troung

I'll just turn this into the all around Indonesian doctrine and structure...

NATIONAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVES
Fundamental to the understanding of Indonesian views on security is the concept of Wawasan Nusantara or "archipelagic outlook". As the world's largest archipelago, Indonesia covers an area (including the Exclusive Economic Zone, EEZ) of about 10 million sq. kms., in which the seas are perceived to link the islands rather than to separate them. Hence Wawasan Nusantara "encompasses an understanding not only of the geographic unity of the nation, but also the recognition that Indonesia constitutes a single, unified political, social, cultural, economic, and defence and security entity". Secondly, given Indonesia's history of domestic unrest, great emphasis is placed on internal political stability. Given its past experience and its geographic location, Indonesia does not perceive an open attack by an outside power as a matter of primary or immediate concern. Consequently the concept of ketahanan nasional or "national resilience" forms the basis of
Indonesian views on national security. The best way to enhance national resilience is national development - economic, political, social and
cultural. Hence, the eradication of poverty and backwardness, considered to be the basic causes of internal insecurity, are considered to be national priorities. Thus, according to Indonesian perceptions, one of the two major threats to its security is that of internal unrest and insurgency, the other, less immediate, being the possibility of conflict in the South China Sea. Apart from the traditional threat from the Communist party (PKI), violent student demonstrations in 1973 and 1978 led to greater concern with internal security. The 1975 withdrawal by Portugal and the subsequent annexation, in July 1976, of East Timor by Indonesia as its 27th province also led to an insurgency by the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN). Elements of FRETILIN resistance still remain. In
Irian Jaya province, the Free Papua Movement (OPM), has been active since mid- 1977. Since then, there have been frequent border incidents, the most serious occurring in 1984, which resulted in 10,000 people seeking refuge in PNG. Although relations with PNG improved after the visit of Prime Minister Paias Wingti to Indonesia in January 1988, tension increased after a series of cross- border raids by the Indonesian armed forces in October and November that year. After further discussions it was announced in July 1989 that PNG would set up a consulate in Jayapura, the capital of Irian Jaya and the Indonesians would do the same in the border town of Vanimo. However, border incursions by Indonesia appear to continue - four were reported in 1990 and were said to have caused five casualties. In 1991, while the two countries have apparently failed to reach an agreement on the repatriation of border crossers, a recent report, quoting an Indonesian source (Major General Abinowo), suggests that the two countries plan to launch joint military operations against separatist
rebels following an improvement in bilateral relations.

In recent times the province of Aceh, on the island of Sumatra has also been the scene of armed anti- government activities. Although Aceh has a long history of unrest (it was one of the last parts of the island to succumb to Dutch control), the present crisis has been attributed to "an element of anti- Jakarta subnationalism, fuelled by a feeling of economic exploitation, a sense of separate historical identity and an element of Islamic militancy". The predominant reason for this anti- Jakarta feeling would appear to be economic. Following the discovery of substantial gas deposits, a processing complex has sprung up in the area as have two fertiliser plants and a paper plant. Other factories are planned. But these developments have had no beneficial impact on the Acehnese who are handicapped by the lack of education and technical training. The jobs created by this economic boom have gone to the Javanese, South Sumatrans and foreigners. This has resulted in the Acehnese looking for employment elsewhere. There have also been reports of "several" boatloads of Acehnese fleeing Sumatra for Penang in Malaysia. Although the Indonesian position is that they are economic and not political refugees, it was decided that the two countries would discuss ways of dealing with these "arrivals". The second major threat is the possibility of conflict in the South China Sea
affecting its offshore oil platforms and its EEZ claim. Claimed by China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines and Brunei, the Spratly Islands straddle the sea lines of communication between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. It can be suggested that Indonesia has a security interest given its trade relations with Japan and the fact that Indonesia is nursing its major naval base to Teluk Ratai which has readier access to the South China Sea. Although it does not lay claim to the Spratly Islands, any intensification of the dispute would certainly affect Indonesia. As a country with least interests in the Spratly's it considers itself as being in the best position to act as a mediator. Preliminary groundwork was done in January 1991 when Indonesia hosted an informal ASEAN workshop on Bali. The next move was to hold another meeting, again informally, but this time with the participation of China and Vietnam. At a four days workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea held in Bandung in July 1991, participants from ten countries, six of which lay claim to all or part of the islands 32 , agreed that: "Any territorial and jurisdictional disputes in the South China Sea area should be resolved by peaceful means through
dialogue and negotiation".

It was also suggested that measures be taken to develop cooperative arrangements in areas such as navigation communications and safety, meteorology, maritime research with the possibility of joint resource management without prejudice to any territorial or jurisdictional claims. Other potential trouble spots include the airspace over, and the waters of, the Straits of Malacca which are the major shipping lane between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. There are also other prime shipping lanes through the Indonesian islands that may be contested in a regional war. The most important of these are the Straits of Sunda and Lombok and have a particular economic and strategic significance. The Sunda Strait provides the most direct route between the US naval base at Subic Bay in the Philippines and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The deep water Lombok Strait (together with that of Makassar to its north) provides an alternative route to that of Malacca for the deep draught oil tankers en route from the Gulf to Japan and South Korea. The importance that Indonesia places on the Straits of Sunda and Lombok within the framework of its archipelagic outlook was demonstrated by their temporary closure in September 1988 for naval exercises in which live ammunition was used. This provoked controversy as well as diplomatic protests from various countries including the US, Australia, West Germany and Japan. These were based on grounds of the alleged contravention of the Law of the Sea Convention (which incidentally has not been ratified by the US). The Indonesian position on the issue was that while a "grey area" existed in this aspect of interpretation of the Law of the Sea, "the straits in question were undeniably part of Indonesia's archipelagic waters, and not in the same category for example as the Straits of Malacca". While such exercises have not been repeated since it is important to note their significance from the Indonesian perspective. In terms of military doctrine these two security perspectives require "the conventional capacity for archipelagic control as well as the ability to carry out counterinsurgency operations". While military alliances are incompatible with this concept (hence Indonesia's position as one of the founders of the non- aligned movement), some "forms of defence cooperation
on a bilateral basis may be entered into ...". This includes, training, exchange of intelligence information, joint border patrols etc. These
activities are routinely undertaken with the forces of other countries in the region. This has also resulted in a rationalisation of the army's territorial commands and a strengthening of the centrally controlled Strategic Reserve Command and the Special Forces Command, which have been provided with greater mobility for quick reaction to internal security problems, that is, there has been a move towards the creation of Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). These changes enable conventional forces up to brigade strength to be deployed by air anywhere in Indonesia as required. In order to give the defence forces time to organise, there exists a peoples' resistance defence
plan ( Hankamata) which entails local militias engaging and harassing insurgents. These militias have so far been led by army non- commissioned officers but these functions are now being transferred to police of similar rank and power.

The air force and navy have also been reorganised to defend the offshore oil fields and EEZ. Attention has been focussed on the development of remote bases such as those on Natuna Besar, the Riau islands and Irian Jaya. Natuna Besar's former oil company airfield has been turned over to the air force. In the Riau group a patrol boat base and an airfield for EEZ surveillance aircraft have been established. Given the security outlook as well as the force structure of Indonesia's armed forces, it is clear that there is no move towards expansionist behaviour. The implications for Australia and PNG are clear. As Harold Crouch has observed:- Indonesia has neither the political desire nor the military capacity to subjugate either Australia or PNG, although her military capacity vis- a- vis PNG is substantial. No issue in the bilateral relationship between Indonesia and Australia seems to be a potential source of serious conflict. The only potentially threatening issue is trilateral and involves PNG. The danger of conflict on the Indonesia- PNG border depends not so much on the intentions and policies towards each other of the respective governments but on the future of a non- governmental organisation over which no government exercises control. Neither the Australian nor PNG governments can do a great deal to influence the course of the OPM's development in the long run. The crucial factor lies in conditions within Irian Jaya itself. Ever since its independence in 1975, Papua New Guinea has been recognised by Indonesia as an independent and sovereign nation. Indonesia has not had any territorial disputes with PNG and its is difficult to conceive of any future claims. However, it is possible that Indonesia would be concerned (as would be Australia) if the situation in PNG degenerated to absolute anarchy or, Bougainville notwithstanding, it suffered serious secessionist challenges. So far as Bougainville is concerned, Indonesia, like Australia, has a policy of non interference. It can also be argued that with enough problems in Irian Jaya and East Timor, Indonesia has no inclination to be burdened with further political, economic and security woes. In so far as Australia is concerned, with the signing of the Timor Gap Treaty in 1989 there are no major outstanding issues between the two
countries. Relations political, economic and military have proceeded to improve steadily over the last few years. High level visits on both sides have become more frequent and have served to remove misunderstandings.