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indianguy4u · 12-16-2005, 02:18 AM

Patton Nagar [indo-pak war 1965]

Quote:

The most accurate Indian account of this most perilous phase in that war is to be found in War Despatches (Lancer International, 1991) written by Lt-Gen Harbakhsh Singh, the hero and western theatre commander in 1965. He confirms the arguments between him and Gen Chowdhury, one wanting to fight at Khemkaran and the other wanting to withdraw. Harbaksh won the argument—the larger objective now was to destroy Pak armour—and laid a trap for the over-confident Pakistani tank force, breached some canals to flood vast stretches of land, forcing the Pakistanis to drive through a narrow area which became a killing ground on a moonlit night. The truth is, there was no real tank battle at Khemkaran on September 10, 1965. It was a massacre that left behind the famous Patton Nagar at Bhikhiwind. Pakistan’s 1 Armoured Division, the pride of its army, withdrew leaving behind 75 tanks destroyed or abandoned. It was led valiantly, and from the front, but with a rash foolhardiness that was the hallmark of Pakistani generalship in that war. Its GOC, Maj-Gen Nasir Ahmed Khan, was seriously wounded, its artillery commander, Brigadier Shammi, was killed and buried by the Indian army at the village Assaluttar—after which the battle is named for posterity—not far from the grave of Indian anti-tank gunner Havildar Abdul Hamid, who won his Param Vir Chakra in that battle. The entire tank force of Pakistan’s famed 4 Cavalry was captured along with its CO, 12 other officers (including six majors) and several others who surrendered voluntarily on the morning of September 11. The war’s most audacious attack, one that spread shivers in Delhi, had ended in complete disaster. That is the near-victory Gauhar credits on the alleged betrayal of secrets by an Indian brigadier. It was, instead, a history of great tactical dash followed by incredible foolhardiness, and indeed the defender’s nerve.

While it hung on to a small — just about 50 sq km — chunk of territory, the Pakistani army never recovered from the disaster of Khemkaran. You do not have to believe stories that Indian reporters or soldiers of that time tell you. I heard it first hand from Wolf Gross, who I met in 1987 while researching an arms proliferation book in Northrop Corporation’s office in Rosslyn, on the outskirts of Washington. In 1965, Gross was a military attache with the US Embassy in New Delhi and was in the first group of foreign diplomats to be taken to see Patton Nagar. It was the real thing. As a sharp-eyed soldier, he could also see how (for India) it was also such a near thing. The Pakistani assault was brilliant in conception and initiation but all this turned into suicidal stupidity in the euphoria of initial successes.