Battleships misinformation
By Dennis Reilly
Published July 13, 2005
James Zumwalt's 7/7/05 Commentary "Dread not the DD(X)" could not have been more
aptly named. As was stated in the 6/21/05 Op-Ed "Battling for battleships", the Navy's
misguided effort to develop the DD(X) is effectively dead. Our purpose here is to correct
misstatements regarding the battleship, presumably obtained from the Navy.
Mr. Zumwalt appears unaware that his famed father was a proponent, not an opponent, of
battleship reactivation during his tenure.
Contrary to the Commentary, Admiral Hamilton did not provide "an honest... assessment
of the DED(X) versus the battleship", as is clear from James O'Bryon's 6/17/05 Op-Ed,
"Distortions about ships". A document, now under review by the GAO, and available at
http://www.usnfsa.org/ , presents a side by side comparison of official Navy Claims with
detailed rebuttal by USNFSA.
The Commentary implies that the battleship would be vulnerable. The latest Rolling
Airframe Missiles provide competent anti-air / anti missile protection to our carriers, and
even destroyers. Modernization of the battleships would surely include this protection.
The battleship's, deck and turret armor, not just the belt, as claimed in the Commentary,
were designed to, and proven to, take hits. Should a weapon get through, no other ship
would have a greater chance of remaining operational.
But, one has to ask why, in a high threat environment, would not a battleship, like a
carrier, be entitled to its own battlegroup with overlapping protections against threats
from above and below the sea surface. After all, within the range of its guided projectiles
(near term 52 miles, mid term 115 miles, long term 450 to 600miles) the battleship has
firepower comparable to that of a carrier. But, unlike the carrier, the battleships firepower
is all weather with tactical response times. Because its projectiles are immune to
antiaircraft defenses, the Hanoi Hilton problem disappears.
The Navy has failed in its attempt to discredit the battleship's firepower potential, so it
has turned its attention to the cost and availability of manpower. The rational way to
discuss costs of any weapons system is in terms of costs per unit firepower.
It would take nineteen DD(x)'s to put the same number of pounds on target per minute (at
the Marine Corp's near term goal of 52 miles range) as can a single battleship. The 1,100
men crewing a battleship with a $1.5B modernization and reactivation cost, will be doing
the work of the 1900 men manning nineteen DD(X)'s costing a whopping total of $32B to
build (at the unrealizable Congressionally mandated $1.7B per copy). Would not the
$30B savings pay for crew training and reconstitution of the spare parts, ammunition, and
support infrastructure trashed by the Navy, with some of this in clear violation of the law,
(PL104-106)?
The battleship's boilers are fired by "Diesel Fuel Marine", not oil, as stated in the
Commentary. It uses the same power plant and the same fuel as the AOE-1 fast supply
ships that support our carriers today. Presumably AOE-1 ships will be replaced by the gas
turbine powered T-AOE(X). There is wonderful synergy going on here. This would free
up a considerable pool of sailors who would be quite familiar with the battleship's
propulsion system, answering another manpower issue cited by the Navy.
Contrary to the Commentary, the battleships would be far from single mission platforms.
They would, in the near term, 1) meet the Marine Corp's near term requirements for naval
surface support, 2) be an extremely effective antiterrorist platform in the Pacific littorals
because of their unique capability to obliterate training camps before the "students" could
disperse, and 3) serve as deterrent to Chinese adventurism in Taiwan, and North Korea's
threat to the South. On the longer term, the battleship's long range guided projectiles
could 4) open a new strategic and tactical dimension, with guided ballistic projectiles
arcing over uncooperative states to reach targets many hundreds of miles away in a
matter of minutes.
The Navy has made decisions that 1) there never again will be a need for forced entry by
the sea, and 2) invasions, should they be called for, will be accomplished by audacious 50
to 100 mi incursions using the unproven V22 "Osprey" tilt-rotor aircraft. The Navy
suggests that fire support will be provided by $500,000 per copy cruise missiles and by
the (endangered) aircraft launched Joint Standoff Weapon, a GPS guided gliding bomb of
comparable cost.
The slow speeds of these weapons compared to battleship launched projectiles result in
inadequate tactical response times and vulnerability to antiaircraft defenses, severely
limiting the viability of this form of fire support. The costs per round are more than ten
times that of the tactically responsive, antiaircraft fire immune, battleship launched
guided projectile.
What in the world can the Navy be thinking? As detailed in the 6/6/05 Op-Ed
"Battleships fit for Duty", they do even not recognize the real strategic threats we face.
The Marine Corp Generals (Semper Fidelis?) dare not contradict their Navy bosses. It is
time for Congress to impose some rational supervision.
Dennis Reilly, a physicist, serves as science adviser to the United States Fire Support
Association (USNSFS)