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ADRI - Army of the Republic of Indonesia
TNI AD - National Army of Indonesia

Since the 01 April 1999 separation of POLRI, the Indonesian National Police, from ABRI, the Indonesian armed forces, the army has begun to use its former name, Tentara Nasional Indonesia or National Army of Indonesia (TNI); the term is increasingly being used instead of ABRI. The ground forces are presently termed Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat.
The Army of the Republic of Indonesia (ADRI) historically has been the dominant service, with administrative control of the armed forces resting with the army chief of staff, in 1992 a four-star general. His staff included a vice chief of staff, an inspector general, and assistant chiefs of staff for logistics, operations, personnel, planning and budget, security, and territorial affairs. Total army strength, which had not changed substantially during the New Order era, as of 1992 was some 217,000, not including several thousand in nonmilitary positions throughout the government.
The chief of staff was responsible for personnel, training, administration, and logistical support of the army, but he did not exercise direct authority over the ten KODAMs, the regional commands of the army that reported directly to the commander in chief. Commanders and staff of each KODAM were responsible for administration, logistics, personnel, training, and the general welfare of assigned and attached combat units. Each Kodam was divided into successively smaller administrative units. These included the Military Resort (Garrison) Command (KOREM); Military District Command (KODIM); and Military Subdistrict Command (KORAMIL). At the bottom of the structure, noncommissioned officers (NCOs) were assigned to every village in the country.
The geographic extent of the army KODAM in the early 1990s was as follows: KODAM I, Special Region of Aceh and Sumatera Utara, Sumatera Barat, and Riau provinces; KODAM II, Jambi, Bengkulu, Sumatera Selatan, and Lampung provinces; KODAM III, Jawa Barat Province; KODAM IV, Jawa Tengah Province and the Special Region of Yogyakarta; KODAM V, Jawa Timur Province; KODAM VI, the four provinces of Kalimantan; KODAM VII, the four provinces of Sulawesi; KODAM VIII, Maluku and Irian Jaya provinces; KODAM IX, Bali, Nusa Tenggara Timur, Nusa Tenggara Barat, and Timor Timur provinces; and KODAM Jaya Jakarta, the Special Capital City Region of Jakarta.
Approximately two-thirds of the army was engaged in the national defense aspect of the armed forces' dwifungsi mission. Operations were rarely, if ever, conducted in any formation larger than a battalion. Each Korem had control of at least one battalion and one or more battalions came under the direct control of the Kodam. Army doctrine differentiated between tactical battalions, which were found in Kostrad and at least one quick reaction force battalion for each Kodam; and territorial battalions, which made up the majority of the units assigned to the ten Kodams. Each battalion had a strength of nearly 700 men, and personnel programs within a fixed staffing size called for recruitment of sufficient numbers to bring chronically understrength units up to authorized levels. Some of these forces were occasionally assigned for temporary missions to Kostrad or Kopassus.
The army had its own small air arm that performed liaison and limited transport duties. It flew one helicopter squadron and one composite squadron composed mostly of light aircraft and small transports, such as the domestically produced CASA 235.
Factionalism within the army leadership, once a severe problem, no longer disrupted operations in the early 1990s. Traditional divisional identification continued to have some significance, however, especially in regard to that developed in the former Siliwangi, Diponegoro, and Brawijaya divisions, which covered western, central, and eastern Java, respectively, during the war of independence and the years immediately thereafter. The detachment of the Jakarta area from the control of the Siliwangi division and the restructuring of the army from a divisional basis to the territorial Kodam system diffused the powers of the divisions and eliminated warlordism.
Most of the army personnel not assigned to combat formations were involved in carrying out the social and developmental portions of the armed forces' dwifungsi mission. Many were attached to the Kodams as support elements, performing intelligence and internal security functions, and maintaining liaison with local officials charged with implementing the government's policies. Some military personnel filled civilian government positions from national and province levels down to the district, subdistrict, or village level. A large portion of the army's territorial forces participated in ABRI civic action projects, such as the nationally directed ABRI Masuk Desa program and locally directed programs at the Kodam level, as part of their mission to promote national development. They constructed roads, bridges, and public buildings, provided medical service in remote areas, and worked to improve rural conditions. The military's civic action mission received added attention after 1983 as part of a program designed to address the problems of a perceived growing gap between ABRI and the civilian population.
By 1992 virtually all of the army's heavy Soviet- or East European-origin equipment had been eliminated and replaced by equipment produced indigenously or purchased from Western countries. Because of funding constraints, emphasis was placed on maintenance and rehabilitation of older equipment. The mainstay of the armored force was the French-built AMX-13 light tank and AMX-VCI reconditioned armored personnel carriers, mostly acquired in the late 1970s. The nation's small arms industry supplied nearly all of the army's small arms requirements, although a substantial number of M-16 rifles purchased from the United States in the 1980s remained in the inventory. Domestically produced arms included FMC rifles, submachine guns, and machine guns made under Belgian-licensed production. Ammunition was in short supply.
Although army recruits received their basic training in a central training facility located in each Kodam area, specialist corps training was provided at the appropriate national corps centers. NCOs were required to attend training courses and to pass examinations in their fields prior to promotion.

KOSTRAD - Army Strategic Reserve Command

KOSTRAD [Army Strategic Reserve Command], which has between 25,000 and 26,000 troops, supervises operational readiness among all commands and conducts defense and security operations at the strategic level in accordance with policies of the ABRI commander. KOSTRAD came into being when Indonesia was dealing with the liberation of West Irian in 1960, and was formally constituted on 06 March 1961. Initially designated the Army General Reserve Corps, its name was changed to KOSTRAD in 1963.
Major General Suharto (later Indonesian president) was the first to be entrusted with the position of PANGKOSTRAD [KOSTRAD Commander]. It was from his position as Kostrad commander, in fact, that Suharto organized resistance to the 1965 coup. Since then the powerful post has been filled by officers considered particularly loyal to Suharto. As of 01 April 1998 Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto [Suharto's son-in-law] was serving as commander of KOSTRAD. Suharto was ousted on 21 May 1999 amid mounting public pressure and large scale violent pro-reform riots. Soon thereafter Son-in-Law Prabowo was pushed out of his position as commander of KOPASSUS and reassigned to head the army's command and staff training college in Bandung.
During the New Order era, the KOSTRAD force has become increasingly visible. These green-beret troops have never been absent from the various military operations, such as G-30-S/PKI [30 September Movement/Indonesian Communist Party], Trisula, the PGRS [Sarawak People's Guerrilla Force] in Sarawak, the PARAKU [North Kalimantan People's Force] in North Kalimantan, and Operation Seroja in East Timor. KOSTRAD troops have also been relied on at the international level, as was the case with Garuda troops in Egypt (1973-78) and Vietnam (1973-75) and with those in the combined peace force in the midst of the Iran-Iraq war of 1989 and 1990.
In 1984 the PANGKOSTRAD became responsible to the ABRI commander for the conduct of combat operations, called defense and security operations. At present, KOSTRAD has a strength of some 35,000 to 40,000 army personnel with two infantry divisions: the 1st Division, headquartered at Cilodong, West Java, and the 2d Division, headquartered at Malang, East Java. Each of the divisions contains airborne and infantry brigades. KOSTRAD also includes a separate airborne brigade; one cavalry brigade; two field artillery regiments; and several combat support and service support units.

KOPASSUS - Army Special Force Command

The Special Forces Command (KOPASSUS), formerly called the Sandi Yudha Forces Command and KOPASSANDHA (which also means Special Forces Command), are trained in intelligence gathering, a variety of special operations techniques, sabotage, and airborne and seaborne landings. Founded on 16 April 1952, KOPASSUS was reorganized and reduced in size in 1985, and by 1992 KOPASSUS forces numbered some 2,500 army personnel identifiable by their distinctive red berets organized into two operational groups and one training group.
Since a reorganization in June 1996, KOPASSUS returned to the organization created in 1985. The stated reason for the reorganization was to permit a development rotation with one quarter on duty, one quarter in training, one quarter consolidation, and one quarter ready reserves which can be used at any time. Along with the reorganization and increase in size, its commander, the son-in-law of the Indonesian president, was promoted to two-star rank. By the late 1990s KOPASSUS numbered some 6,000-strong, an increase in the number of troops, but below that of 1985. Headquarters at Cijantung, East Jakarta, KOPASSUS had expanded to five Groups, with Group IV specifically handling intelligence operations along with the KOPASSUS Joint Intelligence Unit [SGI].
While the "elite" corps of the Indonesian Army is the KOPASSUS Red Beret Corps with its special camouflage field uniform, there are many similarities among KOPASSUS, KOSTRAD, and other corps. Because of differences in units, however, there are individual improvisations that become special features of each corps. The KOPASSUS training package called "How to Find a Fine Fighter."
With its headquarters in Cijantung, East Jakarta, KOPASSUS is considered to be an elite force that has traditionally emphasized its small size and its quick-strike potential. It has been involved in numerous military actions in response to internal Indonesian unrest. KOPASSUS units were involved in 1981 in freeing the hostages from the "Woyla," the Garuda Airline plane hijacked by followers of Imran, leader of an Islamic splinter movement in West Java. Imran forced the plane to land at the Don Muang Airport in Thailand. KOPASSUS troops to Thailand and brilliantly overwhelmed the hijackers. Around 90 troops from KOPASSUS were dispatched to Irian Jaya when a rebel group took hostages there have left the province without rescuing the remaining captives in 1996. KOPASSUS members climbed Mount Everest in 1997.
Colonel Prabowo Subianto, Suharto's son-in-law who married Siti Hediati Hariyadi Suharto in May 1983, was appointed to head KOPASSUS in December 1995. He was promoted to replace KOPASSUS chief Brigadier Subagyo Hadi Siswono, who was assigned to head the fourth Diponegoro Military Region Command.
On 15 July 1997 it was reported that Maj. Gen. Yunus Yosfiah, commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces [ABRI] Staff and Command College, replaced Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid as chief of ABRI sociopolitical affairs. Generally heads of ABRI sociopolitical affairs are officers with territorial, socio-political, or educational experience. Rarely if ever come from the ranks of the KOPASSUS Red Berets. Of previous heads including Bambang Triantoro, Sugiarto, Harsudiono Hartas, Haryoto P.S., Ma'ruf, Hartono, and Syarwan Hamid, not one came from the Special Forces Command. With the September 1997 appointment of Yosfiah as head of the sociopolitical affairs, the three top positions at ABRI headquarters were held by KOPASSUS Special Forces officers. ABRI Commander Gen. Feisal Tanjung, who was installed in 1993, was a KOPASSUS man, as was Lieutenant General Tarub, installed in 1997. This "domination" of the upper ranks at ABRI Headquarters has never happened in preceding periods.
KOPASSUS is associated with human rights abuses and "disappearances" which have been documented by respected human rights organizations and the Indonesian government. A number of activists were kidnapped by KOPASSUS troops in the last months of the Suharto regime, and at least 23 government critics disappeared. Nine later resurfaced and told stories of solitary confinement, interrogation, and physical abuse. One was found dead and 13 are still listed as missing. The abductions took place ahead of a general assembly, which reappointed Suharto as president for his seventh consecutive term on 11 March 1998.
As of 01 April 1998 Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto [Suharto's son-in-law] was serving as commander of the Army Strategic Command [KOSTRAD] and Maj. Gen. Mukhdi Purwopranyono was serving as commandant of KOPASSUS. Suharto was ousted on 21 May 1999 amid mounting public pressure and large scale violent pro-reform riots. Soon thereafter Son-in-Law Prabowo was pushed out of his position as commander of KOPASSUS and reassigned to head the army's command and staff training college in Bandung.
Armed forces chief General Wiranto set up the Officers' Honorary Council (DKP) on 03 August 1998 to probe the abduction and torture of scores of pro-reform political activists. On 21 August 1998 the Council ended its investigations of three senior officers linked to the kidnap and torture of political activists. In closed-door hearings, the Council questioned three officers from KOPASSUS, including the unit's former commander, Lt. Gen. Prabowo, son-in-law of Ex-President Suharto. Wiranto admitted that KOPASSUS was involved in the kidnappings after the probe showed the KOPASSUS command had issued orders to "uncover several movements then considered radical and jeopardizing government programs and public security." On 06 April 1999 a military court on Tuesday found 11 members of KOPASSUS guilty of kidnapping nine pro-democracy activists and handed them jail terms of up to 22 months.
Maj. Gen. Mayjen Syahrir was appointed commanding general of KOPASSUS as of July 1998.
Begining in early 1999 a campaign of systematic liquidation of the resistance was under way in East Timor, forcing thousands of people to flee into the jungles The operations were backed by at least a section of the Indonesian armed forces and intelligence service, notably KOPASSUS. In the countryside, village chiefs in favor of independence were systematically liquidated, and even villages considered not enthusiastic enough for autonomy were destroyed.
East Timor resistance leader Xanana Gusmao accused a renegade "KOPASSUS old guard" of scorning Indonesia's avowed policy of curbing the violence in East Timor. Western military sources said known KOPASSUS officers were involved in attacks on the UNAMET compound in Maliana southwest of Dili, from where the UN subsequently evacuated all its local and foreign staff. In early August 1999, less than three weeks before the poll in East Timor on the territory's future, Indonesia's military commander there has been replaced by Col Muhamad Noer Muis, formerly of KOPASSUS. Most recently, Col Muis was the commander of war training in Sumatra. Jose Ramos Horta, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and a leader of the East Timor resistance, has claimed that the so-called pro-Indonesian Timorese militiamen are in fact members of KOPASSUS special passing themselves off as militiamen.
The United States Congress developed over the past several years a compromise limiting International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance to expanded-IMET, which is a human rights curriculum. However, the Department of Defense used Joint Combined Exchange and Training to train Indonesian military personnel in activities which would have been prohibited under the IMET ban, raising questions about a violation of Congressional intent.