Gun Grape

(M21 Sniper)
I don't know how you come to that conclusion when the first line of the USMC statement clearly states, "...Marine Corps supports the strategic purpose of reactivating two battleships in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996"

(Gun Grape)

Because thats what the Act of 96 was about. Not bringing them back into service but putting them in Cat B storage.

(M21Sniper)
That would include when he told me that a major Defense contractor was going to begin work on guided scramjet projectiles, but could offer no immediate proof. Lo and behold, he produced a P&W document addressed to USNFSA stating that P&W was about to enter into a private venture to develop scramjet powered gun projectiles.

(Gun Grape)
No it said they were formulating a plan to verify the feesability of hypershell. Heard anything since. Granted that was only 2 1/2 yrs ago but you would think they would give an update. Nothing on google

(M21Sniper]"
A report which contradicts the USNs own findings, and the JAGs findings. Like i said, many competing theories.

(gun grape)
From the same report: GAO/T-NSIAD-90-46
"Also, we corroborated the Iowa’s former Commanding
Officer’s perception that the quality of manning on the battleships was lower than that for naval ships on average.”"

"We also identified some specific training issues. However, because training records were destroyed in the explosion, we could not reconcile the conflicting statements from the former Commanding Officer that his personnel were adequately trained on the day of the explosion and the Navy’s accident investigation report that said they were not."

Heres another quote
From GAO T-NSIAD-91-02 the end report a year later

While we did not find evidence of any systemic serviceability or safety problems aboard the battleships, we did find systemic problems with the adequacy of supervisory personnel levels, including gunners mates and fire controlmen, and problems with Navy training for 16-inch gun operations.

Also, the Navy's investigation of the incident found some safety violations aboard the Iowa and a subsequent investigation by the Navy's Inspector General confirmed that improperly approved experimentation of gunpowder and projectile combinations was being conducted on the day of the accident and had also been conducted before.

While the battleships are very capable weapons platforms and have been included in deployment schedules and operational plans, emerging circumstances limit their utility. The battleships were reactivated to alleviate existing force structure shortfalls and to help meet the 600-ship goal using existing platforms.

With their variety of guns and missiles, the battleships provide an imposing array of firepower. The Tomahawk missiles give them a significant capability for attacking land targets and other surface ships. The Harpoon missiles also contribute to the battleships' capability to operate against hostile surface ships.

-- Most likely part quoted on USNFSA--

“The battleships' 16-inch guns are the best source of naval surface fire support for an amphibious assault and are, in fact, the only guns remaining on Navy ships that are larger than 5 inches. Navy officials said that when compared to air support in an amphibious operation the 16-inch guns, within their range limitations, can deliver more firepower under a wider variety of weather conditions. Because of its
imposing size and configuration, the Navy believes a battleship's presence can be a strong deterrent in a third-world scenario.


What they left out: following paragraphs

While the battleships' Tomahawk and Harpoon missile capability is imposing, it is not unique within the Navy. Many Other Navy vessels, submarines as well as surface ships, carry those same weapons. Also, the battleships' contribution to future amphibious warfare may be limited. The 16-inch guns' current maximum range of just over 23 miles impairs the ships' ability to provide effective
naval surface fire support within the context of an "over the horizon" amphibious assault-- one launched from 25 to 50 miles offshore and extending far inland. This range limitation has been noted in Navy documents.

Finally, as the world security environment changes, because ships other than battleships have an excellent strike warfare capability, and because of limits on the battleships' ability to support a large scale amphibious assault; the Navy's need to maintain the battleships is questionable. The planned decommissioning of two battleships, including the Iowa, also raises questions about the usefulness and supportability of the other two ships in the active fleet.

Budget constraints led to the decision to decommission two of the four battleships. The battleships are costly to maintain and difficult to man and, until the ships' unique contributions in the Middle East can be evaluated, mission-related questions concerning their contributions remain.

For these reasons, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to reevaluate the battleships' utility in the light of known constraints and limitations and, unless current Middle East operations convincingly demonstrate their unique utility, direct that the Secretary of the Navy decommission the Missouri and the Wisconsin.




(M21 Sniper)
If you were there then you no doubt are aware that the Iowa operated without any spotter with direct eyes on the target. Given your background, i'm sure you know what that does for accuracy. Since then, a compliment of 5 UAVs were fitted to the Iowas as a result of the Beirut experience, and that fully corrected the problem. And regardless, the New Jersey destroyed a Syrian command bunker 10 stories underground that numerous A-6 sorties had failed to take out. We lost a couple aircraft on those failed sorties as well. The Jersey took out that complex with under a dozen 16" Mk8 AP projectiles.


(Gun Grape)

Over 30 hit the CP out of over 300 fired that day. Bet you got that under a doz number from Stearmans group also. And it wasn't just UAVs and they didn't fix the problem. Same complaints were brought up again after Desert Storm about accuracy. We not only had ground observers but fire finder radar was there also.
Don't know if they were involved in that paticular mission. Still a Lance Corporal, not high enough on the food chain to hear those discussions. Regardless they had their Mk 8 that are suppose to do the job.

But heres a question about those UAVs? If a Fixed wing manned aircraft cannot get within 120nm range to launch JSOW, as you argue, How do you expect a UAV to make it in and be used for TA?



(M21 Sniper)
We do not use TACTOMs for direct fire support now, that's not what they're made for, nor are they suitable for the role. They are also far too expensive and in too limited a supply for the role.
JSOW is not NGFS, and as such, it is inherently uncapable of fulfilling the USMCs own stated NGFS requirements.


(Gun Grape)
They are all part of the Fire Support Triad. And as it stands the Marine Corps says that BB as configured now do not meet the NSFS requirements. You seem to forget that its not just NGF that will be in the show.

(M21Sniper)
I gave you the listed lethal zone and DCZ as it appears on the USNFSA site for the various fuzings of the Mk13 projectile. If you have a manual that states the actual DCZs for all Mk13 HC projectiles regardless of fuzing as the same figure, i'd be grateful if you gave me the title of the manual, and the page number so i can verify it personally. The 2000 meter DCZ with 16" QT and Delay fuzed projectiles is completely beyond reason when viewed against the footprint of the Mk13 16" projectile and the lethal zone of QT and especialy delayed fuze projectiles. The VT fuzed projectile does have a 2000 meter DCZ. The others are 750. I've been told that many times by many people familiar with the gunnery system of the Iowas, including an Anglican Marine Sgt(later turned USAF fighter pilot) that posts at my site.


(Gun Grape)

OK, you made me dig through the seabags of useless junk to find a FM-6-30. TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR OBSERVED FIRE.

8-31. 16-INCH NAVAL GUNFIRE MISSIONS

Adjusting fire from the 16-inch guns of a battleship is somewhat different than adjusting that from the 5-inch guns.

a. Characteristics. The 16-inch gun produces a significantly larger dispersion pattern than does the 5-inch. The pattern is about 150 meters (or greater) wide and 500 meters (or greater) long. The pattern depends on the terrain, target range, and number of guns in effect. The observer should expect 2 to 5 minutes between transmitting a correction and shot of the next salvo.

Table 8-2 list DC distances as

HE Quick 1000 meters
HE /CVT or ICM 2000 meters

My notes from coronado say to use 2 thous as a rule of thumb for all 16 in. But I cannot give you a FMFM or other official reference.

FYI 5” NGF has a 750Meter DC distance. Which is also the min distance for any cal of Naval guns. Same reference FM 6-30. Guns are crappy s h o o t e r s. Just like the old M-107 175mm gun that the Army and Marines had. Long dispersion and the habit of skipping rounds. Thats why they went away when we got a decent 8" how.