendation: The Composite Sailor paradigm shift
requires the synergy of the BM, CTT, DC, EN, ET, GS, HT, MM, MR, OS, QM, STG and TM rates. Examine the KSAs of these rates to determine the Composite Sailor’s actual requirements for the BM (combination of BM, EN, MM and QM), ET (combination of CTT and ET), DC (combination of DC, HT and MR), EN/GS and STG/TM rates that have been suggested for the LCS.
Recommendation: Conduct a study to determine the optimal training curriculum for the above rates. A series of schools training time and KSA requirements data will support an optimized training pipeline to train these
personnel effectively and efficiently to support the minimal manning concept. Minimal manning onboard LCS will require the ability of this training path to respond to manning shortfalls.

Recommendation: Combine watch-station requirements of Operator and Maintainer into a single Operator/Maintainer requirement to facilitate increased personnel flexibility. This will greatly support flexed organizations like the 77 Smart Ship Core/Flex watch philosophy as well as the “flexed” module force concept. Recommendation: Pursue the Integrated Bridge System
(IBS) and Voyage Management System (VMS). Increased digital chart coverage could add to the feasibility of the IBS/VMS system. Use the Integrated Bridge System (IBS) along with the Voyage Management System (VMS) more liberally. Supporting this is the recommendation to increase the coverage provided by digital/electronic charts to reduce the time consuming task of chart preparations and management. When combined with other technologies such as bow thrusters, the IBS/VMS could reduce the ship control requirements down to just a few personnel unlike the crowded legacy ship control requirements.

Recommendation: Pursue the Integrated Condition Assessment System (ICAS) and Machinery Control System (MCS) with the improved On-Board Trainer (OBT). Change philosophy to allow ship control and/or operations control personnel to operate and configure ship machinery as required to support operations and changing tactical requirements. Recommendation: Advance the integrated sensor and communications multi-modal consoles (MMC) and the integrated weapons and decoy Weapons Control Consoles (WCC). The MMC assumes all communication and sensors are integrated into a single station for greater effectiveness. The WCC assumes the control functions of the 57MM, CIWS, RAM, Torpedo Decoy Launcher, Air Decoy Launcher and TACTAS combat systems can be integrated into a single location. These systems can significantly add to the watch station reductions, and manpower reduction, in the Combat Information Center (CIC). More importantly it gives the78 decision-maker the ability to access all of the ship’s assets to make timely and informed decisions.

Recommendation: Pursue a UV launch and recovery system that is similar to an overhead rail system with automated winches and controls operable by only one person. Use Visby Swedish Corvette as a model.

Recommendation: Pursue automation technology. The SONAR can only be supported by two Operator/Maintainers if the log-keeping is automated. Similar to the flight data recorders onboard commercial aircrafts, the log-keeping of the SONAR equipment can be automated. This will allow a more accurate data storage and facilitate data for followon analysis. Recommend pursuing this technology.

Recommendation: Operate with unmanned engineering spaces during Condition III steaming. This will leverage the technology to allow the engineers more control of their time. Personnel will only be required for start-ups, shutdowns and condition-based maintenance requirements. The spaces do not have to be manned after start-up and shut-down evolutions. During Condition I, engineering spaces will only require a monitor in the critical
engineering spaces (i.e., main engineroom and electrical generation rooms) to respond and stabilize from casualties. Operating in this manner will also permit bridge and CIC watchstanders to operate the engineering plant in direct support of mission readiness without delay.

Recommendation: Operate with reduced Damage Control party requirements and increase reliance on technology/automation. The Rapid Response Team (RRT), or minimum fire party, requires a scene leader, investigators, 79 nozzleman and hoseman. Employ the RRT initially and augment as required. Primary DCC should be located near machinery controls which is assumed to be in CCS, and secondary should be located near the decision makers either in the pilot house or CIC. In this case, recommend secondary CCS in the pilot house to facilitate greater control and less workload increase in CIC. Recommendation: Organize the shore infrastructure to support the reduced maintenance onboard the LCS using concepts similar to a “pit stop.” Reduce the workload onboard the seaframe. Determine the workload of 45 personnel, and remove the remainder if possible. Conduct as much routine and large maintenance requirements ashore as possible. Both critical and routine spares and parts need to be readily available to sustain the LCS operational availability and reliability.

Recommendation: Assign future LCS personnel to an operational LCS seaframe for indoctrination. With a limited indoctrination period, every LCS sailor must be afforded the opportunity to get familiar with an LCS for a short period of time prior to assignment to either the LCS or the modules. With the largest combined manpower RQMT of 98, a focused LCS can accommodate additional personnel onboard for training and indoctrination with minimal impact on the core crew accommodations. A trainer would be required to manage the training curriculum. In conclusion, personnel assigned to LCS must be trained and qualified to the fullest extent possible. There is very limited flexibility in the LCS force 80 structure to support gaps beyond a reasonable length of time. If a sailor is unable to fulfill their function onboard LCS, a replacement must be ready and available for immediate relief. Otherwise, mission readiness will quickly become an adverse factor.

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1. The LCS XX Class ship’s mission is to operate offensively in a high-density multi-threat environment as an integral member of a Carrier Strike Group, Surface Action Group or Expeditionary Strike Group. In addition it provides its own limited Air Defense (AD), limited Surface Warfare (SUW) and Undersea Warfare (USW) self-defense and can effectively provide some local area protection to the Force, Group or other military shipping against subsurface
and surface threats. Accordingly, the following primary and secondary warfare mission areas are assigned:

P = Primary
PF = Primary with FMP
S = Secondary


2. The LCS XX is not capable of providing facilities for an embarked warfare commander and staff.

3. Required Operational Capabilities (ROCs) are reported under readiness conditions having major significance in determining the unit's total manpower
requirements. The following summarizes conditions covered: Condition I: Battle Readiness While in Condition I (Battle Readiness), the ship shall be
capable of meeting the following criteria: able to perform all offensive and defensive functions simultaneously; able to keep all installed systems manned and operating for maximum effectiveness; required to accomplish only minimal maintenance - that routinely associated with watch standing and urgent
repairs. For the LCS XX, this condition means self-defense measures are being performed. Evolutions such asreplenishment, law enforcement or helo operations are not appropriate unless the evolution stations are co-manned by personnel from other battle stations. The maximum expected continuous crew endurance for Condition I is 24 hours.



REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES (Page 93') - AAW, AMW, ASW, MIW, and AUS warfare. (http://www.nps.edu/Research/HCS/Docs...ong_thesis.pdf)


Comparison with other legacy departments.