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Hi Guys,
On the World War II thing, IIRC, in a footnote in the 1937 edition of his opus, Guderian opined that the Germans would lose a war with Russia based on projections of economic output for both countries. This is essentially exactly what happened in the end.
By the end of the war, Russian economic production in all key areas (coal output, electricity production, etc.) was basically half of its prewar levels if I read the numbers correctly. Essentially, the Russians crushed the German armies at Stalingrad and Kursk and drove them in retreat across Eastern Europe with one hand tied behind their back.
Some of you are WWII scholars I see so I will defer to you for confirmation or rebuttal as I am by no means an expert in that field.
Moving back to topic, I do not think there is any really good military solution to Iran's weapon ambitions (though it might come to pass if it boils down to bomb or do nothing which looks kind of like where we might be headed).
The thing is, the United States very well may not be able to advance some of its current foreign policy objectives by pre-emptive strikes or regime change.
For purposes of argument, lets consider the following loosely worded objectives as US foreign policy goals:
1. combat terrorism
2. energy security
3. regional stability
4. counter proliferation
Bombing the Iranians is probably going to increase terrorism in the near through long term because it is their chosen offset and we would be giving a wide range of non-Iranian actors and excuse to blow things up. Outright regime change in Iran might remove a terror sponsor for a long term net gain but in the near to medium term I suspect it would exasperate the situation to the point where the opportunity costs would exceed any long term profit.
Destroying infrastructure in Iran and disrupting their daily oil output would in its own right threaten the energy security of the US through higher global prices and it would threaten our allies with reduced supply. How long this situation would last is debatable but other supplies would need to be brought on line which could take months or years.
As to regional stability, a weakened Iran would in its own right cause a power vacum which might have very undesirable consequences.
A maddened Iran would do no favors for regional stability given the Shi'ite majority in Iraq and the sizeable Shi'ite majorities in Saudi Arabia and several other Gulf States. These populations do not get the best of treatment in many instances and may look sympathetically on their Shi'ite brothers in the event of an attack.
Too, economic repercussions on fragile economies that have sizeable trade with Iran would be a destabilizing influence in the region as well as the inevitable refugee flows that could likely be the case in the event of a "10,000 punch beat down".
Finally, pre-emption and/or regime change in Iran would probably be a setback for counterproliferation in general. In the near term we would be removing a known proliferator but in the long term we would probably spur on several others.
Several actors who are currently engaged in proliferation and others who might be considering it might use US action against Iran as a pretext to accelerate their own efforts to secure a nuclear detterent as the U.S. treats nuclear armed powers differently than non nuclear powers.
In general, it is worth noting that the previous government in Iran under the Shah had some sort of nuclear weapons ambitions.
This to me implies that Iraninan politicians in general regardless of their stripe or color consider possession of nuclear weapons to be fundamental policy imperative. This being the case, it is doubtful that surgical strikes or regime change will deter current or future governments from pursuit of WMDs and their delivery systems.
A bell weather change in the Iranian security calculus is the only thing that is going to make them not want to pursue these weapons; if not, we will be playing the same game again in twenty years.
At this point, even though the U.S. may come to a conclusion that justifies military action against Iran and it does come to pass, it has all the appearances of quite possibly taking three steps backwards to go one step forward.
Military action may be the last resort but there is little or no margin for error in any Iranian scenario as near as I can tell.
We ought to at least consider the contingnecy plan: do nothing. The U.S. has sat on its hands before in matters of proliferation and it might do so again whether any of us as individuals likes it or not.
This position relies on two assumptions.
First, the acquisition of fission weapons will most likely alter the behavoir of the regime as it has done to other regimes in the past.
Secondly, the Iranian threat is ill defined as being between vaporware on the one hand and hardware three to thirteen years down the road on the other.
This makes it pertty difficult to asess the best course of action. Once the threat materializes and is concrete, we might actually find that it is easier to deal with via deterrence, containment, balancing power and other tools.
The international State system has proven remarkably adept at absorbing and balancing proliferators in the past so there is a fall back position at any rate.
If it is any comfort, the cases of South Africa, Libya, Argentina and Brazil show that it is possible for states to renounce intentions and capabilities or even completed weapons themselves. This means that there is still room for future negotiated settlements if the situation continues to that point.
Ye Gods! What a pickle! We might accomplish nothing by doing something but than again we might accomplish something by doing nothing...or it might work out the other way around.
William
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Pharoh was pimp but now he is dead. What are you going to do today?
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